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ABSTRACT

A Study of the Punishment US Federal Legislators from 1798 to 2016
by
Kenneth J. Grossberger

Advisor: Heath Brown, PhD

Public distrust of government has increased because of the criminal behavior of federal
legislators over time, due, at least in part, to the political effects on Congress (which causes
confrontation and accusation), and therefore it is critical to study how Congress deals with the
corruption of its members. This study examines the punishment of U.S. federal legislators for
criminal corruption in the context of time. This was accomplished by collecting and analyzing
original data by means of the multiple methods of binomial logistic regressions and content
analysis. The results showed that several variables were predictive of the criminal justice and
political punishment outcomes as well as providing reasons why various stakeholders thought
that those punishments were justified. The implications of this research are that relationship
between the criminal justice and the political variables can produce outcomes that help explain
the punishment of Members of Congress. The negative effects of those crimes were harmful to
Congress and such behavior damaged the credibility of the institution. This multiple-method
dissertation examines 136 observations of federal legislators. Most of the members in the dataset
were indicted, convicted and punished, and Congress needs to formulate policies that address the
illicit behaviors of those members who engaged in crime in order to protect the institution and to
reassure the public that a sense of justice prevails in the Capitol.
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INTRODUCTION
A.

Purpose of the Study

This study examines the punishment of crimes committed by U.S. federal legislators over
time. During an era of rising public distrust of government and congressional polarization, it is
important to understand how Congress deals with the malfeasance of its members. The Members
of Congress (MOCs) in this study are few in proportion to the number of all those who have
served in the U.S. Congress and are spread across political eras and political parties. The effects
of the criminal accusations and convictions of these legislators are serious and meaningful,
damaging to the perception of justice of the institution of Congress itself, and therefore the study
of the illicit behavior of these legislators is warranted and necessary. The first case in this
research was that of Rep. Matthew Lyon, accused of treason in 1798, which is why the study
starts with that year. The last case was that of Rep. Chaka Fattah, who was accused of influence
peddling, money laundering and other charges in 2016.
A comprehensive exploration of this topic requires analysis of elements of both criminal
justice and political science. This is primarily a study of the retribution against the criminal
MOCs, but the political context (both procedural and electoral) cannot be overlooked as having a
critical effect on the one important dependent variable punishment, which falls into two types:
criminal justice (e.g. prison, probation, fines, restitution) and political (loss of seat in Congress
by resignation, expulsion, loss of election).1 In most cases, when MOCs were punished by the
criminal justice system, they were forced out of office by various means (112 members in this
study lost power).

1

The loss of power variable is based on the “premature departure” from Congress thus, for example, the loss of a
committee chair does not rise to the ultimate severity level of losing one’s seat in Congress (Dagnes and Sachleben,
2014, p. 52).

The essential objective for this dissertation is to study the punishment of MOCs who
were accused of crimes. The 136 observations in the study’s population are drawn from over
12,000 who have served in Congress or less than two percent of the total population of those who
have held congressional office (US House of Representatives, 2015), but despite the small
number of members who were accused of committing crimes, this study postulates a loss of
confidence in political institutions and the democratic process due to such behavior2.
If there is a common thread to the study of political crimes in the institution of the
American Congress it is Judge John Noonan’s definition of bribery as an “illicit exchange”
(1984, p. 685), which underscores the criminal intent of these politicians. The concept of
criminality is critical to the construct of accusation, the entry point for MOCs into the criminal
justice process (and this study). However, the definition of illicit has changed depending on
circumstances: eras, new laws, and public acceptability3. If corruption is accepted behavior in
certain circumstances (and therefore not punished), is it still corruption, notwithstanding that
later standards may deem it so?
The political environment may allow corrupt behavior, and may even reward it, but at
some point, whether through some reform effort or by popular demand (or both), new standards
are formulated, the offenders may commit illegal acts, and prosecutions may result. However,
the question of acceptability is defined by the process by which government, or the law, may
move from punishment to prevention4 (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p.18), leading to policy
outcomes only possible by the workings of the very institution in which the corrupt MOCs
"’The allegations contained in today's indictment represent a betrayal of the public trust for personal gain,’ said
U.S. Attorney Eric H. Holder Jr. ‘Congressman Rostenkowski used his elective office to perpetrate extensive fraud
on the American people’" (Thomas, 1994).
3
Noonan (1984, xi) claims that the “elements” of the bribe “change with the culture” and “contract or expand with
conventions, laws, practices.”
4
Anechiarico and Jacobs in this reference talk about “reform movements” that attempt to “transform and improve
the efficient functioning of government” that might mitigate the need to punish wayward politicians.
2

2

operate. The review of the literature in this type of offending ranges from the generic (the theory
and concept of corruption) to the specific (cases involving federal legislators) showing the facets
of public corruption and its corrosive effects on government institutions and society.
The dependent variables in this dissertation’s Chapter IV are the binary criminal and
political punishments suffered by many of these politicians. The importance of these outcomes
is that all of the offenders in this study were accused of various crimes and, whether ultimately
held accountable or not, at some point their actions crossed the legal line by which the offense
was determined. The concept of “crossing the line” is paramount in the consideration of a case
for this study (Cambridge Idioms, 2006). But this concept means more than just socially
unacceptable, it is the defining point in the “contours of crime” wherein a legislator chooses to
transgress (Katz, 1988, p. 317). For each MOC the choice involved deciding where the line was,
or to deny there even was a line. In their desire for power, money, sex and other forms of
gratification legislators yielded to the seduction of the congressional environment at the time
they made their decisions to offend (Katz, 1988, p.4). Most of these legislators may have
rationalized their behavior, even though as federal lawmakers, they presumably knew better
(Sykes & Matza, 1957; Festinger, 1956, p.2). For most, despite denials and rationalizations,
their guilt was manifest to the stakeholders involved. These perceptions highlighted the crucial
difference between members of Congress and other types of offenders when there were
accusations of wrongdoing. When a member of Congress engages in corrupt behavior, it
implicates the institution itself, highlighting the need to protect our public institutions. The
following analyses show that both criminal justice and political outcomes may be explained by
political factors like party and polarization. Considering the major theories of criminal justice,
the outcomes of these cases and the motivations and concerns of various stakeholders suggest

3

that deterrence is not a rationale for punishment in this context. Rather, the evidence firmly
points towards a political rationale—the maintenance of institutional integrity—for punishment,
flowing from an implication of mediated corruption theory.
B.

Background of the Problem

A number of the cases in this data set have been closely studied. Two prominent
examples of this institutional corruption are ABSCAM (short for Arab scam) wherein the
Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested six members of the House of Representatives and one
Senator (all of whom were later convicted) for bribery (Grossman, 2003, pp. 1-3), and the House
Banking Scandal, where four Members of Congress were convicted of fraud and conspiracy
(Yost, 2005).5 The cases of these eleven MOCs point to the need for the punishment of these
crimes. The members involved were, in ABSCAM, Sen. Harrison Williams, Rep. Raymond
Lederer, Rep. Michael Myers, Rep. Frank Thompson, Rep. John Murphy, Rep. Richard Kelly
and Rep. John Jenrette; and in the House Banking Scandal, Rep. Carroll Hubbard, Rep. Donald
Lukens, Rep. Mary Rose Oakar, and Rep. Carl C. Perkins.
This study examines the observations of 136 Members of Congress who were accused of
crimes. This research puts criminal activity by legislators in historical context through a review
of cases from the eighteenth century to 2016. The analysis takes on two forms, binomial logistic
regression and content analysis. The binomial logistic regressions considers two dependent
variables, the severity of the punishment of the members convicted, and loss of power of the
members accused. The content analysis chapter examines the reasons why members should be
punished, looking at various stakeholder comments on the observations of four of the most

5

Seventeen members in the House Banking Scandal were “serial violators,” according to the House Ethics Committee, and of
those eleven retired or were defeated in the next election (Dagnes and Sachleben, 2014, p. 7).

4

punished legislators in the study. These members, like most of those in the dataset, lost their
seats at the ballot box, resigned under pressure or were removed.
The Washington political environment had a significant effect on legislators as it tended
to enforce a conforming behavior on federal legislators. The cultural mandate implied by the
saying “to get along, go along” became the prevalent motivator6. The situationally induced
notion of playing ball, and sometimes getting swept away in the Congressional power
environment (i.e. deal-doing and negotiating with lobbyists, politicians and various stakeholders)
was powerful. Rewards flowed sometimes without consciousness of consequences7.
This research contributes to the literature in that this universe of cases has not been
studied before. It is important to understand how and why these crimes were punished and the
two scandals mentioned above, along with the other observations, indicated a moral breakdown
that affected Congress and typified this form of corruption. A crime by a member may be an
individual failing but may also be perceived as an institutional problem. Therefore, this work
focuses on the punishments of MOCs as the particular phenomena to be investigated.
C.

Significance of the Study

The purpose of this study is to show that the harm done by the transgressions of criminal
legislators creates institutional issues with which Congress and the criminal justice system must
contend. The damage done to the political system was expressed in the comments by Sen. Bill
Bradley in 1982 during Senate consideration of the expulsion of Sen. Harrison Williams (D-NJ)
for bribery in the ABSCAM scandal. Sen. Bradley argued that there was reduced public trust in
elected officials in that “embarrassing behavior becomes unacceptable behavior with regard to

Speaker Sam Rayburn’s famous quote, see New York Times, November 17, 1963.
The rewards here refers to the benefits of the illicit exchange. The dissonance refers to the consequences, not their
actions.
6
7

5

the Senate’s institutional integrity” and that “bribery inverts and mocks the democratic process
turning it upon itself” (Katzmann, 1991, p. 387). Sen. Bradley added that the fundamental harm
done by these MOCs is that “it is at the core of the democratic government – the faith people
extend to political institutions” (Katzmann, 1991, p. 387). Sen. Bradley then voted in favor of
the motion for the expulsion of Sen. Williams, the senior senator from his state and ironically his
political mentor. Echoing this sentiment, the judge in the case of Rep. George Hanson stated, “if
the people who make the laws can’t obey them who can be expected to obey them” (Valley
Morning Star, 1975). Noonan (1984, p. xxiii) concluded that the actions of those engaged in
bribery “always subvert the trust that accompanies public office and distinguishes office from
power.” This issue is further explored in Chapter V as citizen stakeholder comments are
examined. The apparent distrust of government, and the damage done to political institutions
that criminally corrupt legislators cause, warrant this study.
D.

Theoretical Framework
1.

Research Questions

This study answers the following research questions:
How do stakeholders respond to MOC convictions?
What factors are related to the punishment of MOCs by the criminal justice system and the
institution of Congress?
What are the theories of justice used by the criminal justice system and Congress?

2.

Theories
a)

Deterrence

Deterrence is the concept of dissuading individuals from committing criminal acts
(Williams & Hawkins, 1986, p. 545-546). However, the criminal justice literature shows that
6

punishment only moderately or weakly provides any deterrence for would be offenders (Pratt, et
al., 2009, p. 368; Pratt, et al., 2009, p. 370; Von Hirsch et al, 1999, p. 26; Paternoster, 2010, p.
766). The basis for increasing the sanctions is to dissuade the offender (specific deterrence) as
well as others (general deterrence) from committing similar transgressions (Williams &
Hawkins, 1986, p. 545-546). While a linchpin of the criminal justice system, there is not much
empirical evidence to prove that deterrence is effective (Paternoster, 2010, p. 766).8 The
literature shows that there have been a variety of criminal justice and political punishments
assessed against MOCS, from probation and minor fines to long prison sentences, and also
removal from office, without much apparent deterrent effect.
MOCs were not deterred from criminal behavior as supported by the literature. As white
collar criminals (referred to in section II.B.2) “they [don’t] have to follow the rules because they
made them” (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006, p. 67) and that they operated in an “ethos of
entitlement” (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006, p.68). House Speaker Dennis Hastert commented
that Rep. Cunningham’s sentence should send "’a strong message’ that nobody is above the law”
(CNN, 2006). U.S. Attorney Dana J. Boente commented that Rep. Jefferson’s case “shows that
that no person, not even a congressman, is above the law" (Markon & Schulte, 2009). Rep. Doc
Hastings stated that, in reference to Rep. Traficant’s expulsions hearings, “whether we like it or
not, in recent years too many Americans have come to believe that holding high office means a
person gets to play by different rules than everyone else” (Congressional Record, 2002). In the
case of Sen. Williams, US Attorney Thomas Puccio stated that “using your office, using your
influence, to make money, [is] something which you are not permitted by law to do” (Katzmann,

Paternoster, in his meta-analysis of deterrence cited above stated that “we do not have very solid and credible
empirical evidence that deterrence through the imposition of criminal sanctions works very well.”
8

7

1991, p. 307). This dissertation will show that deterrence theory does not adequately support an
explanation of the punishments of federal legislators.
b)

Mediated Corruption

Political or institutional corruption can be mediated by political agents9 (Thompson,
1993). The Theory of Mediated Corruption, as proffered by Thompson (1993) is useful as it
explains the connection between MOC behavior and a relevant political theory. The potentially
criminogenic environment of Congress becomes more fertile ground for accusation and
indictment as the increased political struggle for party control of the institution enhances the
scrutiny of illicit behavior of legislators. The Theory of Mediated Corruption states that political
or institutional corruption may be facilitated by agents exogenous to an exchange that might
otherwise not have been illicit, or might not have occurred (Thompson, 1993). This study will
show that the theory helps explain the role of the power environment of Congress as a facilitator
of illicit behavior.
3.

Hypothetical Propositions

The hypothetical propositions in this study are drawn from both criminal justice and
political science. The four propositions are:
1. Punishment is increased based on the increased seriousness of crime
2. Punishment is treated the same across time
3. Punishment is mediated through politics
4. Punishment is contingent on the perception of crime
The first proposition is that punishment is treated differently based on the seriousness of
crime. Deterrence Theory (DT) may provide an explanation for differential punishments by
showing that potential offenders were more concerned with the consequences of their actions

9

In this case Congress, as a matter of political agency. Congress was a facilitator of corrupt behavior.

8

than the possible gain from those actions10. The literature shows that there were a variety of
criminal justice and political sanctions assessed against MOCS, from probation and minor fines
to long prison sentences, and also removal from office. The severity of punishment of MOCS
was the result of the seriousness of the crimes, and the loss of power (LOP) also resulted from
the members being accused, indicted and convicted of infractions.
INSERT TABLE A.1 – CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION TREE
The second proposition is that punishment relative to the severity of the offence has
remained consistent across time, and Deterrence Theory is suggested. This research primarily
considers severity as the potentially relevant means of gauging punishment. The contention for
the proposition is that MOCs may have been punished similarly for like offenses throughout
history. If, on the other hand, punishment has varied across time, then there would be evidence
that the criminal justice system and Congressional leadership may have shifted as well. The
concept of time may prove to be critical to the understanding of the interaction of the variables.
The third proposition is that punishment is mediated through politics, and the theoretical
consideration is the Theory of Mediated Corruption (see Thompson, 1993). Thompson states
that political or institutional corruption can be mediated, or in this case brought about, by
political agents. In the case of the Keating Five, a 1995 political scandal, Thompson’s prime
example of the theory, the meditators were five US Senators11 (Thompson, 1993). Congressional
polarization and the polarization scores of individual members are political factors that support

von Hirsch, et al. (1999) state that deterrence is the “avoidance of a given action through fear of the perceived
consequences” and that these consequences are “extrinsic” as they result from the “actions of others,” in this case
the CRJ system and Congress.
11
Senators John Glenn (D-OH), Don Riegle (D-MI), John McCain (R-AZ), Alan Cranston (D-CA) and Dennis
DeConcini (D-AZ). Thompson contends that the actions of these senators mediated the corruption in this case,
analogous to Congress mediating the corruption of some of its members. This is a question of agency or facilitation,
whether by an individual or an institution.
10

9

such mediation, which in turn may influence criminal justice punishments and the degree to
which offenders lose political power.
The fourth proposition is that punishment is contingent on the perception of crime. The
perception of the congressional leaders of their members’ criminal acts may be understood by
their desire to protect the institution of Congress and to hold onto power, and it is critical to these
leaders that members be dissuaded from such unacceptable behavior. This proposition may be
analyzed by looking at MOC punishment before and after 1974, the year of the Watergate era
reforms. This proposition is further analyzed by the content analysis in Chapter V.
The popular perception of congressional integrity in general was shaped by individual
cases, such as that of Rep. Andrew Hinshaw, accused of bribery in a prior position (New York
Times, 1977), in that “the public could infer that this one instance reflected a larger pattern of
self-enrichment by our public officials, and was exceptional only in that the congressman was
caught” (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, p. 7). The negative electoral consequences of the
appearance of impropriety, let alone crime, suggest that “involvement in even a minor scandal
can feed voters’ suspicions and undermine trust” (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, p. 67).
E.

Methodology
1.

Design of the Study – Multiple Methods

This study uses a multiple methods approach including quantitative regressions to
analyze both criminal justice and political punishments, and a content analysis to deduce the
rationales different stakeholders expressed regarding sanctions for various offenses. The
argument for using multiple methods is that with such a sequential design, the second method
explains what the first could not, and thus is needed (Miller, 2006, p. 29-33). This may still

10

leave certain weaknesses in the study, as the sample size is small, and deterrence theory may be
ineffective in explaining the rationale for the punishment of these federal legislators.
2.

Quantitative Methods

This study will use methods that determine the significance of the relationships between
the independent variables (IVs) and the dependent variables and also analyze the statistical
strength of the binary punishments.
The first proposition, punishment is treated differently based on the seriousness of crime,
will be analyzed by comparing punishments by offense using a dichotomous scale dividing the
MOCs’ punishments into severe and non-severe categories, and then testing the assumption
using a binomial logistic regression. The second proposition, punishment is the same for a
related offense, across time, will be analyzed by comparing the various punishments over the
time period of the cases, and testing it by means of a binomial logistic regression. The third
proposition, punishment is mediated through politics, will be analyzed by comparing political
variables for majority/minority membership, congressional polarization, member party unity
scores of the individual Members of Congress (MOCs), and tenure of the accused members, and
then testing them using binomial logistic regressions for the variables. The fourth proposition,
punishment is contingent on the perception of crime, will be analyzed by comparing punishment
before and after 1974, and punishment during eras of high congressional polarization, and then
testing them by means of binomial logistic regressions.
3.

Content Analysis

A content analysis will be used to confirm or to provide additional reasons for the various
stakeholders’ need for sanctioning the criminal behavior of members. Key words and phrases
taken from statements made by stakeholders (i.e. MOCs, congressional leaders, judges,

11

prosecutors, journalists, authors and law enforcement officials) regarding the punishments
assessed against the most severely punished MOCs will be examined and coded in order to
perform a content analysis from which inferences may be drawn. These inferences will add to,
confirm, strengthen or supplement those made from the quantitative analysis.
4.

Value of the Study

This is a unique data set involving federal legislators who were accused of crimes. The
combination of criminal justice and political variables used to determine political and criminal
punishments has also not been found in the literature. The loss of power as a punishment
balances the criminal justice sanction of the severity of punishment, and the analysis of
stakeholder comments about those punishments sheds light on the reasons why those
stakeholders felt such punishments were necessary. The suggested findings were that crime type
mattered, in that instrumental crime (rationally based) was more of a consideration than
expressive crime (emotionally based) and helped explain the difference between crimes
considered to be reflective of the institution and those that were expressive were more indicative
of individual failings. The discussion of the significance of forced resignation as a punishment
shed light on the political realities facing members who were accused.
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II.

LITERATURE REVIEW
A.

How the Literature Informs Theory

The literature in the area of political corruption in general, and of these legislators in
particular, implies that deterrence is a major factor in the prosecution of this kind of criminal
behavior, and that the accused legislator is seriously concerned with prosecution, punishment and
the political effects thereof (loss of power).
On the political side the Theory of Mediated Corruption was not found in the MOC
literature but may be relevant for the theoretical proposition punishment is mediated through
politics and is therefore included in this study.
It is important to understand how and why these crimes were punished and how Congress
managed the issues of justice related to these offenses. The scandals mentioned herein12, along
with the other cases, reveal a failure of the members’ duty to the institution that typify this form
of corruption.
The major themes for this literature review are assessed here.
B.

Corruption, White Collar Crime and Case Literature
1.

Corruption

The collection of articles on various topics on corruption in Heidenheimer & Johnston
(2002) is useful as background on political misconduct and surveyed scholarly perspectives on
corruption by elected officials. It established conceptual and definitional parameters and
considered the political context of official corruption. It presented the institutional impacts of
corrupt acts and thus was source material for framing this dissertation’s research. It refers to a
1964 essay by Bayless Manning, then Dean of the Stanford University Law School, called The
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Watergate, the House Post Office Scandal, ABSCAM, Koreagate, Credit Mobilier, the House banking scandal,
Oregon land fraud, Wedtech
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Purity Potlatch (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 7) ”the actors in the political drama…appear
more than life-sized, establishing, declaring, and appearing to live in accordance with standards
that are not of this world…. we therefore demand ultimate moral pronouncements from our
parties and our officials.”13 Manning suggests we expect too much from our public officials.
Many of the authors in the Heidenheimer and Johnson text seek to clarify the definition of
corruption in light of this conceptual challenge.
A paper by Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye provides a rationale of corruption that
Heidenheimer suggests has been widely used in social science: “behavior which deviates from
the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding, pecuniary or status gains; or
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Heidenheimer
& Johnston, 2002, p.26; Nye, 1967, p. 966). Nye uses such examples as bribery, nepotism, and
misappropriation. Heidenheimer stresses that the key concept in Nye’s definition includes the
main element of officials acting in a public capacity. Also, the officials’ gain may not
necessarily be monetary or material, they may be protecting their political positions by corruptly
violating rules (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 45), alluding to the need to hold onto to
power. Mark Philp’s definition includes the concept of a “violation of trust,” compounded by an
act that “harms the public interest” and “exploits the office” for illegitimate reasons
(Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 42). His definition includes the unethical nature of an
exchange that contravenes the obligation a public official has towards duty, office and the law.
Heidenheimer & Johnston (2002, p. 150-151) discuss unlawful acts by public officials ranging
from “petty corruption” (doing various favors for friends such as “fixing parking tickets”),

The original book “The Purity Potlatch” by Bayless Manning is out of print, but the quote was found in the
Anechiarico and Jacobs article and in the Heidenheimer text.
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“routine corruption” (political contributions in exchange for considerations), and “aggravated
corruption” (which result in political scandals and major crimes by political machines).
The decision by a politician to engage in corrupt activities was a matter of risk, as defined
by political scientist Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978, p. 31). She offered a formula for the decision
by a politician to engage in a corrupt act based on the rational actor theory: “if the benefits of
corruption minus the probability of being caught times the penalties for being caught is greater
than the benefits of not being corrupt, then the rational individual will be corrupt,” personal
ethics notwithstanding (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 631). This construct is similar to the
rational choice calculation for deterrence theory (Akers, 1994, p. 133 and 140). Rose-Ackerman
(1978, p. 40) offered the policy solution that corruption may be controlled by increasing the
probability that the corrupt individual will be punished, similar to the construct of the certainty of
punishment in deterrence theory.
The Heidenheimer & Johnston text also contained articles that emphasized the need for
political education. They mentioned James Q. Wilson’s (1966, p. 31) contention that the
fragmentation of American political systems provided opportunities for politicians to escape
scrutiny in their corrupt activities. Wilson’s noted that “men steal when there is a lot of money
lying around loose and no one is looking”14 (Wilson, 1966, p. 35), pointing out the opportunistic
underpinnings that provide much of the rationale for corrupt behavior. Heidenheimer &
Johnston concluded that government itself can induce corruption and that the “theoretical and
empirical linkage” revealed by their study shows that the cost-benefit calculation was primary in
the decision processes for those who chose to cross the line of official corruption (Heidenheimer
& Johnston, 2002, p. 642). Rose-Ackerman (1978, p. 31) summed up this nexus of MOC
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Dan Ariely, in Predictable Irrationality (2008, p.54 ), explains how, when one has the opportunity to get
something for “free” one typically ignores the downside of the transaction.
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interests: “…corruption occurs at the interface of the public and private sectors.15 Whenever a
public official has discretionary power over a benefit or cost, incentives for bribery are
created.”16
Former federal judge John T. Noonan (1984) wrote a lengthy treatise on bribery as the
prototypical form of corruption (and the crime most committed by MOCS). He states that while
the absence of admissions was common, and the deceit inherent, the behavior was pervasive,
occurring in almost every society and in every era. Yet despite its negative connotations, bribery
was not always considered illegal. His work contains a significant discussion of the definitions
of bribery (depending on culture and era), including his summary definition: “the improper
reciprocation with an officeholder for an act intended by society to be gratuitous” (Noonan,
1984, xi), or using a public office to leverage a transaction for personal gain. He outlines the
following rationalizations (p. 684-693), reminiscent of Sykes & Matza’s (1957) techniques of
neutralization:
1. “Everybody does it” - Noonan refers to such actions in numerous eras and societies
indicating the pervasiveness of illicit exchanges. This is the most common
rationalization.
2. “It is necessary to do it.” This is the suggestion of survival, in business or in politics,
implying a need. Speaker Sam Rayburn’s famous dictum (perhaps more dictate than
advice) to new representatives was “to get along, go along” (New York Times, 1963).
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The Federal criminal case of Gov. Bob McDonnell of Virginia, whose conviction was overturned by the Supreme
Court, was the subject of comments by former lobbyist Jack Abramoff which underscored the relationship between
public office and private gain. The New York Times article captures the dilemma of mediated corruption: “To many
observers, the court essentially said that a politician can be found guilty of corruption only if the government can
definitively show an official ‘quo’ in response to a benefactor’s ‘quid’ — a very high bar in a world of winks and
nods” (Hulse, 2016).
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About 53% of the cases in this study involved bribery and acceptance of an illegal gratuity (bribery with intent not
established, see Receiving Illegal Gratuity by a Public Official, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (n.d.).
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Rayburn’s words underscore the institutional cultural effects, or about how Congress
does business.
3. “Reciprocities are formally indistinguishable.” This is the blurry line argument that so
many public officials used in that many types of bribery seemed to be non-corrupt
exchanges. The difficulty is in formulating “satisfactory criteria” for what a society
deemed to be “prohibited” acts, given shifting cultural norms and bases of acceptability.
4. “It is immorally enforced.” The author refers to the inconsistencies inherent in the
hypocritical ways the rules against bribery were only sometimes enforced or where
bribery was situationally or cultural allowed or mandated.
5. “The material effect …is either trivial or undemonstrated.” This argument essentially
suggests that no real harm is done and that bribery in many cases amounts to no more
than a societal “taboo.” This moral logic is the same as arguing that pilfering really is not
stealing or is a victimless crime.
The author contends that, whatever the rationalization, the future of the bribe remains
problematic because whatever the level of relative unacceptability the act itself is “universally
shameful,” is a “sellout” to the public, is a “betrayal of trust” and contravenes a “divine
paradigm.” “Bribery is a legal concept” states the author, thus the punishment comes from the
law, but enforceability is an issue and remains selective in that the proscription of such illegal
reciprocity depended on accepted cultural and contextual notions. While bribery itself is
“criminal and consensual” the motivations are often political and personal. Bribery is
characterized by “intentionality, form and context,” again depending on era and culture. Laws
were created when cultures were driven by religious or political motivations since transgressors
of such legal boundaries had to be held accountable, witness the fact that there was no specific
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Federal law against bribery in the 19th century in the United States as offenders were, during that
time, prosecuted for corruption.17 This area of law has seen a steady increase of new legislation,
leaving a bigger and more definitive line, and a wider net, and thus more politicians were
brought into the criminal justice process on this legal basis as time progressed. Laws clarified
the difference between a benign gift and an illicit quid pro quo, indicating that a causal link to an
illegal act had been established (Noonan, 1984, p.702-705).
Thus, the bribe in the conceptual sense is an “inducement improperly influencing the
performance of a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised” (Noonan, 1984, p. xi)
which renders misbehaving politicians culpable and convictable (also Sutherland’s construct, see
Sutherland, 1940). The many ways in which bribes were conceived and exchanged may have
revealed the cleverness of the transgressors but did not mitigate the criminality. Noonan (1984,
p. 605-620) uses numerous historical examples of bribery with several subjects from this study.
He recounts the Credit Mobilier scandal of the 19th century involving Rep. Oakes Ames, Rep.
James Brooks (both in this study’s dataset) and others. ABSCAM prosecutors secured the
convictions of six Congressmen (John Jenrette, John Murphy, Raymond Lederer, Richard Kelly,
Michael Myers and Frank Thompson) and one United States senator (Harrison Williams).18 All
accepted cash or other substantive interests in return for helping their business “partners” (FBI
agents posing as Arab sheiks) further their enterprises, resulting in prosecutions under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and various sections of Title 18 of the United States Code
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The earliest Federal bribery statute that could be found, 18USC201, was enacted in 1962 as Public Law 87-849
(Govinfo.gov, n.d. ). But Noonan (1995, p. 601) said “no statute with regard to bribery applicable to Congress
existed before 1852. No convictions were obtained before the 20 th century.”
18

In contrast to the thinking that all politicians are corrupt, Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD), also targeted by the FBI in
the ABSCAM investigation but refusing to take the bait and stated to the agents posing as Arab sheiks ”wait a
minute, what you are suggesting may be illegal.” He then tried to report the incident to the FBI when he was
informed of the investigation. News anchor Walter Cronkite called him a hero but Pressler responded “what have
we come to if turning down a bribe is heroic?” (Carlson, 2014).
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(Noonan, 1984, p. 677-680). All received prison sentences and either resigned or lost their seats
in Congress in the next election). As Noonan suggested, bribery had a negative effect on
political activity when it produced a higher consequence of “economic exploitation” as agreed to
by a public official.
The collection of examples in the text reveals the soft but significant underbelly of
political corruption, however innocuous the persuasion. Noonan refers to bribery’s “entrances
and exits in the (political) system” suggesting a linear process although such behavior was
frequently recycled by offenders and copied by others. But whether willingly engaged, or
economically exploited, the public officials involved were substantively involved in criminal
activity and were often prosecuted. Noonan highlights the unacceptability of corrupt behavior
and its effects on the body politic and political institutional integrity, a notion similar to
Anechiarico & Jacobs’ (1996) statement that “corruption undermines citizens’ confidence in and
commitment to the commonweal and can even destroy the legitimacy of the political system.”
The cases of corrupt federal legislators have had a consequential effect on the institution the
legislators served in.
2.

White Collar Crime

Criminality, as defined by Edward Sutherland, is the quality of being convictable,
whether or not the accused was actually convicted (Sutherland, 1940).19 Corrupt politicians are
white collar criminals, by Sutherland’s definition, as they compare to businesspeople who are
“respectable,” come from the “upper class” and have similar motivations. Sutherland
specifically referred to politicians in his definition of white-collar crime: “white-collar
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Convictability and criminality are precursors to accusation (the entry point for MOCs in this study) in that
prosecutors understand that accusation is usually not practical without the chance of a conviction and that a criminal
state of mind must typically be present for prosecution to proceed.
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criminality in politics, which is generally recognized as fairly prevalent, has been used by some
as a rough gauge by which to measure white-collar criminality in business” (Sutherland, 1940).
Further, he contends that criminal politicians could escape punishment because they
could affect criminal laws and the criminal justice system to their benefit, recognizing that such
politicians control the political process, and the laws, thus possibly feeling more emboldened to
engage in corrupt behavior (Sutherland, 1940). Sutherland’s critical argument is that white
collar crime, and in this case crime by politicians, could be defined in terms of its criminality
whether or not the elected official was punished for the crimes committed (Sutherland, 1940).
The concept of criminality, the intent to commit a crime that would have resulted in a conviction
had it been prosecuted, is central to the theoretical underpinnings by which a federal legislator is
included in this study. This political version of white-collar crime has caused much damage to
the “social fabric,” and added a social cost, in that these crimes “create distrust…which lowers
social morale and produces social disorganization” (Sutherland, 1940). The intent of these
corrupt politicians is as manifest as their business counterparts as it usually involved “bribery of
public officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favorable contracts and legislation…”
(Sutherland, 1940). Elected federal officials hold a special place in American culture, and while
accusations against them may be few in number, the criminality of some was evident, and the
effects of such criminal behavior were noted by various stakeholders. Corruption is specifically
defined for such politicians and “only involves the behavior of an official in his or her public
role” (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p.26).
Shover & Hochstetler (2006, p. 52), in their work on white collar crime, suggest that such
offenders “…. are more advantaged by material circumstances and respectability” and thus may
feel a sense of privilege in that they may be above scrutiny and prosecution. The authors imply
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that much of white-collar crime is not reported, thus what is known may be only part of the
problem. They also note that white collar crime occurred, in many cases, when “ambition
eclipsed rationality” (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006, p. 66), that some such criminals think “they
[don’t] have to follow the rules because they made them” (p. 67) and that they suffered from a
working in an “ethos of entitlement” (p. 68). Opportunity theory states that ”…illegal
opportunities and how to exploit them guiltlessly [are] part of the collective ethos” which
suggests that the environmental pressures in Congress to do deals and to conform to anticipated
political behavior may have helped to create such advantage-taking (Shover and Hochstetler,
2006, p. 117). The process of engagement between an MOC and a lobbyist or another member
seemed to have become a potentially routinized crime-inducing relationship over time (63 of the
136 cases in this study’s dataset involve bribery/illegal gratuity and span eras from 1857 to
2007). While there were rules and laws in place the “differential power and authority” in
Congress resulted in a “tendentious goal displacement” (of what would typically be attributed to
a legislator), which “trumped normative constraints” such as criminal laws and Congressional
ethics rules (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006, p. 119). The environmentally driven pathological
proclivities of some legislators to offend showed that “performance pressure and the presence of
criminogenic cultural conditions have been linked repeatedly to increased likelihood that
criminal choices will be made” (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006, p. 119). Some legislators may
have conflated legislative goals with personal gain hoping to benefit from official disinterest, a
notion suggesting that there may have been fewer prosecutions in some eras. This sense of the
institutional avoidance of punishing members may have been the result of these “criminogenic
cultural conditions” resulting from the environmental pressures to conform to the deal making
practices that sometimes drove legislators to offend, and a rationality of behavior that led to
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corruption with the resulting costs to the institution as well as to the offenders. This helps
explain the environmental conditions in which the MOCS operated, and the political character of
Congress.
C.

Accusation, Indictment, Conviction, Punishment

The corruption case of U.S. Sen. Harrison Williams illustrates the criminal justice
process, from investigation through imprisonment.20 The case takes on added significance
because it involved a ranking legislator, thus highlighting the unacceptability of criminal
behavior of elected officials in the highest-level legislative body and the status issue commented
on by other stakeholders. Senator Bill Bradley, in his remarks on the senate floor on the
institutional integrity issue during the debate on the question of Sen. Williams’ expulsion, stated
“it is our constitutional responsibility, as senators, to assess our colleague’s action by standards
we hold for ourselves” (Katzmann, 1991, p.386). Historically other senators accused of bribery
and facing expulsion either resigned or lost at an election prior to a Senate vote. Harrison
Williams was the first sitting senator to face expulsion on bribery charges and the vote by the
Senate would have been precedent setting. But the evidence against him was clear and
convincing, and, having lost his case in federal court, and having argued strenuously on the
Senate floor until the last moment, he resigned the day before the vote rather than face the shame
of expulsion. Sen. Bradley asked, “have the senator’s actions reduced public confidence in
elected officials?” (Katzmann, 1991, p. 387). The U.S. Senate voted fifteen times for expulsion
of their own members throughout history and four resigned or lost the next election before the
expulsion vote (Grossman, 2013, p. 382). Like the others, Sen. Williams was accused of having
“abused a position of trust” and taking advantage of a “criminal opportunity” (Katzmann, 1991p.

The Katzmann (1991) text is essentially a case study of Sen. Harrison Williams’ prosecution, trial and
punishment.
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298-307). The Williams case is an instructive example of a MOC engaging in criminal conduct,
getting caught and being prosecuted, and suffering very serious criminal justice consequences
and the sanction of the loss of power. This case helps explain two of the theoretical propositions
explained later in this dissertation: punishment is treated differently based on the seriousness of
crime21, and punishment is mediated through politics22. Certainly Sen. Williams was harshly
punished, sentenced to three years in Federal prison and having been forced to resign his Senate
seat. Also, the sense of the Senate was that Sen. Williams must be punished for the reasons
stated by Sen. Bill Bradley above.
D.

Politics and Political Effects

Scandals are central to the theme of political corruption and many provided cases for, or
supported cases in, this research (e.g. ABSCAM, Wedtech). Such scandals had serious political
effects on the MOCS involved (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, xi). The definition of scandal
involves four components: “transgression”, “concealment”, “public denunciation” and
“reputation damage” (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, p. 3-4). The issue is that damage to a
politician’s reputation usually results in the loss of power by means of losing the next election or
by resignation. The cases in these scandals involved crimes committed by MOCS in this study:
bribery, misuse of funds, embezzlement, converting campaign contributions for private use, and
other crimes (including the notable cases of, among others, representatives William Jefferson,
Bob Ney, James Hasting, Tom DeLay, Randy Cunningham, and Jesse Jackson, Jr.).
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From the most seriously punished such as Rep. Cooley who was fined over $4 million with 13 months in prison
for money laundering (Pettersson, 2012) and Rep. Mel Reynolds who was sentenced to 78 months in prison for bank
fraud (Mahdan, 2018), to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski who was sentenced to 17 months in prison and fined $135,000 for
mail fraud (Law Center, 2004).
22
As stated earlier political agents can be the mediators of corrupt behavior (Thompson, 2003).
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Political scandals, such as the Credit Mobilier affair of 1873 (involving two observations
in this study) and ABSCAM (involving seven observations), were the bases for many of the
cases used in this research (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, p. 5). These scandals provided details on
the loss of power variable. The political effects of these scandals, while compromising the ability
of the accused legislators to remain in power, also damaged the perception of Congress as such
incidents correlate with a “broader patterns of politics with significant institutional
consequences” (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, p. 46). The authors also discuss the loss of power
construct in terms of the “premature departure” (from Congress) (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, p.
52) phenomenon by means of resignation (forced or voluntary, but the politician usually had
little practical choice), loss of the next election, reelection abnegation23 (choosing not to run,
again with little choice as a loss would be near certain, although some ran for reelection
anyway), retirement, expulsion or exclusion (the prevention of a member taking a seat in the next
Congress), or the threat thereof, almost always forcing the politician’s resignation rather than
their having to face the ignominy of removal (Dagnes & Sachleben, 2014, p.52). This forced
resignation phenomenon is a recurrent theme in the literature involving the criminality of federal
legislators as a key component of the loss of power consequence. The Grossman (2003) and
Long (2007) texts cite numerous examples, and in this study forced resignation is recognized as a
form of punishment. Noonan (1984, p. xxiii), in his discussion of bribery sanctions, states that
“political sanctions…(including) forced resignation from office (along with loss of promotion)
are frequently invoked.” The case of Robert Garcia, a Member of Congress from the Bronx, New
York, provides an example of the nexus between criminality and resignation. Garcia was
indicted in Federal court 1988, (in the Wedtech bribery scandal), and was convicted in 1989. His
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Abnegation in the sense of refusing (Merriam Webster, n.d.).
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first conviction was overturned, he was retried, convicted again and then his second conviction
was also overturned (Grossman, 2003, p. 139), both cases having been heard by a Federal
appellate court (Grossman, 2003, p.139; United States Court of Appeals 1993). However, he
resigned his seat in Congress in January of 1990. Garcia’s appeals victories exonerated him of
the crimes, but did they mitigate the criminality? Having resigned the damage was done to his
career and his reputation. Katzmann (1991. p.349) stated that resignation was a “collateral
consequence” and resulted in a loss of power.
Congress for many years functioned on the seniority system, whereby a member rose to
leadership, especially in committees, based upon his or her tenure. A study by the Congressional
Research Service (n.d.) shows that the average tenure (in years) of a member (both houses) has
been steadily increasing over the course of history (Glassman & Wilhelm, 2015, p. 3). Does the
increase in a member’s tenure have any meaningful effect on the construct accusation? Does it
affect the dependent variable punishment?
While there was no specific reference in the literature as to the effects of the variable time
on MOC punishment, Paternoster (2010, p. 822), analyzed the time discounting issue, or the
effect of the lag from the crime to the punishment. This “discounts” the deterrent effect of
punishment as people typically are less concerned with events far in the future, especially in
decision-making. However, this study measures time as the incremental difference in the years
in which the cases occurred, and the possible effects on punishment.
Two instances serve as examples of members punished for political reasons. Rep. Robert
Smalls of South Carolina was convicted of a bribery in 1877 while a Member of Congress for a
crime allegedly committed prior to this service, but the evidence was apparently manufactured
for political purposes to remove him from Congress (Biography.com, 2017; New World
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Encyclopedia, n.d.). Rep. Clement Vallandigham was deported by President Lincoln after
Vallandigham was accused of disobeying a martial order and publicly sympathizing with the
South24. He was initially sentenced to military imprisonment for as long as the war lasted
(Vallandigham, n.d.).
E.

Sources of Data for Variables
1.

Encyclopedias and Lists

There are many encyclopedias, lists and compendia with information on the corruption of
the MOCS in this study, and some have been useful in providing information on the variables.
Mark Grossman’s text supplied comprehensive information on the crimes of these legislators, as
well as significant biographical information that yielded much of the data for the variables. This
work has been especially useful in identifying crimes, punishments, political outcomes and
demographic information. Grossman’s work proved to be a primary resource for information on
federal legislators’ criminal issues. The observations are supported by several academic and
media references. For example, the case of Rep. Wayne Hayes is explained in detail, from his
personal details to his rise in politics. Hayes was accused of misusing House funds, having hired
his mistress as a Congressional staffer (Grossman, 2003, p.157). Hayes was investigated by
Congress and forced to resign his position as Chairman of the House Administration Committee,
one of the most potent committees in the House, and he eventually resigned from the House
altogether. Grossman briefs each politician’s biography and the background of the criminality
and provides details of the outcome. Each case history is supported by academic sources and
media articles, mostly from local media.

A military tribunal hearing Vallandigham’ s case ordered him sent through the lines to the South, after which he
eventually wound up in Canada. Although Lincoln held that the southern states were still part of the union the
deportation, as a punishment, was to send Vallandigham out of what was universally recognized as the United
States.
24
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ABSCAM was an example of a complex scandal in which the FBI investigated eight
federal legislators, seven of whom were indicted and convicted of bribery and related charges
(Grossman, 2003, p.1-3). The members were involved in an FBI sting operation that ended in
1979 wherein FBI agents posed as Arab businessmen offering inducements to members of
Congress and local politicians to participate in illegal business schemes. Six House members
and one United States Senator were sentenced to prison and all either resigned, lost elections or
did not run for reelection (Noonan, 1984, p.604-619; Grossman, 2003, p.1-3). This is the largest
number of congressional members to be punished in one scandal, and many claimed they were
the victims of entrapment (Long, 2007, p.248; Noonan, 1984, p. 616). Was Abscam a useful
crime fighting technique or a cynical artifice which manufactured crime where it otherwise
might not have occurred (Noonan, 1984, p.616-617)? Whatever the perspective, those
observations were examples of MOC criminality.
Most of the cases in Grossman were also found in Long’s almanac of Political
Corruption, Scandals, and Dirty Politics (2007), a compendium of briefs on numerous cases from
the founding of the United States to the current era. The Long almanac has been especially
useful as a corroborative resource for data on these cases, as well as providing additional cases
for research.
2.

Official and Institutional Sources

The U.S. Congress produces numerous documents and studies, and these provided much
of the data for the independent variables. Other institutional organizations (such as the United
States Office of Government Ethics and the various courts) publish research as well and these
have been used as corroborative sources. The primary case sources for demographic information
leading to the independent variables listed below are the Biographical Directory of the United

27

States Congress, the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, the Congressional
Directory (U.S. Government Printing Office), the Historical Summary of Conduct Cases in the
House of Representatives (Committee on Standards of Official Conduct: 1798-2004) and Hinds
& Cannon (1907); and U.S. Congress cases, Biographical Directory of the American Congress
(2005). The Brookings Institute publishes its Vital Statistics on Congress (in conjunction with
the American Enterprise Institute), which is a significant corroborative source of demographic
information, election data and provides interesting political content. These sources have been
used for biographical background and data of the federal legislators for election years, party
affiliation, offices held, dates of incumbency, election data, professional and employment history
and information on their crimes and scandals. Also, these sources provide details on the case
accusations, investigations, convictions and punishments, laying the groundwork for the
corruption analysis in these cases.
F.

Polarization in Congress

Two independent variables for polarization in this study are based on the polarization
scores for the members of Congress and also for Congress itself. Polarization in Congress
“occurred when conflict between the two parties became completely one-dimensional; that is,
when the regional division within the parties becomes the primary focus of conflict or disappears
altogether” (Poole, 2008, p. 5).
1.

Ideological Divisions

Poole suggests that Members of Congress as “political and cultural elites,” are “deeply
polarized ideologically and this polarization is at its highest level since the latter part of the 19th
century” (Poole, 2008, p. 3). Further, since the 1960s, “U.S. politics became much more divisive
and that more Democrats staked out consistently liberal positions, and more Republicans
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supported wholly conservative ones” (Poole, 2008, p. 5). These divisions have led to an
environment where bipartisan bickering is assured and that it is rare that “a news cycle passes
without new stories of political dysfunction in Washington, DC” and that this has “begun to
erode the public confidence in the ability of our representative institutions to govern effectively”
(Barber and McCarty 2015, p. 19). At the heart of this institutional paralysis, and its failure to
perform, is the “emergence of excessive partisanship and deep ideological divisions among
political elites and officeholders,” and that “polarization is to blame” (Barber and McCarty, 2015
p. 19). Congress is still divided along party lines as “politicians naturally fall on a left-right
axis” indicating more of an ideological split (Ellenberg, 2001, p. 2). This has led to more intense
infighting and contests for power thus “legislatures become more polarized not when individual
politicians adopt more extreme views, but when they are unseated by more extreme politicians.”
The extremes tend to dominate, civil discussion abates, political power is more hotly contested,
with winning the party goal and showing that polarization “is an effect of replacement (of
members), not conversion” (Ellenberg, 2001, p. 2)25. If polarization results in the goal of
replacing a member of the opposition party26 then the variable polarization becomes a viable
means of assessing accusation, and ultimately the punishment of MOCs in this study.
2.

Scoring Methodology

Polarization measures are based on a statistical technique known as “DW-NOMINATE
(Dynamic-Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation) scoring of both Congress and MOCs, using
legislators’ roll call votes in each House that provide spatial mapping and data that provide
observations of polarization” (Poole, 2008, p. 6). The mapping output reveals that “throughout

25

The hope is that a party can change a seat from the opposition to its own ranks, but usually the replacement is
from the same party.
26
Taking advantage of a criminal accusation, or turning an ethical charge into a criminal accusation, seeing that
charge through to conviction and punishment, and forcing a resignation or removal from Congress by other means.
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the last 100 years both houses of Congress have split into two grand clusters, Democrats and
Republicans” (Ellenberg, 2001, p. 2). This mapping technique uses the scaling of votes from
“taking a roll call matrix and ‘unscrambling’ it – that is, finding a rank ordering of legislators and
the correct ‘polarity’” (Poole, n.d., p. 4). In this manner voting data is converted into spatial
maps which provide a graphic depiction of the voting patterns. These maps provide a clear
representation of the polarity in Congress as “…. the language of politics is full of spatial terms
like left, right, and center, and it seemed… that the spatial model was the ideal model of
political choice” (Poole, n.d., p. 1). The purpose is to “assess party voting and therefore to
determine party opposition as conservative-liberal ideologies began to align more consistently
with party membership.” Thus, the natural division in Congress became philosophical as well as
political (Poole, n.d. p. 8). While the first polarization dimension used by Poole is ideological,
the second dimension is north-south geographic construct, which was more relevant for the
measurement of 19th century congresses.
The premise of using this concept in the study is the assumption that, in times of high
polarization, parties and members would be more adversarial and would be more inclined to be
more confrontational with members of the other party. This might result in more clashes, more
accusations, more punishment, and the effect of one party reducing the number of the opposition.
G.

Analysis, Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps in the Literature

The research and literature provided cases that helped examine the circumstances and the
criminal behavior of the MOCS, but they did not adequately address the policy considerations27.
The observations in this study have been researched in an attempt to provide data leading to
analysis that will address these gaps, and to account for the consequences of the criminality of

27

For example more effective means of punishment of offending members.
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the politicians involved. Some data for the politicians in the study were readily available and
some were difficult to find (such as prior professions and race). Some cases have not been used
due to a lack of definitive and corroborative evidence of critical data, including crimes allegedly
committed. Also, given the small sample used, the size effect issues may become a statistical
issue.
The literature shows that the criminality of federal legislators has led to several different
kinds of political punishments including loss of power. The “illicit exchange” (Noonan, 1984, p.
685) is at the heart of this tendency as “the connection between the gain and the benefit is
improper because it damages the democratic process” (Thompson, 1993, p. 369). Though the
number of accusations in this study may be relatively small, the cases of corrupt federal
legislators have had a detrimentally consequential effect on the political process (Welch &
Hibbing, 1997). Also, the many comments and statements found in the literature provided the
preliminary data for the content analysis categories. Those categories may be reaffirmed, or new
categories may emerge as the content analysis progresses.
One issue is that many media sources (whether newspapers or online) contain
information that could not be otherwise sufficiently corroborated and might therefore be
somewhat uncertain (single source) or recycled (the same data appearing in several media
stories). Also, some information was simply incorrect and could not be used. This may be the
result of poor and unprofessional reporting, faulty fact checking, or a media rush to judgment
mentality that values circulation over factual accuracy.
Dagnes & Sachleben (2014, p. 3) refer to a “lack of an established database of scandals”
of the academic type, a finding in this study as well. While the Grossman text is quite well
researched it is not a comprehensive compendium of all federal criminal corruption. This
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potentially has had an effect on the small number of cases and the difficulty in corroborating
some of the variables.
Grossman relied heavily on The Biographical Directory of the American Congress, which
provided biographical information for each member, and much information on the variables, but
only some details of the crimes or corruption mentioned. It is the official directory of
biographies for Congress and briefly describes each member’s background and career. Some of
the pertinent details are missing, for example, in the case of Rep. Nicholas Mavroules of
Massachusetts, indicted and convicted of bribery and money laundering (Abel, 2003), the
directory only mentions that the member failed to win reelection. This highlights one of the
research issues in using government sources, that often the negative details are omitted
apparently for political or institutional reasons. Given the fact that this and other government
sources are official documents, it is not surprising that negative information has been suppressed.
These sources have been useful in providing the background on the criminal prosecutions
of the MOCS and corroboration of the biographical data. In most instances the data agree but
there are some differences between these sources and others (e.g. media) and in such cases the
official documents above were given precedence. While there are many sources of information
on the accusation and punishment of these MOCS, not much has been found on prosecution.
There is much literature on the theory of deterrence, but Paternoster (2010, p.766) infers
there is not much empirical evidence that supports deterrence and this might be an explanation
for the punishments assessed in this dissertation as there is no way to prove that the punished
members were deterred. The Theory of Mediated Corruption has no empirical basis and its
relationship to punishment is presumptive. Therefore, it may be necessary to find additional
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substantiation as to why Congress felt MOC punishment was necessary. This suggests the need
for the content analysis.
The MOC literature does not include the concept of polarization, which may be useful in
exploring the effects of politics on the dependent variable punishment. Also missing from the
case literature is the consideration of the ethics reforms of the 1974 era and their effects on any
potential increase in MOC punishment28.

The post-Watergate reforms were extensive: “They sought to restore faith in the U.S. political system by
combating the corrupting influence of money in politics; promoting ethics and transparency in government;
protecting people against abuses of government power; and limiting certain extraordinary exercises of presidential
authority” (Berger and Tausanovitch, 2018).
28

33

III.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
One of goals of this project is to investigate the theories of justice used by Congress and

the criminal justice system. Several possibilities seem theoretically viable but not yet tested.
This multiple methods study uses a criminal justice theory and a political theory as the lenses
through which MOC crime is examined.
A.

Theoretical Propositions

The following theoretical propositions form the basis of thought for the quantitative
analysis in the next chapter.
1.

H1 - Punishment Varies Based on the Seriousness of crime

This proposition emphasizes the severity of punishment. The study looks at deterrence as
the measure of the variation in punishment and tests the severity of the sanctions.29 Certainty of
punishment did not mean much to top federal officials who may have thought they were beyond
the reach of sanctioning authorities, and celerity (the effect of punishment close in time to the
offense) was not discouraging since accused federal legislators apparently were not deterred. The
severity of punishment of these MOCS has been the result of the seriousness of those crimes,
with LOP attendant in most cases. LOP was a significant and consistent consequence of most
criminal prosecution for MOCS and was considered the most severe punishment by many
accused members. However, punishment was less severe in some cases as the accused
legislators received some sort of consideration in punishment, usually for political purposes.30

Paternoster (2010, p. 783), describes the 3 variables typically associated with deterrence theory: “there are three
properties of legal punishment that are related to its cost, the (1) certainty, (2) severity, and (3) celerity (or swiftness)
of punishment. Other things being equal, a legal punishment is more costly when it is more certain (more likely than
not to be a consequence of crime), severe (greater in magnitude), and swift (the punishment arrives sooner rather
than later after the offense).”
30
Rep. William Janklow had numerous speeding tickets and traffic accidents but still maintained a legal driver’s
license. In August of 2003 he ran a stop sign at high speed and killed pedestrian, was arrested and convicted and
received a sentence of only 3 months in jail plus probation. While he resigned from Congress, did he receive a
lesser punishment because he was a former governor in that state?
29

34

This key concept is operationalized as: defining the seriousness of crimes by means of a binary
analysis used to parse punishment into various levels.
2.

H2 - Punishment is Treated the Same Across Time

This proposition suggests that the severity of punishment for like crimes has not varied
over the last 218 years (the first case was 1798, see History of the Federal Judiciary, n.d.),
measured by the year in which a legislator was punished. When a Member of Congress is
convicted of a crime, Congress must also consider institutional sanctions of that member separate
from those of the criminal justice process. The theory of deterrence posits that more punishment
may deter criminal behavior, even if it proved weakly in prior empirical tests. The hypothesis is
that MOC punishment remained consistent for like offenses over time and that Congress decided
whether or not newly convicted members should suffer consequences similar to those convicted
of similar crimes in the past. However, given the increase in criminal laws over time the
research may show the opposite, that with new laws being passed as time progressed members
were prosecuted and punished to a greater extent, or that despite the increase in laws members
would be punished to varying degrees based on other factors (e.g. the attitudes of political
stakeholders at those times) thus there may be punishment differentials over time. The
operationalization of the key concept of time is measuring the outcome of cases in the political
arena by from the beginning of the research (1798) to the end (2016) to determine if there were
any effects on the punishment variable.
3.

H3 - Punishment is Mediated Through Politics

The institution of Congress is political in nature and therefore the political environment
itself may be a mediating factor in facilitating or inducing criminal behavior. The business of
Congress involves deal-making and processes that have the potential for corruption, therefore
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political necessity may affect an exchange, or create the need for an exchange, and thus may be a
mediating factor that provides the opportunity for the resulting criminal behavior.
An example of this was the deal-making and subsequent accusation (along with the
investigation and subsequent resignation) of Speaker of the House James Wright (Smith, 2007, p.
139). The political effects were that Rep. (and future Speaker of the House) Newt Gingrich led
the fight to oust Speaker Wright, under controversial circumstances, and thereby enhanced his
party’s prospects for power. Wright was the first Speaker ever to be forced to resign for such
criminal allegations. Wright “was as partisan as Newt was partisan” and Gingrich stated, “if
we’re going to take them down, let’s start at the top” (Stolberg, 2012). Gingrich eventually led a
Republican effort to successfully take back the House from the Democrats after driving a number
of Democrats from office (Stolberg, 2012).
Speaker Newt Gingrich himself eventually resigned because of ethical violations. Reps.
Wright (financial fraud) and Hays (misuse of funds) were accused of crimes. After Watergate,
the spotlight got brighter, and the focus on illicit behavior got sharper. There were 28 cases
during the period from Watergate (1974) to ABSCAM (1980), more than any other similar
period in the dataset. Noonan (194, p. 604) underscored this point stating that “compared to the
last 180 years, the amount of attention to congressional bribery in the 1970s was remarkable.”
But given the strong desire by members to fight for power accusations were met with resistance,
as Noonan (1984, p. 611) observed “….and on the defendants’ part, with their politician lives at
stake, there was a strong motive to go to trial.”
Where do we draw the line? The case of bribery and corruption case against Rep. Chaka
Fattah, in light of the Supreme Court decision exonerating Gov. McDonnell of Virginia, leaves
open the question as to just what the government may consider bribery (McDonnell v. US, 2016;

36

Tawa, 2016).31 Thus mediated corruption may not be punishable in some circumstances, but the
loss of power may be predicted by mediated corruption.
4.

H4 - Punishment is Contingent on the Perception of Crime

The author Mark Twain famously said, “the only distinctly native American criminal
class is the Congress” (Library of Congress, 1989). The remark is a humorous exaggeration, but
nonetheless expresses a sometimes popular perception fueled by MOC indiscretions. The
politically sensitive institution of Congress, where leaders depend on political credibility to move
their agendas and get reelected, deal with perception as much as reality, and when members are
accused of crimes Congress endeavors to provide a public impression that the institution is
capable of policing itself. Congress employs the theory of deterrence by reinforcing the
perception that members convicted of crimes will be commensurately punished by the institution
as a lesson to others.
Congress based its use of MOC punishment on public opinion at the time of the
accusation. For example “the United States now imprisons a higher proportion of its population
than any country in the world” and that the “primary driver” for this “prolific expansion” is “an
increasingly punitive public” (Enns, 2016, p. 857). In a social environment with “public opinion
as a determinant of mass incarceration in the United States” a public focus on punishing
wrongdoing is enhanced, and the thinking is that the political environment has been following
suit engendering an increasing need to sanction MOC wrongdoers (Enns, 2016, p. 857). It may
also be inferred that this “increasingly punitive public” is a driver of congressional leadership
attitudes towards sanctioning its wayward members.
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In the McDonnell case the Supreme Court ruled that the certain acts do not constitute corruption, and the
government has a higher burden of proof for such crimes. Rep. Fattah’s lawyer said the “ruling narrows the
definition of what sort of conduct serves as the basis of a corruption prosecution” (Tawa, 2016).
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The unintended consequence of LOP may be the loss of public trust. Accusation alone
has the same effect as conviction in electoral terms, causing lost elections and forcing legislators
to abandon reelection. The Pew Research Center (2015) provides data on the perception of
public trust from 1958 to 2015, and the data is used to support the concept of public trust.
INSERT FIGURE A.4 - PEW RESEARCH GRAPH – PUBLIC TRUST
B.

The Criminal Justice Continuum

MOCs accused of crimes are considered for this study, and accusation is the entry point
for an observation in this research. The 4 stages of the criminal justice continuum used in this
analysis are:
accusation → indictment → conviction → punishment
In this study punishment is the dependent variable and accusation, indictment and
conviction are stages leading to punishment. The 14 cases of those accused but not indicted cases
are idiosyncratic and are excluded from the analysis. 45 MOCS were convicted but not punished
(see Table A.3d).32 Punishment is the dependent variable, dichotomized into criminal justice
punishment (measured by severity) and political punishment (measured by loss of power).
Logistic regression was used in the first quantitative analysis and is appropriate as the
dependent variables are categorical and dichotomized. The statistical analysis shows key
relationships among the variables and sheds light on the correlation between deterrence and the
punishment of the MOCS being studied. The analysis of mediated corruption also provides
meaningful insights into the possible relationships among the political variables and punishment.
The content analysis provides substantiation as to why various stakeholders felt that the
punishments of the members were justified, and these findings may support the results of the
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For example, Sen. Ted Stevens, Rep. Robert Garcia, Rep. Tom Delay and Rep. Robert Smalls had their cases
overturned on appeal, and Sen. John Mitchell died before he could be sentenced.
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regression analysis in that deterrence and mediated corruption may to be linked to punishment in
a meaningful way.
The decision flow chart depicted in Figure A.1 graphically displays the various stages of
the criminal justice process which are used in this study to analyze the observations of the crimes
MOCS were accused of. The data for these stages are in tables A.2 and A.3a and indicate the
number of observation reductions at each level.
INSERT FIGURE A.1 - CRIMINAL JUSTICE FLOW CHART
INSERT FIGURE A.2 - PARTY MEANS
INSERT TABLE A.3a – AICP STAGE ANALYSIS
Accused is the entry point for a MOC, and the Table A.3a shows that 89.7 percent of
those accused were indicted by a prosecutorial authority.33 An example of those accused but not
indicted was Rep. Charles N. Wilson (TX), who was accused of drug use by federal authorities,
but the case was dropped for lack of evidence. Additionally the case of Sen. Theodore Bilbo
(MS) was twice accused of bribery, once by the Mississippi state senate and again by the US
Senate. The state senate failed to expel him by two thirds vote and a deal was made when the
US Senate tried to exclude him. In neither case were the charges referred to law enforcement as
the legislatures attempted political resolutions.
Forty-one MOCS were indicted but not convicted, and some examples were: Sen.
Edward Gurney (R-FL) (Grossman, 2003, p. 391), accused of bribery and other charges and was
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Various cases were dropped from consideration in this study such as Rep. Corrine Brown (tax fraud, financial
disclosure fraud) (Bever, 2017) and Sen. Robert Menendez (bribery) (Bresnahan, 2016) , as these were after the
2016 and thus not part of the research scope, and not adjudicated at this writing as the data was incomplete. Rep.
Hugh Addonizio (kickbacks) (Grossman, 2003, p.5-7) and Sen. Albert Fall (Teapot Dome scandal) (Grossman,
2003, p. 123-125) were accused of crimes post-congressional service, and Rep. Arch Moore (extortion, obstruction)
(New York Times, 1990) and Rep. Mark Siljander (money laundering, conspiracy and obstruction of justice)
(Michigan Live, 2012) were dropped from the study as their accusations occurred after their term in Congress as
well. Representatives such as Charles Wrangel and Newt Gingrich were not included in the study as their
transgressions were ethical, not criminal matters.
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found not guilty. Rep. Henry Helstoski (D-NJ) (Grossman, 2003, p.159) was indicted for
obstruction of justice, conspiracy and related charges, but the charges were eventually dropped.
Rep. Daniel Sickles (D-NY), and also a Union General in the Civil War, was indicted for the
murder of his wife’s but as not convicted, being the first to use the insanity defense (Long, 2007,
p. 61).
There were 45 observations of Members of Congress who were convicted but not
punished, and some examples were: Rep. John Williamson (R-OR) (Grossman, 2003, p. 372373), convicted in a land fraud scandal but his conviction was overturned; Rep. Tom Delay (RTX) (Fund, 2014) was convicted on money laundry charges, but the case was reversed on appeal;
and Rep. Robert Garcia (D-NY) (Grossman, 2003, p. 139) twice convicted on bribery, extortion
and conspiracy charged, and both times the convictions were also reversed on appeal.
Thus, at each stage of the AICP continuum there were fewer cases as they dropped for
lack of prosecution, not guilty-verdicts and conviction reversals on appeal.
C.

Research Questions

The corruption of Members of Congress is explained by white collar crime theories in the
context of the institution of Congress. The research questions in this study are:
•
•
•

What types of crimes have Members of Congress been accused of?
What factors are related to the punishment of MOCs by the criminal justice system and
the institution of Congress?
What are the theories of justice used by the criminal justice system and Congress?

These questions are explained below.
1.

What types of crimes have Members of Congress been accused of?

The criminal accusations of MOCs in this study are those contemporaneous with, or
related to, their service in Congress. The offenses these legislators were accused of are divided
into two areas: instrumental crime (based on financial or political gain) and expressive crime
40

(motivated by desire or emotion resulting in, for example, violence or sex). Expressive crimes
may be more significant than instrumental crimes in terms of political punishment in that they
may be considered more morally offensive by congressional leaders. Table A.5 lists the crimes
the MOCS in this study were accused of, divided into 2 typologies and coded in the quantitative
analysis as follows:
CRIME: 0 = non-instrumental (or expressive); 1 = instrumental.
Instrumental crime usually refers to a property crime and expressive crime usually refers
to violence or some other crime of passion made “in the heat of the moment or under intense
social pressure” (Krohn, Lizotte & Hall, 2010). Therefore “instrumental crime is generally
dispassionate, whereas expressive crime is more emotional, impulsive and less reasoned”
(Krohn, Lizotte & Hall, 2010). Consequently, deterrence should be more effective with
instrumental crime. Criminals acting on the basis of their feelings are more apt to commit an
expressive crime whereas the “search for a particular overt reward” may lead to an instrumental
crime (Canter, 2000). The difference between the 2 types of crimes are essentially the difference
between an illicit action to “make a statement,” and to “make a living” (Leroch, 2014, p.1-2).
Instrumental crimes are usually committed by rational actors and they can be more affected by
“increasing the costs to perpetrators” as they are “motivated by the desire to gain material
objects” but more emotional actors are more likely to commit expressive crimes as they are
“motivated by the desire to communicate personal attitudes to others” (Leroch, 2014, p.1-2).
Table A.4 is a summary chart of the MOC crime typology (Krohn, Lizotte & Hall, 2010), see
also Table A.5, MOC Crime Typology Frequency.
INSERT TABLE A.4 – CRIME TYPOLOGIES
INSERT TABLE A.5 – MOC CRIME TYPOLOGY FREQUENCY

41

These 275 accusations of illicit acts for the 136 legislators span a wide range of offenses, a total
of 40 different crimes in all. Many MOCS were accused of multiple criminal acts, thus
complicating the categorization of their cases.
2.

What factors are related to the punishment of MOCs by the criminal

justice system and the institution of Congress?
For the purpose of the quantitative analysis the factors related to the punishment of the
MOCS in this study are the variables that will be used in the analyses.
a)

Dependent variable

Punished
Punishment is divided into the two areas below. About 67% of the accused
legislators were punished (see Table A.3a).
•
•

b)

CRJ punishments
o As adjudicated by courts of law and Congress
Political punishment
o Loss of Power (meaning loss of congressional office)
Independent variables

Party
Party may also be defined as Democrat/Non-Democrat34. This variable tracks the
political party of the accused legislator as a measure of ideology (Poole’s first
dimension) and provides a natural home team for electoral purposes (Poole, 2015).
Party (Dem, non-Dem) may be a predictor of punishment. The expected direction of
this variable is positive, meaning that being a Democrat increases the possibility of
punishment.
Majority/minority party membership
Majority or minority membership may provide a basis for confrontation leading to
political targeting and removal from office as a strategy. The expected direction of
this variable is negative for majority members and positive for minority members.
Year Punished
This variable is measured as the year a legislator was punished and assumes that
punishment remains constant across time periods. The expected direction of this
variable is positive.
34

Democrat, non-Democrat is abbreviated to Dem, non-Dem throughout the paper.
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Tenure of the Accused
This variable represents the effect of a legislator’s time in office up the point of
accusation. The attempt here is to determine if longer times in office have a
corrupting effect on the legislator. The expected direction of this variable is positive.
Punished before/after 1974
This variable divides the cases before and after 1974 (the year of the Watergate
scandal). The assumption is that the ethical and legal changes of the Watergate era
had an effect on the subsequent accusation and punishment of MOCS. Certainly, the
focus on congressional behavior had changed. The criminal net may have been
widened after 1974. The expected direction of this variable is positive, meaning that
more punishment would be expected after 1974.
Polarization of Congress
This variable measures the polarization of the various Congresses in this study based
on roll call voting. During the 19th century and part of the 20th century, most of
Congress was polarized along a north-south axis. From the late 20th century to the
present, party membership became more aligned with political ideology (e.g.
Democrats usually as liberals and Republicans usually as conservatives). MOCS
may be more susceptible to criminal accusation during times of high Congressional
polarization. The expected direction of this variable is positive in that the higher the
polarization score of a Congress in which a member was accused the more likely the
member accused, and ultimately would be punished.
Member Party Unity Score
This variable represents the ideological extremity of the Members of Congress in this
study. The data is based on roll call votes in Congress and measures the liberalconservative ideological voting record of the member. The extremity of the voting
record may have rendered a member susceptible to targeting due to the political
strategy of the opposition party. The expected direction of this variable is positive,
meaning that the higher the member party unity score the more likely the member
would be accused, and then punished.
Crimes Type
This variable represents the crimes of which legislators were accused and divides
them by the crime typology described in Table A.4. The expected direction of this
variable is positive for instrumental crime, but negative for expressive crime.
INSERT TABLE A.4 – CRIME TYPOLOGIES
Seriousness of crime
The seriousness of crime is trichotomized into high felony, low felony and
misdemeanor, the three categories which the crimes of the accused naturally fit.
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c)

Analyses Used

The content analysis considers different factors based on the categories derived from
comments made by various stakeholders in the political and criminal justice areas.
The descriptives analyzed indicate that the typical co-MOC is male, over 50 years old, a
Democrat, either a lawyer or professional politician, accused of an instrumental crime and
having served at least 8 years in Congress. While this may not necessarily have much predictive
value, it is nonetheless interesting that an analysis of the means of the variables provides a
composite MOC that may prove useful for comparative purposes.
3.

What are the theories of justice used by the criminal justice system and

Congress?
There are two considerations for this question: for criminal justice the proposed theory is
deterrence, and for the political arena the operative theory is mediated corruption.
a)

Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory is one of the cornerstones of the criminal justice system and has three
components: certainty, severity and swiftness (Beccaria, 1872). The relevant literature indicates
that the empirical testing of the certainty of punishment provides moderate results, severity of
punishment has weak results at best, and swiftness has had little empirical testing (Paternoster,
2010, p. 818). The premise of swiftness (the time lag between offending and punishment)
mitigates the deterrent effect of certainty and severity, as “whatever sanctions the criminal justice
system may have available…. their effectiveness in deterring crime is naturally diminished by
their lack of temporal proximity to the offending decision” and that “people have a tendency to
discount future events” (Paternoster, 2010, p.822). However, this hypothesis is problematic
since “it is very difficult to state with any precision how strong a deterrent effect the criminal
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justice system provides” (Paternoster, 2010, p. 765). Certainty of punishment is not
hypothesized to have a sufficient deterrent value for MOCs as they may have felt they were
above the law, thus severity of punishment is used in the analysis as having a better probability
of effective testing. Also, there are definitive statistics for severity (e.g. months in prison) but
not for swiftness and certainty.
INSERT TABLE A.6: PUNISHMENT CATEGORIES
The inferences drawn from the literature, indicate that LOP is a legitimate threat for
MOCs and therefore needs to be considered in the deterrence discussion. However, loss of
power, a dichotomous concept (one loses power or one doesn’t), is the ultimate punishment for
an embattled politician fighting to stay in office. For these cases there is almost no recidivism
because once a federal legislator is out of power there is almost no opportunity to re-offend (e.g.
one cannot be bribed if one is not in a position of power) and loss of public trust is difficult to
regain. Keeping in mind that deterrence theory is parsed between general deterrence (for all
members of a certain population) and specific deterrence (for one individual), the goal of
prosecuting authorities for these cases was to punish the individual and to set an example for the
rest of the legislator population (Katzman, 2009, p. 355).35 But in terms of LOP as a punishment
MOCS lose power in almost all cases as a consequence of criminal justice prosecution.
b)

Theory of Mediated Corruption (Thompson)

The Theory of Mediated Corruption, formulated by Harvard ethicist Dennis F. Thompson
(1993), states that political or institution corruption can be mediated by political agents. His test
case was the “The Keating Five” scandal involving the savings and loan corruption

35

Katzmann provided the statement made by US Attorney Thomas Puccio, prosecutor in the case of Sen. Harrison
Williams, at the sentencing hearing, when Puccio said that the court must impose an “appropriate sentence, which is
helpful to deter others who might wish to engage in similar conduct and similarly betray the public trust.”

45

investigations in the 1980s targeting Charles Keating, Jr., a businessman, and five US senators:
Dennis DeConcini, John Glenn, Donald Riegle, Alan Cranston and John McCain, all of whom
had favorable reputations (and two were national heroes). The case is of particular interest
because it defined Thompson’s theory, which connects the corrupt behavior of politicians to the
“effects on the democratic process” (Thompson, 1993). It involves “the three elements needed to
define corruption in general: a public official gains, a private official benefits, and the benefit is
improper,” which delineates what elected are officials are not supposed to do (Thompson, 1993).
This principle provides “a more fruitful way of reuniting the concepts of systematic corruption in
traditional political theory with the concepts of individual corruption in contemporary social
science” (Thompson, 1993). Thus, mediated corruption is useful in explaining the link between
individual behavior and a relevant political-social theory. The concept of mediation provides the
basis for much of the understanding of political corruption as, in most cases, there is an exchange
of some kind involving a mediator, and once the exchange turned illicit the mediation would
become a criminalizing factor. This study uses the theory to show that the congressional
environment and the political process of deal-doing (that becomes the illicit exchange) are agents
that mediate corruption (Noonan, 1984, p. 685).
Thompson postulates that this theory properly conflates “the concepts of systematic
corruption in traditional political theory with the concepts of individual corruption in
contemporary social science” (Thompson, 1993). For example, in the case of Sen. Harrison
Williams the political environment of Congress mediated the Senator’s individual corruption.
The Senator “did not hesitate to link his willingness to perform an official act” to an opportunity
for personal gain. The deal he tried to make established the “critical nexus,” or the
“incriminating link” (Thompson, 1995, p. 104) between this official act and a corrupt motive
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establishing the illicit exchange (Noonan, 1984, p. 685). The relevance of Sen. William’s case is
that it established that “the connection between the gain and the benefit is improper because it
damages the democratic process” (Thompson, 1993, p. 369). This provides a useful definition
for Thompson’s theory as “it may be called mediated corruption because the corrupt acts are
mediated by the political process” Thompson, 1993, p. 369). Thompson’s theory is used in this
study to assess the process that led to political punishments.
The courts sentencing Members of Congress may use a different standard of deterrence.
If, for example, the statistical analysis of MOC crimes yields results similar to those provided by
the deterrence literature, it may be inferred that the courts applied deterrence theory similarly.
However, if the results vary significantly then it may be inferred that MOCs were punished
differently than non-office holders. The criminal justice system and the institution of Congress
have different approaches to the issue of the punishment of MOCs as the courts are theoretically
interested in the law only and Congress is interested in both the law and political perception.
Thus, the loss of power becomes a critical construct in assessing the stakeholders’ justification
for punishment.
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IV.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
A.

Data Collection
1.

Collection Sources – Methods - Time Period

Data were collected from government, academic and media sources using an Excel
spreadsheet, and then transferred to SPSS version 23, and later version 25. Specifically, research
was done by examining criminal cases (those in which a MOC was accused of a crime by a
prosecuting authority) found in sources of political crimes and scandals such as the
Politicalgraveyard.com, The Downfall Dictionary and numerous media articles. The texts of
Grossman (2003), Long (2007), Noonan’s Bribes (1984) and Dagnes & Sachleben’s Scandal
(2014) provided many of the observations. The media provided additional information from the
past and recent cases such as those of Rep. Michael Grimm and Rep. Chaka Fattah. Additional
internet searches and research of the texts used in this study yielded few additional cases.36 That
notwithstanding, there may be some cases that were missed, but the dataset remains small and as
such the population and sample are the same. Given that, it is reasonable to conclude that the
136 observations gathered thus far have a significant probability of being the population in
question. The data was collected over a period of several years, primarily from 2013-2017. The
data collection was completed by the end of 2017 for the observation period 1798 to 2016.
2.

Sample/Population

The sample is the population: N = 136 MOCS. As these observations had a high
probability of being the entire set of accused federal legislators, sampling error was not an issue
as the sample will not be generalized to a population.

36

There have been a number of new MOC accusations since data collection was completed.
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3.

Sample Frame

For inclusion of an observation, a MOC must have been accused of a crime, as defined by
statute, by a prosecuting authority (including Congress), while serving in the United States
Congress contemporaneous to the criminal accusation or the crime committed, or whose criminal
actions were related to the member’s tenure in Congress.
4.

Observations Included and Omitted

The 136 MOC observations in the data conform to the sample frame above. Various
member cases were omitted as mentioned above in III.B, mostly as their cases were for crimes
committed before or after they left Congress, of their offenses were ethical not criminal. These
observations were contrary to the definitional parameters for inclusion in the dataset. Some
examples were Rep. Andrew J. Hinshaw, Rep. Harold Giles Hoffman, Sen. William Langer,
Rep. Caleb Lyon, Rep. Maury Maverick, and Sen. William Roach. There were 22 such
removals.
B.

Variables Measurements
1.

Descriptions of the Measures - the Variables
a)

Dependent Variables - Punishment

The criminal justice punishments ranged from long prison terms to short probations. The
dilemma for the accused (even pre-indictment) in assessing the potential of punishment involved
the calculus of the political costs against the criminal justice costs.37 Punishment is the basis for
the dependent variable and is differentiated into two outcomes. 122 MOCs were indicted and of
those 41 were not convicted of a crime (30.1% of those accused). See Table A.3a for these data.
The 41 members found not guilty can be operationalized by crime type (33 instrumental and 8

37

Some accused legislators risked running for re-election rather than resigning hoping to remain in power (e.g. Rep.
Nicholas Mavroules, see Abel, 2003).
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expressive) and LOP (29 lost power – 12 resigned, 1 was excluded, 7 lost the next election and 9
did not run for re-election). See Tables A.3b and A.3c for these data. Thus, the majority of that
group was accused of more rational crimes and most lost power regardless of the criminal
adjudication. Accusation had a significant effect on LOP, whether or not the member was found
guilty.
INSERT TABLE A.3b – NOT-CONVICTED MOCS BY CRIME TYPE AND LOP
INSERT TABLE A.3c – MOCS CONVICTED/NOT CONVICTED BY PUNISHMENT TYPE
(1)

Criminal Justice Punishments

Criminal justice punishment includes incarceration in terms of prison (felonies with
imposed sentences of more than a year) and jail (misdemeanors with sentences of less than a
year) (NOLO, n.d.). Additional forms of criminal justice punishment are categorized as fines,
restitution and such alternatives to incarceration (ATI) as probation and community service. The
factor analysis (see Table A.31) produced category consolidations for prison and jail (as
PRISON), fines and restitution (as FINESADJ) and probation and community service (as ATI).
The criminal justice punishments were consolidated as some were too small (e.g. fines with
restitution, probation with community service) to be used efficiently (see Table A.8). This
variable was measured by severity of punishment (Table A.9 in the appendix) in a binary scale of
criminal justice punishment (severe, non-severe). Also see Table A.10, which is used to explain
the severity of punishment in this chapter. Political punishment is also on a binary scale (0 = no
loss of power, 1 = loss of power).
INSERT TABLE A.8 – CRIMINAL JUSTICE PUNISHMENTS
CONSOLIDATED CATEGORIES
INSERT TABLE A.9 – MEASUREMENT SCALES - SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT, LOSS
OF POWER
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INSERT TABLE A.10 – PUNISHMENT GROUP FREQUENCIES WITH CUT POINTS
INSERT TABLE A.31 - FACTOR ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
Financial punishments, such as fines and restitution, were adjusted for inflation using a
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator calculation (Table TA.7 in the technical appendix38) to
standardize these values over time. The GDP deflator index used a base of 2009 and fines and
restitution were adjusted upward or downward depending on whether those punishments
occurred before or after 2009. The index was constructed by taking the GDP for a given year,
adjusting it for inflation, and calculating the percentage increase based on 2009 dollars (US
Department of Commerce, 2017). For example, Rep. Mario Biaggi was fined $500,000 in 1987,
however, after adjusting for the effects of inflation (using a GDP deflator ratio of 166.99%), the
standardized value of the fine was $834,934.91. All fines (including two restitution cases), were
adjusted accordingly and a new variable (FINESADJ) was created.39
(2)

Political Punishment

Political punishment is defined as the loss of power, meaning loss of congressional
office. Dagnes & Sachleben (2014, p. 52) term this phenomenon “premature departure,” the
inference being that a MOC lost an office due to a serious problem. The phenomenon of
congressional resignation, while mostly involuntary40, was either part of an agreement or a
designed political outcome, and thus was forced. Therefore, resignation from Congress41 was

38

The Technical Appendix may be found on my academic website at //kennethjgrossberger.academia.edu
The fine for Sen. Joseph Burton, assessed in 1903, was calculated at the 1929 rate as that was the first year in the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis index. The same logic was used for the fine of Rep. Matthew Lyon, assessed in
1798, Sen. John Mitchell (assessed in 1905) and Rep. Robert Potter in 1931.
40
Even those members who resigned “voluntarily” had little practical choice, as in the case of Rep. Bob Ney, who
pled guilty to charges of conspiracy to defraud and falsifying financial disclosure forms and was sentenced to 30
months in prison. His loss in the next election was assured thus his resignation was an acceptance of reality (BBC,
2007).
41
95 members were convicted but 14 did not lose power. Also 13 members were convicted yet never suffered
criminal punishment (see Table A.3c).
39
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defined as a punishment and almost always meant the end of a political career.42 The other
major cause of the loss of power was losing the next election, a “political sanction,” “repudiation
at the polls” by the electorate, from which a politician rarely recovered (Noonan, 1984, P. xxiii).
(3)

Comparison of Criminal and Political Punishment

The criminal justice punishments were assessed by amounts, in years and dollars, and the
political punishments were analyzed on the binary scale mentioned above. The severity of
punishment dependent variable was operationalized by the various criminal justice punishments
described above and the loss of power dependent variable was operationalized by the removal
from political office by various means. The operative mechanism for the severity of punishment
was the criminal courts that adjudicated guilt and punishment. The operative mechanisms for the
loss of power were Congress and the electoral system. The main functional difference between
the two outcomes is that the courts determined the severity of punishment by the evidence of the
crime and Congress and the electorate determined the loss of power by their respective political
judgments.
The dependent variables are correlated by the fact that MOCs are the highest elected
legislators in the country thus the allegations involving them gain the attention of the CRJ system
and the electorate. Most lost power43 whether convicted or not as the perception of guilt was
sufficient for Congress and the electorate to force a member from power.
b)

Qualification for the Study

To qualify for this study a MOC must have been accused of a crime by a legal
prosecuting authority (including Congress) while serving in Congress, meaning the crime must

42

With the exception of a few rare cases such as that of Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who resigned and was
reelected (see Grossman, 2006, p. 269-270).
43
112 members out of 136 total in the data set, see Table A.3c.
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be contemporaneous with, or have a relationship to, congressional service.44 For the next stage
in the process a legislator must be indicted by a legal authority (usually a legal court, or
sometimes Congress). Of the 136 MOCs accused, 122 were indicted (89.7% of those accused),
see Table A.3a. Thus, for all practical purposes to be accused is to be indicted for these MOCs,
at least in political terms.
Below are descriptions of the predictors used in the analysis.
c)

Independent Variables

Party (Dem/non-Dem)
o Label:
o Scale:
o Operationalization:
o Coding:
o Propositions affected:

PARTY
Categorical (dichotomous)
Party membership at the time first accused
0 = non-DEM; 1 = DEM
H3

The Democratic Party was originally the Democratic-Republican Party, whose
antecedents date back to the founding of the country (Chambers, 1963, p. 475). The Republican
Party was formed in 1854, and was a collection of former Whigs, disaffected Democrats and
other anti-slavery types (Gould, 2003, p. 13-14). Given the older age of the Democratic party
there was a greater statistical probability for more Democrats in the analysis, thus it was not
surprising that the 57% of the observations included were Democrat. This may be more
circumstance than significance. For MOCs who changed political affiliations, the party at the
time of accusation was used. As the party variable was dichotomized parties no longer in
existence (e.g. the Whig party) were in the non-Democrat category, and there was only a small
number of such cases involved (see Table A.11).

44

There are a few exceptions, for example Rep. Robert Smalls was accused of a crime while a Member of Congress
for a crime allegedly committed prior to this this service, but the evidence was apparently manufactured for political
purposes to remove him from Congress (he was pardoned post-conviction). He is therefore kept in this study
(Biography.com, 2017).
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The relationship between this variable and the two dependent variables is expected to be
positive.
Majority/minority party membership
o Label:
o Scale:
o Operationalization:

MAJ/MIN
Categorical (dichotomous)
Majority or minority status at the time of
accusation
0 = minority; 1 = majority
H3

o Coding:
o Propositions affected:

The political hypothesis was that aggressive party politicians were increasingly
confrontational and intended to weaken or remove members of the opposition. Majority
membership for an MOC accused of a crime provided useful political targeting by an aggressive
minority seeking power. However, minority party status places a MOC in a more delicate
political position if accused of a crime. The majority controls the committees, the decision
making (especially the decision to investigate) and the logistics in Congress and minority
members are usually at a disadvantage. The strength of association between this independent
variable and the dependent variable was presumed to be strong as the natural antagonism
engendered by the 2-party system provided environments where vulnerabilities of the opposition
were exploited for political gain and ultimately party control. The expected direction of
association was negative for majority party membership and positive for minority party
membership as the majority controls the process, to the disadvantage of the minority. Therefore,
the majority could better insulate itself against minority attacks (but not always) and better
protect its members, while the minority would be less effective doing so.
The coding process began with a dichotomized variable for House and Senate members.
The party variable (Dem/non-Dem) was used to identify the party at time of accusation, and then
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a variable was created to identify the Congress (by number). From these data, the
majority/minority status for the accused MOC at the time of accusation was deduced.
Year Punished
o Label:
o Scale:
o Operationalization:
o Coding:
o Propositions affected:

YEARPUN
Discrete
The year an MOC was first punished
None
H2

The differential in years (from one year to another) may explain some of the effects of
punishment. A scale was constructed from the years 1798 to 2016 (from the first case in this
study to the last) for this variable and the various accusations measured on that timeline. The
strength of association between year punished and the dependent variables were assumed to be
positive as more laws were passed as time progressed, and there might be more prosecutions as a
result. In the 19th century the crime of bribery was combined with other crimes under the general
category of corruption. Once there was a specific criminal statute against bribery prosecutors
could better focus their cases and more prosecutions might result. For example, from 1798 to
1962 there were 32 definable bribery cases, or about 1 case every 5.1 years. From 1962 (the year
the current federal bribery law was enacted) to 2016 there were 30 bribery cases, or about 1 case
every 1.8 years, a significant increase.
Tenure of the Accused
o Label:
o Scale:
o Operationalization:

TENACCUS
Discrete
Total length of time in congressional office
measured in years from the time elected to
the year first accused of a crime
None
H2

o Coding:
o Propositions affected:

The original variable in this study measured total tenure, which was the total time served
in Congress. This is a separate variable created in SPSS for the data that measures the time
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served in Congress up to the point of criminal accusation, in years (see Table A.20, Year
Accused). For certain cases, the time was combined for Senate and House terms to the year of
accusation. For MOCS with non-consecutive terms the years in office were added together, up
to the year of accusation. This variable relates to the effects of the seniority system, the
traditional path to power (and possibly corruption) and was hypothesized to be significant in
determining whether a MOC would be accused and punished. The assumed strength of
association between tenure and the dependent variables should be strong and the direction should
be positive (the more tenure the more the possibility of corruption, thus more possibility of
indictment). The assumption was that the more tenure acquired by an MOC the greater the
chance of becoming more familiar with the Washington and congressional environments thus
increasing the possibility of becoming more intimately associated with other members, lobbyists
and interested stakeholders. More senior members would be more susceptible to illicit political
deals than relatively powerless newcomers. The potential was for instrumental crimes, as
bribery was more likely for members in positions of power engaging lobbyists.
INSERT TABLE A.20 - YEAR ACCUSED 1958-2015
Punished before/after 1974
o Label:
o Scale:
o Operationalization:

1974
Categorical (dichotomous)
MOCs punished up to or after 1974,
the time of major political ethics reforms
0 = punished, up to 1974
1 = punished, including and after 1974
H2

o Coding:
o Propositions affected:

The Watergate era reforms provided substantial impetus for more scrutiny of corrupt
behavior and thus more accusation and punishment. There were 28 cases in this study from
Watergate (1974, the scandal involving President Nixon) to ABSCAM (1980, a sting operation
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conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), the most for any similar period under
consideration.

The strength of association between this variable and the dependent variables was
presumed to be strong, and the direction of association should be positive (more accusations and
convictions resulting after the reforms of 1974). Congress passed many measures designed to
control campaign financing and ethics following White House corruption in the Watergate
scandal, including the Federal Election Campaign Act and amendments (Ballotpedia, n.d.).45
Also, the changes in the congressional seniority system in the early to mid-1970s helped mitigate
the “get along, go along” mentality mentioned earlier (CQ Almanac, 1971; CQ Almanac, 1973).
The resignation of a president under threat of impeachment, along with the prosecution of many
high-ranking government officials were the result of what Michael Barone called the
“criminalization of political differences” among the stakeholders which typified politics in that
era (Marisco, 2014). There was a heightened sense of acceptability of prosecuting members of
the other party in order to remove them from office, labeled a new form of political “tribalism”
by Norman Ornstein (Marisco, 2014). The reforms of this era were ostensibly designed to right
the wrongs and to reassure the public that elected officials would act ethically or be punished.
Welch & Hibbing (1997) stated that “the two decades following Watergate produced major
changes in the American polity, including, if anything, increased press and public attention to
corruption and scandal.” Certainly, the highly publicized fall of an American president brought a
great deal of attention to corruption as the suffix “-gate” became the accepted rhetorical form for

45

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (which took effect in 1972) and the 1971 Revenue Act provided new
restrictions in campaign financing designed to restrain illegal contributions (Ballotpedia, n.d.).
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scandal.46 Dagnes & Sachleben (2014, p. 36) concluded that “the press has an increased appetite
for political scandals…(and) this new trend was no doubt spurred by Watergate.” While there
was an argument that the corrupt behavior of MOCS was nothing new, the evidence shows that
the Watergate era brought new and intensive scrutiny to the illicit behavior of politicians. The
reforms of the 1974 era provided the basis of this variable by which this study analyzes MOC
punishment, and the hypothesis is that Watergate had a significant effect.
Polarization of Congress
o Label:
o Scale:
o Operationalization:

POLAR2
Continuous
Polarization score for a given Congress for
the year in which a member was accused of
a crime
none
H3, H4

o Coding:
o Propositions affected:

This variable represents Congressional polarization scores that indicate extreme political
divisions and an environment in which accusations, and ultimately punishment of MOCs, may
occur. It was reasonable to expect that there was a relationship between congressional
polarization and the dependent variables as eras of high polarization might provide a political
atmosphere in which political animosity would be so intense that any potential criminal
accusations of the opposition might be exploited. The assumption was that polarization affects
accusation47, and eventually punishment. The direction of association between this variable and
the dependent variables was expected to be positive.

Schudson (2004), in his article on scandals stated that Watergate “offered a language and framework for public
discourse about scandal around the world in the decades since.”
47
The hypothesis for polarization is that members in a polarized Congress and members with extreme policy views
escalate confrontation in Congress thus polarization may increase the probability of criminal accusation.
46
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The datasets for this variable were found in Keith Poole’s website48 for the US House of
Representatives (house_polarization46_113) and the US Senate (senate_polarization46_113).
Poole used a statistical method he labeled Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation
(or DW-NOMINATE) to measure congressional roll call votes based on two dimensions:
ideological (first) and economic/geographic (second). The votes were sampled for relative
differences in these two dimensions so that liberal/conservative and north/south differences
might be obtained. Then the data was analyzed by taking an average of the difference of Poole’s
mean scores for each party in a year in which a MOC was accused of a crime. This was done for
both chambers. This analysis yielded continuous data for each year in Poole’s tables (for the data
and explanations see Poole, 2008; Poole, n.d.; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997)49.
Poole’s datasets contain scores for the 46th Congress (beginning in 1879) through the
113th Congress (beginning in 2011). Senate and House polarization data was missing for some
Congresses: for example, there was no data for the 1st Congress through the 45th Congress as
these legislative sessions were prior to the 1878 Congressional elections. These were the next
contests after the Hayes-Tilden presidential election of 1876, which resulted in a deal ending
Reconstruction after the Republicans and Southern Democrats agreed to award all disputed
electoral votes to Hayes. This election affected the 2nd dimension as the Democratic party split
narrowed the polarization scores between the 2 major parties. Poole chose not to use data prior to
the 1879 for this reason as there was insufficient error to make the analysis effective. There was
no data after the 113th Congress as this research ended.

48

Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal constructed the NOMINATE process in the 1980s to assess Congressional
polarization.
49
Poole’s website is no longer available but the data was retrieved earlier in this research.
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Figure A.2 in the appendix shows the polarization in the House of Representatives from
1879 to 2013 measured by party voting means and indicating periods of high and low
polarization based on the first dimension. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) made a distinction
between Northern Democrats and Southern Democrats as one was historically liberal, and one
more conservative based on observed voting patterns.
INSERT FIGURE A.2 – PARTY MEANS
Member Party Unity Score
o Label:
o Scale:

o Coding:
o Propositions affected:

MPUS
Continuous
o Operationalization: Ideological extremity
score of an MOC measured by party loyalty
in roll call voting
none
H3, H4

The ideological extremity score for a legislator was the result of individual voting as
provided by data from Poole (n.d.2) and may be a predictor of criminal accusation and
punishment. Poole’s data provided Party Unity Scores, from his DW-NOMINATE method and
was based on member roll call votes.50 The scoring method wasn’t perfect, was the result of
combinations of eras, was scored in percentages of legislator voting agreement with a party but
provided a useful predictive model of a member’s voting (Poole, 2008). The direction of
association was expected to be positive (based on Poole’s assumptions), as the more polarized a
member’s voting (relative to his or her own party) the greater the chance of political targeting,
and therefore political accusation if a member was accused of a crime. The member party unity

50

The so-called 50-50 votes are a measure of ideology as the party votes usually fall along ideological lines. Poole
(n.d. 2) states that “a Party Unity vote is one that pits a majority of one Party against a majority of the opposite Party
(see https://legacy.voteview.com/Party_Unity.htm). The data for the votes comes from Poole’s website which states
that “the files….contain the party unity scores by Congress for every Democrat and Republican voting on at least 10
party unity votes in the Congress. A party unity vote is defined as one where at least 50 percent of Democrats vote
against at least 50 percent of Republicans.”
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scoring method was based on assessments of certain votes on specific issues chosen for their
policy bases such that they could be classified in one of the two dimensions.
Member party unity score was measured during the Congress in which the MOC was
accused, or if the accusation occurred post-congressional service, the last Congress in which the
MOC served was used. This study did not use the Congress in which punishment occurred
because the MOC was most likely out of office by then, and the Congress in which the legislator
was accused was the closest to the alleged corruption. The starting point of the analysis began
with accusation, therefore that Congress was the more appropriate measurement point. For
example, for Rep. Frank Clark (D-PA) the 93rd Congress was used (instead of 95th Congress
during which he was accused) because his last service was in the 93rd. This study used the
member party unity score for closest or last Congress in which MOC served if the accusation
was after congressional service (for a crime committed while in congressional service). Rep.
James Traficant was accused during the 107th Congress, but he recorded but very few votes
during that legislative session so the 106th Congress member party unity score was used.
The data was not complete as there were missing scores for certain eras. For example,
there was no data for 31st to 34th Congresses as the country had a virtual one-party system, so
Poole did not produce data for them. The two-party system was transitioning from
Democrat/Whig to Democrat/Republican and the voting data did not conform to the 2dimensional model, and therefore was not used (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, p. 86-88; Poole,
n.d.2). There was also data missing from the 18th Congress for Senate and House Party Unity
Scores. The 18th was the transition Congress after the dissolution of the Federalist Party. The
error rates for these Congresses dropped and were not sufficient to produce the measurements
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required for inclusion in the datasets for the House and Senate based in the methodology used by
Poole and Rosenthal.
Member party unity score was a measure based on so-called 50-50 votes, where more
than 50% of one party opposes more than 50% of the other party on a specific vote (Poole,
n.d.2). These votes provided sufficient variance to be used in Poole and Rosenthal’s
methodology. While a measure of the chamber the 50-50 votes provided scores for each
member, by Congress, and the data were found on Poole’s website at
https://legacy.voteview.com/Party_Unity.htm.
Figure A.3 in the Appendix, from Poole and Rosenthal’s website (for the 111th
Congress), depicted the results of voting during a period of high member party unity score scores
and provided an example of ideological extremity. Significantly there was no voting overlap in
this example as strict party voting occurred.
INSERT FIGURE A.3 HERE - HOUSE POLARIZATION 2009-2011
Crime Type
• Label:
• Scale:
• Operationalization:
•
•

Coding:
Propositions affected:

CRIME
Categorical (dichotomous)
MOC crime accusations dichotomized by type
of crime
0 = expressive; 1 = instrumental
H1, H4

Criminal statutes multiplied and evolved as history progressed, for example, there were
no federal statutes for bribery in the 19th century as previously mentioned. The crimes in this
study were divided between instrumental and expressive types as shown in Table A.4.
Instrumental crimes might be more indicative of the type of corruption that affects the institution,
for example. Expressive crimes might be more indicative of a personal type of corruption. A
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frequency table of all crimes is in Table A.5. This variable should be positive as related to
instrumental crime as well as for expressive crime.
INSERT TABLE A.4: CRIME TYPOLOGIES
TABLE A.5: MOC CRIME TYPOLOGY FREQUENCY
Seriousness of Crime
• Label:
• Scale:
• Operationalization:
• Coding:
• Propositions affected:

SOC
Categorical
Seriousness of crimes accused measured on 3 levels
0 = misdemeanor, 1 = low felony, 2 = high felony
H1

The seriousness of crime, as measured by the potential criminal justice sanctions, was
presumed to influence the eventual punishments assessed. This was determined by punishment
of the crime charged, mostly on the federal level. The seriousness of crime classifications were
operationalized by criminal justice punishments, based on the terms used in Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (United States Sentencing Commission, n.d.), and as split in three by SPSS:
misdemeanor, low felony and high felony (see Tables A.25a and A.25b).
INSERT TABLE A.25a – SOP CLASSIFICATION TABLE
INSERT TABLE A.25b – SEVRITY OF CRIME CATEGORICAL VARIABLES
CODINGS
There was an assumed correlation between the seriousness of crime and SOP, and the
direction of association between each severity category and the dependent variable should be
positive. It is also assumed that as the seriousness of crime increases the greater the potential for
the loss of power.
2.

Descriptive Statistics

The standard deviations scores on the Descriptive Statistics (see Table A.13a) showed a
wide range from .389 (Crime Type) to 52.088 (Year Punished). Some of the standard deviations
were quite high in addition to Year Punished, as in Member Party Unity Score (16.2168556).
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These values indicated a significant spread of the data away from the mean. Some of the
standard deviations were low, indicating a spread of the data closer to the mean (e.g. in addition
to Crime Type, there was Majority/Minority Status at .454, Party at .497 and Accused
Before/After 1974 at .496).
INSERT TABLE A.13: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
3.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study was one member of the United States Congress, either
a Senator or a member of the House of Representatives, having been accused of a crime by a
prosecuting authority.
C.

Analysis of Severity of Punishment and Loss of Power Models
1.

Overview, Data Checking

This section presents the data analysis findings for the dependent variables severity of
punishment and loss of power using the independent variables party membership (Dem/nonDem), majority/minority status, year punished, tenure of the accused, punished before/after
1974, polarization in congress, member party unity score, crime type and seriousness of crime.
Primary data were collected and processed in this analysis. Binomial logistic regressions were
run in IBM SPSS Statistics v.23 and then v. 25 to analyze the model of all IVs against each
dependent variable. Some of these correlations were statistically significant. The results of the
logistical regressions are shown in Tables A.16 and A.17. The sample size was small, and the
assumptions were met (except as mentioned below). The sample and the population were the
same and were non-random in nature due to the definitive selection process of the observations
(only the punished legislators were used). The binomial logistic regressions provided results on
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statistical significance, direction of the relationships and the odds ratios for the categorical
variables.
The dependent variables were discrete and dichotomized. The independent variables
were a mix of categorical, discrete and continuous values thus logistic regression was
appropriate. The descriptive statistics were run and the means and standard deviations were
produced (see Table 13). The data, having been collected over a period of time, were checked
for errors and updated as additional sources of information were found. For example, the initial
data on Rep. Robert Garcia (Grossman, 2003, p. 139) indicated that he was convicted but not
punished, but further research showed the conviction was overturned on appeal. Initial findings
provided months sentenced, but additional research provided the actual amount of time served as
in the case of Rep. Carroll Hubbard, who was sentenced to 36 months in prison but only served
24 (New York Times, 1998).
2.

Statistical Analysis of the Variables

The Chi Square goodness of fit test statistics are in Table A.14 in the appendix. Five of
the nine variable values rejected the null hypothesis (at p=.05) and thus are statistically
significant for this purpose (majority/minority, tenure of the accused, polarization of congress,
crime type and seriousness of crime). The statistics for the other four variables (party
membership, year punished, accused before/after 1974 and member party unity score) showed
that the null hypothesis was not rejected and thus we cannot tell if the observed values were
significantly different from the hypothesized values. These bivariate results indicate the models’
ability to predict the hypothesized outcomes.
TABLE A.14 – CHI SQUARE TESTS STATISTICS OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
IVs
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3.

Statistical Assumptions

The statistical analysis used a binomial logistic regressions (BLR) for each of the 2
dependent variables. A BLR was run for the SOP model and the LOP models. The results of all
BLRs are found in Tables A.16 and A.17. The outcomes were discrete and met the logistic
regression assumptions.51 While not an explicit assumption for logistic regression the discrete
and continuous variables of year punished, tenure of the accused, polarization of congress and
member party unity score were not normally distributed (see Descriptive Statistics, Table A.13).
The sample size of 136 was within the recommended 10 cases per predictor52. There were
sufficient degrees of freedom in the model for each dependent variable to allow for the
population parameters. The sample was the population thus there was no generalization.
The tests for multicollinearity (see Tables A.15a and A.15b in the appendix) were
satisfied and showed that the predictors were independent of each other by the standard
parameters of collinearity assumptions (tolerance >.10 and VIF <10).
INSERT TABLE A15.a – COLLINEARITY STATISTICS FOR SOP IVs
INSERT TABLE A15.b – COLLINEARITY STATISTICS FOR LOP IVs
4.

The Models - Results
a)

Severity of Punishment Model

There were three statistically significant predictors in the full model for this dependent
variable (see Table A.16). The standard error for the constant was 8010.989, a high value, likely
due to the small sample.53

51

The dependent variable was binary, there was linearity between the independent variables and the log odds, there
was no multicollinearity, and there were no outliers .
52
For the 9 independent variables there should be 90 recommended cases for this data set (see Van Smeden, et al.,
2018; and Statistics Solutions, n.d.
53
The P value of .10 is used for both the SOP and LOP regression due to the small sample size, as at p=.05 very few
relationships were statistically significant.
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The variable party (Dem/Non-Dem) was statistically significant and positive (at .063, p
≤.10) and the odds were 4.692, indicating that a Democrat was more than four times more likely
to suffer severe punishment than non-Democrats. For year punished (at .074, p ≤.10) the odds
were 1.041 and the direction was positive, meaning that for each year that passed there was an
increased probability of 4% that a member would suffer severe punishment. For polarization of
congress (at .066, p ≤.10), the odds were 74.733 meaning that as Congress was more polarized
the chance of a member being punished more severely increased by more than 74 times, and the
direction as positive.
INSERT TABLE A.16: BINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS – SOP MODEL
b)

Loss of Power Model

The standard error for the model was 34.805 (p ≤.10), a high value indicating the model
was not a good predictor of the outcome. Two independent variables in the model were
significant (see Table A.17).
Party membership (Dem/Non-Dem) was positive and statistically significant (at .028,
p=.10) in the model, and the odds were .190 meaning that being a Democrat decreased the
possibility of the losing power by 19% as the direction was negative. For Crime type (.005,
p=.10), the odds were 17.922, indicating that by committing an instrumental crime a member
was about 17 times more likely to be punished, and the direction was positive.
INSERT TABLE A.17: BINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS – LOP MODEL
5.

Validity and Reliability

Cronbach’s alpha was used as an internal reliability test (an homogeneity test).
“Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items
are as a group. It is a measure of scale reliability (IDRE, n.d.).” The low alpha score (.151)
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indicated a low probability of reliability. This was undoubtedly due to the small population of
observations (see Table A.19).
INSERT TABLE A.19 RELIABILITY TEST – CRONBACH’S ALPHA
6.

Analysis of the Four Theoretical Propositions

The theoretical propositions hypothesized in section III-A above were analyzed using the
BLRs.
a)

H1: Punishment Varies Based on The Seriousness of Crime

The first sub-proposition was Punishment for Corruption, an Offense to the Institution, Is
More Severe Than Punishments for Other Felonies (H1a). The results of the logistic regressions
were based on the dependent variables severity of punishment and loss of power and the predictor
crime type. The hypothesis was that instrumental crimes, such as bribery (the most frequently
committed offense), were punished more than expressive crimes. But the results were not
statistically significant. However, loss of power could be strongly predicted from crime type
(.006, p≤.10) with odds at 19.201 and the direction of the relationship was positive, as predicted,
and shown in the full model (see Table A.17).
b)

H2: Punishment Is Treated the Same Across Time

This proposition, through the sub-proposition The Severity of Punishment of Crime Has
Not Varied Over the Last 218 Years (H2a), suggested that there were positive relationships
between SOP and Year Punished, and LOP and Year Punished. The results of the binomial test
were statistically significant for SOP at .074 (p≤.10) with odds at 1.041, a moderate result. But
the results for the LOP model was not significant (at.117, p≤.10). The hypothesis was that the
severity of punishment remained constant over time but SOP did increase somewhat over time.
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c)

H3: Punishment Is Mediated Through Politics

There are four sub-propositions, and the first is Members of the Minority Will Be
Punished More Harshly Than Members of the Majority (H3a). The variable majority/minority
status was tested against SOP and LOP. None of the results were statistically significant
although the preliminary hypothesis was that minority members would be more severely
punished as the political leverage and investigative authority in Congress was with the majority.
Ethics violations and investigations could then be targeted to minority members, who might then
be subject to criminal prosecution and eventual punishment. Their removal from office would
strengthen the majority. But this could not be supported.
The second sub-proposition is During Periods of High Congressional Polarization,
Crimes Will Be Punished More Severely Than in Low Polarization (H3b). The direction of the
relationship only between the SOP and polarization of Congress was positive, in keeping with
the hypothesis, and was significant only in the SOP model (.066, p≤.10), with odds at 74.733 was
positive, indicating a strong predictive value. The relationship between SOP and polarization of
Congress was not statistically significant, contrary to the hypothesis.
The third sub-proposition was that The More Orthodox the Voting Record of the Member
the Greater the Chance of More Severe Punishment (H3c). This refers to the member party unity
score variable which assesses a Member of Congress who votes with his or her party more of the
time than not. The member party unity score regressions were not statistically significant,
despite the initial thinking that more extreme members, those who voted with their party
exceptionally often, might be more at risk for political targeting.
In perhaps one of the most interesting non-significant results, tenure of the accused, as a
predictor, was inconsequential in determining either outcome in the fourth sub-proposition
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Members with Less Seniority Will Be Punished More Severely Than Those with More Seniority
(H3d). The hypothesis was that the tenure of a member would prove significant as the
opportunity for corruption would increase over time as a member would become more inured in
the Washington environment and would thereby attract the disproportionate attention of
lobbyists and other stakeholders. But this was not the case54
d)

H4: Punishment Is Contingent on the Perception of Crime

The first sub-proposition was that the Congressional Reforms In 1974 After the
Watergate Era Corruption Scandal Led to More Severe Punishment Than Before 1974 (H4a).
Both model regression results were not significant, and the direction was negative for each. It
was hypothesized that the since there were many more prosecutions (and subsequently MOCS
punished) in the immediate period after 1974 that the regressions for this proposition would have
shown significance given the public attention to this scandal.
For the sub-proposition Punishment Will Be More Severe During Periods of Low Public
Trust of Congress and Less Severe During Periods of High Public Trust of Congress (H4b) the
hypothesis was based on the thinking that to the electorate, in most cases, an accusation was as
damaging as a conviction, so that if a Member of Congress was accused of a crime his or her
electoral prospects would be seriously diminished. Thus, loss of power should have correlated to
low public trust. The effect of an accusation alone usually was as good as a conviction in
electoral terms and caused resignations, election losses and forced legislators to abandon
reelection. Once trust was lost a politician rarely survived.

54

There was not much variation in the variable, with odds at 1.031 for SOP and 1.111 for LOP, thus the
relationships between the predictor and the DVs was only moderate at best. The shortest tenure in the dataset
belonged to 11 members, and notably Rep. Wes Cooley (R-OR) who was among the most punished. The longest
tenured member was Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK) whose indictment was dismissed and therefore did not suffer any
CRJ punishment (although he did lose the next election).
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The data on the lowering of public trust of government was hypothesized to be affected
by the lowering of trust in politicians, a primary example of which is the accusation and
punishment of members of Congress. The voting public may consider a single corrupt politician
as indicative of the whole institution.
The Pew Research Center (2015) provided data on the perception of public trust of
government from 1958 to 2015 (see Figure A.4). The Pew data was used to construct a public
trust variable in SPSS with the percentage of public trust by year. Where a given year was not
included in the PEW data, either an average of the years preceding and following were taken, or
the data for the nearest year was used. The data was then compared to the year punished
variable but only for MOCS suffering LOP. Then a second variable was constructed by
dichotomizing by high trust (1) and low trust (0) using the 50% cut point (50% public favorable
rating of the government) from the first public trust variable (IV = PUBLIC TRUST2, DV =
LOP). Only 70 cases were included in the analysis (65 observations had missing data) as only
the MOCS suffering LOP were considered, and the PEW data only started with the year 1958.
The relationship between PUBLIC TRUST2 and LOP was not statistically significant (at .999,
p≤.05), meaning public trust was not correlated to the loss of power (see Table A.21).
INSERT FIGURE A.4 – PEW RESEARCH GRAPH – PUBLIC TRUST
INSERT TABLE A.21 – LOP AND PUBLIC TRUST2
D.

Interpretation of Severity of Punishment and Loss of Power Models
1.

How Models Support the Hypotheses

The regressions show that the Pearson values for this dataset were not much different
than other data tested in the deterrence literature, showing moderate, weak or no results
(Paternoster, 2010), with the exception of polarization of Congress. However, we might
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hypothesize that since accused MOCS must have been concerned with political effects, this
sensitizing condition might have made this particular group more susceptible to general
deterrence. The findings show that three predictors were related to SOP in the model: party
(Dem/non-Dem), year punished and polarization of Congress, and party (Dem/non-Dem) and
crime type were related to LOP in the model (therefore these variables were useful predictors of
a member losing his or her seat in Congress, in varying degrees of strength).
Party (Dem/non-Dem) was a weak predictor of the severity of punishment, year punished
was a moderate predicator and polarization of Congress was a very strong predictor with high
odds at 77.102. All were positive in direction. The interesting finding is that the polarization in
Congress had such a significant effect on punishment severity possibly explained by the animus
generated during times of high polarization and the zero-sum mentality of many of the members.
Certainly, such polarized times made politics a risky profession as the media of the day would
report any negative behavior, exposing a member to extraordinary scrutiny and possible
prosecution for any perceived wrongdoing.
The variable 1974 was not significant in either dependent variable, thus was not a
predictor of how much punishment was meted out to Members of Congress, nor whether they
lost their office. This is counter to the hypotheses. The Watergate effect (bringing more attention
to political corruption) was not a factor and did not provide an explanation as to why members
were caught and punished. The sense was that as the natural oppositional environment in
Congress devolved from debates to games to fights (Rapoport, 1960), and as civility disappeared
the tendency to accuse and punish increased, but this was not reflected in the regressions.
For the dependent variable loss of power two independent variables in the model were
significant: party membership and crime type. The chance of a member suffering LOP decreased
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by 19% due to party membership, thus being a Democrat (the party of the plurality of members
accused) was somewhat predictive. This variable’s effect might be based on some power
construct, as the Democratic party was older than any other party in the nation’s history and thus
there was a greater probability that more party members would be subject to prosecution. The
crime type variable had odds of 17.922, indicating a strong relationship to LOP. Clearly, being
accused of an instrumental crime made for a much higher probability of a legislator losing his or
her seat in Congress than being accused of an expressive crime.
The regression results for severity of punishment showed that Democrats had a greater
chance of suffering severe criminal justice punishment than members of other parties. Yet
Democrats were predicted to have a lesser probability of losing power. However, a review of the
data shows that 49 Democrats suffered criminal justice punishment, but 60 lost power. Of these
19 lost power but were not criminally punished. These statistics were counter to the hypothesis
and may have been sufficient to account for this anomaly.
The variables that proved to be non-significant still belong in the model as they make
theoretical sense even if they did not test well, and they may have suffered from the sample size
effect. The mix of criminal justice and political variables was interesting and provided a unique
contrast for the consideration of punishment.
2.

Interpretation of the Non-Significant Correlations

A review of the SOP non-significant results (see Table A.16) showed that the
majority/minority correlation was weakly negative (odds .660 less 1 = -.340), tenure of the
accused was weakly positive (odds 1.031), accused before/after 1974 was negative (odds .461),
member party unity score was positive (odds 1.011), crime type was positive with very high odds
and seriousness of crime had a positive correlation (odds 1.789).
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The LOP non-significant results indicated that majority/minority was positive (odds =
1.163), year punished was positive with odds of 1.028, tenure of the accused was negative (odds
1.111), accused before/after 1974 was negative (odds .599), polarization of Congress was
negative (odds .254), member party unity score was very positive (odds 1.003) and seriousness
of crime was moderately positive (odds 1.231).
3.

Contribution of the Theoretical Prepositions

The four theoretical propositions covered the critical areas of concern for this study. One
point was that the loss of power, even as a binary construct, was a severe penalty, as politicians
go to great lengths to acquire and protect power, thus losing their elections may have been the
ultimate punishment for them. It was a zero-sum consequence as one lost one’s seat or one did
not, and strongly affected an accused member’s calculus in deciding whether or not to defend
against criminal charges.
For the proposition H1, Punishment Is Treated Differently Based on The Seriousness of
crime, only the relationship between crime type and LOP was significant, with strong cause and
effect. Instrumental crime was more rationally predisposed, and thus was more predictive of
losing one’s seat in Congress. The rational actor theory is inherent in deterrence and this result
helped confirm that concept.
None of the results of the proposition The Severity of Punishment of Crime Has Not
Varied Over the Last 218 Years (H2) were significant. The fact that more criminal laws were
enacted over time, and thus there were more criminal acts possible, added to the possibility that
more crime might be committed, but did not affect the significance of this premise.
For proposition H3, Punishment is Mediated Through Politics, there were 4 subpropositions. Only the relationship between polarization of Congress and SOP was statistically
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significant. The first proposition was Members of the Minority Will Be Punished More Harshly
Than Members of the Majority (H3a). Minority members were not necessarily targeted, and the
majority did not often use extraordinary measures based on its control of Congress to investigate
and punish minority members. For During Periods of High Congressional Polarization, Crimes
Will Be Punished More Severely Than in Low Polarization (H3b) there was a reasonable
expectation that polarization would be a major factor in both SOP and LOP and the findings
were strongly in keeping with the expectations in the LOP model. For the sub-proposition The
More Orthodox the Voting Record of the Member the Greater the Chance of More Severe
Punishment (H3c) the member ideological extremity scores were not predictive and thus orthodox
MOCS were not necessarily at greater risk. The sub-proposition Members with Less Seniority
Will Be Punished More Severely Than Those with More Seniority (H3d) should have been
strongly correlated with both dependent variables. But this proposition was not a determinant of
punishment, as originally thought. Tenure was thought to be a strong predictor, as the hypothesis
was that the longer a politician stayed in office the more likely he or she would become
corruptible. Also, by rising in seniority a member was more likely to become a part of the power
system, and thus more corruptible by being more useful to corrupt stakeholders. But this was not
the case.
This study expected that the last proposition, Punishment Is Contingent on The
Perception of Crime (H4), would be related in a positive way to SOP and LOP. The first subproposition was Congressional Reforms in 1974 After the Watergate Era Corruption Scandal Led
to More Severe Punishment Than Before 1974 (H4a). There were twenty-nine MOC accusations
in the period from Watergate (1974) to ABSCAM (1980), more than any other similar period in
the study. Twenty members were punished, again more than any other such period in the study.
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Two scandals drove up the numbers, and there certainly was increased scrutiny of, and less
tolerance of, political corruption during and following Watergate. But the variable was not
significant, and the expected strong takeaway did not manifest. The second sub-proposition was
Punishment Will Be More Severe During Periods of Low Public Trust of Congress and Less
Severe During Periods of High Public Trust of Congress (H4b) and assumed an inverse
correlation of public trust and congressional polarization (e.g. high congressional polarization =
low public trust). A review of the Tables A.22, A.23 and A.24 showed that all CRJ sanctioned
members of the majority suffered severe punishment during times of high polarization but
twenty-nine (82.9%) of the CRJ sanctioned minority members incurred low punishment during
times of high polarization. During times of low polarization legislators in both the majority and
minority were subjected to less severe punishment. The results, based on face validity, were
clear that MOCS that suffered criminal punishment were sanctioned more severely during high
polarization periods than those punished during low polarization periods. This is in keeping with
the hypothesis.
INSERT TABLE A.22 - FREQUENCIES: LOP WITH MAJ/MIN AND POLAR3
INSERT TABLE A.23 - BINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION
LOP WITH POLAR3 AND MAJMIN
INSERT TABLE A.24 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS CHART OF MAJ/MIN AND POLAR3
E.

Conclusion
a)

Review of the Findings

The combination of criminal justice and political variables provided a new perspective on
the dichotomized effects of punishment, and the data seems to reflect useful relationships among
the variables which revealed the pressure on accused members caught between wanting to hold
onto power while trying to avoid catastrophic criminal justice consequences. The analysis
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indicated issues of power and the potentially corrupting effects of the institutional environment
of Congress, both of which affected the Members of Congress in this study.
b)

Relationship to the Content Analysis

The content analysis chapter which follows further examines the significance of some of
the variables in light of comments made by AICP stakeholders (including members of Congress,
congressional leaders, judges, prosecutors and the media) regarding the justification of the
punishment of members.
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V.

CONTENT ANALYSIS
This content analysis is a method that compares and analyzes comments made by various

stakeholders55 about the prosecution and convictions of four highly punished MOCs chosen for
this analysis.
A.

Rationale and Theories

The rationale for this qualitative analysis, and the underlying hypotheses, is that of the
two theories used in the quantitative section of this dissertation, Deterrence Theory (DT) does
not fully explain the purposes of punishing members of Congress who commit crimes, but the
Theory of Mediated Corruption may provide useful insights. The fact that most of the MOCs in
this study were sanctioned is sufficient to warrant the inquiry into these observations, and the
political context provides a better understanding of their criminal behavior. As public officials,
stakeholder responses are relevant for members of Congress contemplating criminal acts.
This analysis will show that the various stakeholders were concerned about the corruption
of these legislators as may be mediated by the Congressional environment. The Theory of
Mediated corruption provides the frame for the analysis of the stakeholder comments. If this
theory is viable then some of the political variables in this dissertation would apply (e.g.,
majority/minority status) and suggest that the congressional environment is a potential mediator
of MOC criminal behavior. Further, Thompson (1995, p.1) writes about a survey of the
American people which states that, “Congress as an institution is corrupt.” The analysis
ultimately is about the integrity of the institution, and its potential for facilitating the criminal
acts of its members.

55

A stakeholder in this study is someone with a vested interest in the criminal actions of the four MOCS in question,
whether a judge, Member of Congress, prosecutor or journalist, and their judgments on MOC punishment is
meaningful as they have a practical or presumptive moral stake in the outcomes of the cases.
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B.

Hypotheses
1.

Initial Convenience Sample

An initial, non-probability convenience sample of stakeholder comments was conducted
in order to determine a basis for categories to be used in the content analysis. This sample
provided six conceptual categories56 which represented the concerns of the stakeholders. The
sample was collected from the literature, scandals found in the initial research and provided
various stakeholder observations of MOC punishment as shown in Table A.27. In terms of
conceptualizations inferred from the quotes and comments (see Table TA.30), institutional
integrity was an issue for political stakeholders and public trust was important for legal
stakeholders. Also, loss of power was of concern as this might be a significant outcome. These
initial categories were used to form the bases of the hypotheses below.
INSERT TABLE A.27: CONTENT ANALYSIS - INITIAL NON-PROBABILITY
CATEGORIES
a)

Explanation of the Initial Six Categories

The six conceptual categories explained below were deduced from the stakeholder
comments and were supported by the literature from political and legal authors, and major
political scandals (see Table TA.45)57.
(1)

Public Trust

Public trust was an important issue for the stakeholders as evidenced by their comments
(see samples in Table A.41a). Once trust was lost by politicians, it was difficult to regain, and
the consequences of offending the electorate were serious. Such trust was destroyed by criminal
acts, chief among them bribery, the most prolific offense by politicians (see Table A.5). Noonan,

56
57

Some of the quotes and comments used in this sample are found in Chapters I and II earlier in this dissertation.
Some citations from earlier in the dissertation were used in describing the conceptual bases for these categories.
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(1984, p. 703-704) states bribery is a “sellout” to the public and a “betrayal of trust.” This
behavior damages the “social fabric,” and the actions of these white-collar criminals “create
distrust…which lowers social morale…” (Sutherland, 1940). Winning an election depends on
the electorate, and public trust is necessary for earning votes. Fenno (1997, p. 28) stated that “if
politicians hoped to retain public trust…they must maintain this link between campaigning and
governing” suggesting a connection between ethical behavior both in elections and in political
office. Assistant US Attorney Puccio, in the trial of Sen. Harrison Williams, argued that the
court must apply a sentence “which is helpful to deter others who might wish to engage in
similar conduct and betray the public trust” (Katzmann, 1991, p. 355).
INSERT TABLE A.41a - SAMPLE OF COMMENTS REFERRING TO PUBLIC TRUST
(2)

Retribution

The stakeholders’ sense of retribution mandated that offending MOCs deserved
punishment, and in the cases of the MOCs in this study, that takes both criminal justice and
political forms. The criminal justice punishment itself has two bases in that “there is, in general,
more punishment for professional versus personal improprieties, perhaps because constituents
see the former
as more relevant to MCs’ job performance” (Paschall, 2019). Criminal justice punishment is the
expected outcome of criminal behavior, and MOCs run the risk of losing their political offices as
well. Sen. Wallop, in the trial of Sen. Williams, commented “there can be no compromise with
bribery, influence peddling, conflict of interest and ethically repugnant conduct” (Noonan, 1984,
p. 618), and the political fate of Sen. Williams was removal from Congress, ending his career, as
“expulsion was symbolic execution” (Noonan, 1984, p. 618). Katzmann (1991, p. 367) argued
that “punishment should be scaled to the offender’s culpability and the resulting harms” and that

80

the case of Harrison Williams “demonstrates that criminality can produce punitive consequences,
such as loss of employment, quite apart from the penal sanction” (Katzmann, 1991, p. 385).
Thompson (1995, p. 140) echoed this notion stating that “in the current system of enforcement
consists of two decisions: a finding by Congress and a subsequent verdict by the electorate.”
(3)

Institutional Integrity

Stakeholders, especially the political ones, were concerned with protecting the institution
of Congress. The electorate was negatively affected by political scandals in that “from
overdrawn checking accounts in the House banking scandal in 1992…..malfeasance by members
of Congress has become a familiar feature of the institution” (Paschall, et al., 2020). This issue
is significant enough to warrant a separate conceptual category.
Several authors make this point regarding the effects of members’ behavior on Congress.
Paschall, et al. (2020) stated that “it would be a mistake, then, to overstate the importance of
scandals to MCs’ career prospects and to the functioning of Congress as an institution”
Further, Thompson (1993, p. 144) remarked that “the [Congressional] ethics process seeks to
determine whether a member’s conduct has harmed the institution.” Fenno (1997, p. 34) inferred
that party politics diminished institutional integrity in that the Republican tactics in their 1994
takeover of Congress “represented an attack on the performance of Congress as a political
institution.”
(4)

Loss of Power

Members of Congress often fear losing their political offices more than criminal justice
punishment, as the research in Chapter IV suggests. The loss of power for these members
devolves to a form of political incapacitation by removal from Congress, and as such was a
consequential consideration for the stakeholders. Members were concerned that “alleged
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misconduct undermines voters’ assessments of the accused, making the incumbent more
vulnerable to defeat” (Basinger, 2013) and that “combine retiring, resigning, being expelled, and
losing a primary or general election, only 59 percent of scandal-tainted incumbents returned to
the House in the subsequent Congress, compared to 87 percent of incumbents who were
untainted by scandal.” MOCs are aware that “the public deems that politicians’ sins are relevant
to their character, which is relevant to their electability” (Basinger, 2013). The research shows
that political scandals damage members and that “not surprisingly, these effects translate into
electoral costs” to the extent that “it is well established that scandal-implicated MCs tend to fare
worse at the polls in the next election than their untainted colleagues” (Paschall, et al., 2019).
(5)

Status

Section II.B.2 above provides the thinking of several scholars on the issue of status.
Sutherland (1940) wrote about the issue of status58 in his work on white collar crime and the
need to punish those in positions of high status (e.g., federal legislators) in that they were
“respectable” and came from the “upper class,” but their criminal actions made them
“convictable” whether they were actually convicted. These inferences to corruption are similar to
those of Shover & Hochstetler (2006, p. 52), who suggested that such offenders “… are more
advantaged by material circumstances and respectability and thus may feel a sense of privilege in
that they may be above scrutiny and prosecution” and that they suffered from a working in an
“ethos of entitlement” (p. 68). Noonan (1984, p. 619) stated that “no legislator, however high his
status, was exempt” from punishment.

“Status” refers to socioeconomic status of the MOC, differentiating blue collar crime from white collar crime (a
term coined by Sutherland in 1940), common terms in criminal justice separating street crime (e.g., violent crime)
from financially motivated crimes.
58
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(6)

Corruption

Corruption refers to acts and behavior that violate legal norms, and thus nefarious actors
are justifiably punished. Chapter II of this dissertation provides some hypothetical substance for
this category. There is an inherent criminality to such acts as suggested by Harvard political
scientist Joseph Nye’s definition of corruption: “behavior which deviates from the normal duties
of a public role because of private-regarding, pecuniary or status gains” (Heidenheimer &
Johnston, 2002, p.26). Mark Philp provided a definition for corruption that involved a “violation
of trust” by an act that “harms the public interest” and “exploits the office” for illicit reasons
(Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 42), with the binary possibilities of “routine corruption”
(e.g., bribery) and “aggravated corruption” (e.g., scandals) (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p.
150-151). Rose-Ackerman (1978, p. 31) stated that “…corruption occurs at the interface of the
public and private sectors…. whenever a public official has discretionary power over a benefit or
cost, incentives for bribery are created.” Corruption is a factor of the political environment in
Congress, a potential breeding ground for criminogenic behavior.
2.

Variables and Stakeholders
a)

Comments

Table A.37 shows the stakeholder comments by category and the type of stakeholder
comment by MOC. There were 253 total comments collected of which 217 were comments
made post-conviction (after the MOCS were convicted). The analysis was based on these postconviction comments as they may be more relevant regarding the stakeholders’ judgments about
the effects of the crimes committed.
INSERT TABLE A.37 - CONTENT ANALYSIS - COMMENTS DATA RESULTS
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b)

The Majority/Minority Variable

The majority/minority variable symbolizes the struggle for power n Congress. Many
political stakeholders think that MOCs in the minority in Congress have a negative effect on
institution. For example, Rep. Robert Walker, part of the Newt Gingrich led Republican
revolution in 1994, stated that “the chief job of the minority party is to become the majority"
(Wolfensberger, 2010). The antagonism fostered by minority members trying to topple the
majority in an aggressive manner reveals the members’ behavior in the institution. Rep.
Gingrich, then a minority Member of Congress, attacked Speaker James Wright in 199459 stating
that “the House is sick, and Wright is the symbol” (Fenno, 1997, p. 16). The minority was trying
to become the majority, and Gingrich’s comment represented the attitude of the minority,
suggesting that the status of the institution meant less than the quest for power, even if it
devolved to making criminal accusations against majority members.60 Perverse political
influences diminish the integrity of the institution, chief among them is the constant power
struggle between the majority party and the minority party (Fenno, 1997, p. 35).
The minority sought to gain power at the expense of the majority as “sometimes the
minority chooses a path out of emotion, not reason; and on occasion the minority simply acts
because it is preferable to taking no action at all” (Green, 2, 2015, p. 180). This suggests that the
compulsion of power-seeking has a possible effect on institutional integrity as traditional
Congressional protocols are sacrificed. The transactional side of politics provided an
environment which facilitated corruption. Congress was negatively affected by the political
maneuvering in that it “…fostered a pattern of arrogance on one side and frustration on the other
side of the majority-minority relationship in the House” (Fenno, 3, 1997, p. 13).

59
60

In 1994 the “Republicans won a majority in the House for the first time in 40 years” (Wolfensberger 2010).
Speaker Wright was accused of taking improper gratuities in 1989 (Dunham, 2015)
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(1)

Competition and Confrontation in Congress

Congressional confrontation is operationalized as the contest for power. The majority
party confronts the minority party and retaliation may result. This conflict increases divisions
between the majority and minority, and results in perverse competition and political targeting
leading to the loss of power as each side tries to remove the other side’s members. The minority
wants to become the majority and the majority defends against the minority. Both sides want to
win elections and control the legislative process. The end game is power and the means to that
end is electability. Many authors write about this and how confrontation devolves to corrupt
behavior is hypothesized here. Thompson (1995, p. 143) said that “more than half of the cases in
which ethics committees have taken action since 1978 have also been the subject of criminal
action,” indicating a nexus between congressional behavior and criminal justice. This is
apparent, especially since ABSCAM, as Lee (2015) observes: “after 1980 forces favoring more
confrontation steadily gained advantage and minority parties in both chambers became more
aggressive.”
Lee (2015) stated that “rising party conflict may also be driven, at least in part, by an
environment of intensified party competition for the control of governing institutions.” Fenno
(1997, 1 p. 13) refers to “confrontational partisans” who seek to gain power and Lee (2015)
references actions that “typically trigger ferocious party conflict.” Lee (2015) further states that
when leaders offer controversial measures the result is that “overall party conflict goes up.”
Fenno (1997, p. 35) wrote about the 104th Congress stating that a “confrontational majority”
would attempt to hold the minority in check to maintain power. Lee ( 2016, p. 2) stated that
“intense party competition for institutional control focuses members of Congress on the quest for
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partisan political advantage” indicating more of the zero-sum attitude of the congressional power
struggle.
c)

Stakeholder Categories

The analysis of the comments made about the four MOCS in question revealed that there
were, ultimately, three groups of stakeholders: political, legal and citizen (see Table A.33). The
stakeholders were determined by profession from the comments’ sources (e.g., Member of
Congress, journalist, prosecutor) and the resulting nine stakeholder roles were consolidated into
these three groups. The political stakeholders were the largest group, about 51% of the 253 total
comments collected, legal stakeholders were about 41% and the citizen group was the smallest at
about 8%. The literature suggested that the political stakeholders were the group most relevant
to the analysis as their comments tended to focus on the political effects of the punishment.
Legal stakeholders were also significant and their comments were hypothesized to be more about
public trust.
INSERT TABLE A.33 - CONTENT ANALYSIS - MOC AND STAKEHOLDER COUNTS
3.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses that drive the qualitative analysis are supported by the correlations
between the variable majority/minority and the content analysis outcome categories institutional
integrity and public trust. The key stakeholder category is political. The legal stakeholder
comments were more likely to involve public trust, and less so for institutional integrity, but the
political stakeholder comments concentrated on institutional integrity. Thus majority/minority
stakeholders, legal stakeholders, institutional integrity and public trust are the categories and
concepts that form the bases of the hypotheses.

86

The four hypotheses below represent the key considerations in the content analysis. The
key relationships are shown in the 3x2 matrix below, and the hypotheses are based on the
comments by these political and legal stakeholders (see Tables TA.46 and TA.46a). There were
too few comments made by the citizen stakeholders to be effectively used in the analysis, and
retribution was also not mentioned sufficiently and thus was not included in the matrix (see
Table A.37 Comments Data Results).
Table A.47 – Content Analysis Hypotheses - 3x2 Matrix
MAJORITY POLITICAL
STAKEHOLDERS

MINORITY POLITICAL
STAKEHOLDERS

LEGAL
STAKEHOLDERS

a)

INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
H1a: In commenting on the MOC cases
majority political stakeholders will
mention institutional integrity more than
non-political stakeholders would
H2a: In commenting on the MOC cases
minority political stakeholders will
mention institutional integrity more than
non-political stakeholders would
H3: In commenting on the MOC cases
legal stakeholders will mention public
trust more than political stakeholders
would

PUBLIC TRUST
H1b: In commenting on the MOC cases
majority political stakeholders will
mention public trust more than nonpolitical stakeholders would
H2b: In commenting on the MOC cases
minority political stakeholders will
mention public trust more than nonpolitical stakeholders would
H4: In commenting on the MOC cases
legal stakeholders will mention public
trust more than political stakeholders
would

H1 - Political Stakeholders and Institutional Integrity

The political stakeholders were concerned that the institution of Congress needed to be
protected from the transgressions of its members due to the MOCs presumptive immunity. The
literature suggests that the integrity of Congress was a critical concern and that the aggressive
and negative behavior of members would have a deleterious effect on the institution. The contest
for power devolved to a fight for majority control, and the resulting behavior had a negative
effect on the institution.
b)

H2 - Political Stakeholders and Public Trust

The literature does not support a positive correlation between the comments made by
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political stakeholders and public trust. The comments count was the lowest of the 3 categories
for political stakeholders and the hypothesis is for a negative correlation. While these
stakeholders are elected politicians, and concerned about the electorate, they seem to be more
concerned with congressional power than the public’s attitudes towards their behavior in
Congress.61
c)

H3 - Legal Stakeholders and Institutional Integrity

Institutional integrity was the lowest for legal stakeholders of the 3 categories and there is
sparse literature for this relationship. These stakeholders should be concerned with the
retribution of the convicted MOCs as they are actors in the AICP process, but the comment total
for this category was the lowest, a counter-intuitive result. These stakeholders also should be
less concerned with institutional integrity as they have no transactional relationship with
Congress. The hypothesis is that there should be a negative correlation between legal
stakeholders and institutional integrity.
d)

H4 - Legal Stakeholders and Public Trust

Legal stakeholders commented the most about public trust, and this should result in a
positive correlation. Prosecutors and judges exact justice in the name of the public and their trust
is critical to the criminal justice system. Prosecuting and punishing elected politicians is a
mission for AICP actors and the goal is to protect the people.

61

This represents the concept of institutional integrity as those in the institution view their roles only in response to
preserving and reinforcing within-organization status for themselves and their party. Their constituents become
increasingly unimportant, and potentially ignored.
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4.

Chi Square Test
a)

Method

A cross-tabulation analysis was run using political stakeholders and legal stakeholders
against the categories institutional integrity and public trust. The purpose was to determine the
chi square test of association among the variables. The data used were the comments made by
the political stakeholders (n=129, see Table TA.46) and the legal stakeholders (n=92, see table
TA.46a), which were based on the data in the Primary Coding Analysis (see Table TA.36). The
variables coded in the chi square analysis were as follows:
Majority Political Stakeholder
Minority Political Stakeholder
Legal Stakeholder
Institutional Integrity
Public Trust

b)

0=Non-Majority Political Stakeholder
1=Political Majority Stakeholder
0=Non-Minority Political Stakeholder
1=Minority Political Stakeholder
0=Non-Legal Stakeholder
1=Legal Stakeholder
0=Non-Institutional Integrity
1=Institutional Integrity
0=Non-Public Trust
1=Public Trust

Results

The assumptions for a chi square analyses were met62. The first chi-square test of
independence was performed to examine the relationships among majority and minority political
stakeholders and institutional integrity and public trust. The second chi-square tests the
correlation between the legal stakeholder and the categories intuitional integrity and public trust.
The results are below (see Table A.48).
For H1a (Stakeholder Politician Majority * Institutional Integrity) the correlation between
the variables was non-significant, X2 (df=1, N = 221) = 1.237, p = .259 with a designated alpha
level of .05. The non-significant results indicated a case where the distribution of observed

62

The data in the cells wer frequencies and counts, and the categories of the variables were mutually exclusive
(McHugh, 2013).
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frequencies did not deviate significantly for the expected frequencies under the null
hypothesis. Thus, there was no relationship between the variables. The same is true for the other
political stakeholder interactions that follow. For H2a (Stakeholder Politician Minority *
institutional integrity), the correlation between the variables was non-significant, X2 (df=1, N =
221) = 1.273, p = .259 with a designated alpha level of .05. For H1b (Stakeholder Politician
Majority * public trust), the correlation between the variables was non-significant, X2 (df=1, N =
221) = 2.174, p = .140 with a designated alpha level of .05. For H2b (Stakeholder Politician
Minority * public trust), the correlation between the variables was non-significant, X2 (df=1, N =
221) = 2.174, p = .140 with a designated alpha level of .05. The test results for these interactions
are shown in Table A.48. The p values were larger than the designated alpha level, so the null
hypotheses were accepted, and the results were not statistically significant. The results showed
that minority political stakeholders did not comment as much about the majority MOCs in terms
of institutional integrity. An examination of the cross tabulations tables for the political
stakeholders showed a relatively small difference between the observed counts and the expected
counts. The same was true for the observed and expected counts for the public trust interactions
as the differences were small. These results disconfirmed the hypotheses for the political
stakeholders. Thus the hypotheses for the political stakeholders were not sustained for the
institutional integrity category (a positive correlation was anticipated) but were for the public
trust category (a negative correlation as expected.)
INSERT TABLE A.48 – CHI-SQUARE RESULTS
For H3 (Stakeholder Legal * institutional integrity), the correlation between the variables
was significant, X2 (df=1, N = 221) = 69.027, p = .000 with a designated alpha level of .05. The
null hypothesis for the test is that the distribution of one variable is randomly distributed across
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the categories of the second variable (no relationship). The significant results indicated a case
where the distribution of observed frequencies deviated significantly for expected frequencies
under the null hypothesis. Thus, there is a relationship between the variables. This is the same
for the H4 interaction (Stakeholder Legal * public trust) as the correlation between the variables
was significant, X2 (df=1, N = 221) = 33.808, p = .000 with an alpha level of .05. The test results
for these interactions are shown in Table A.48. There were large differences between the
expected and observed counts for these interactions, especially for legal stakeholders and
institutional integrity, a counter-intuitive result. Thus the legal stakeholders were concerned
with the integrity of the institution of Congress. The large spread for the public trust counts were
as expected inferring that legal stakeholders were interested in popular concern for MOC
punishment. Thus the hypothesis for the institutional integrity category was sustained (a
negative correlation as predicted), but the hypothesis for the public trust category was not (a
negative correlation was anticipated).
c)

Discussion

The chi square findings indicate that the legal stakeholders commented more about, and
may care more about, MOCs who harm the institutional integrity of Congress than political
stakeholders do, and also are more concerned with public trust. While not in line with the
hypotheses, the fact that the political stakeholders comments count for institutional integrity was
higher than the political stakeholders (see tables TA.46 and TA.46a) leads back to the theoretical
proposition H3 in Chapter III63 and the theoretical question from Chapter II64. The interactions in
Congress as shown by the literature focus on the power struggle between the majority and

63

Punishment is Mediated Through Politics.
What factors are related to the punishment of MOCs by the criminal justice system and the institution of
Congress?
64
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minority members. Thompson (1993) stated that “(political) conduct was part of a normal
competitive process, in which all politicians are encouraged by the political system to solicit
support and bestow favors in order to win elections.” However, Thompson continues, a number
of “politicians are corrupt or are forced by the system to act in corrupt ways,” thus institutional
integrity suffered when political confrontation led to bad behavior by the members. Competition
led to corruption. In order to connect the chi square tests of the hypotheses to the to the
dissertation’s theoretical proposition the conceptual process would be:
majority/minority → competition/confrontation → corruption → AICP
C.

Content Analysis of the Stakeholder Comments
1.

Content Analysis Explanation

Holsti defined content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by systematically
and objectively identifying special characteristics of messages” (Columbia University, n.d.). Its
use in this study is to categorize and then compare the reasons for MOC punishment in the view
of various stakeholders in the four cases selected for the analysis. The goal of content analysis
“is to make valid inferences from the text” (Weber, 1990, p. 9) and content analysis involves
“coding and categorizing of text” (Bachman & Schutt, 2013, p. 314). Those authors also state
that this method analyzes the “characteristics of messages delivered through the mass media and
other sources” and that it is basically a survey of documents and records with a “fixed choice
response” that “produces quantitative data that can be analyzed statistically” (Bachman & Schutt
2013, p. 314). Content analysis has been defined as a “systematic, replicable technique for
compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding
and categorizing” (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 18). Content analysis, using a deductive methodology,
can reveal the underlying reasons for punishment, resulting in relevant conceptual categories.
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2.

Comments Sample

The convenience sample of comments and quotes were initially organized into the
categories shown in Table A.27. Comments from the various sources were assessed for
relevance and formed conceptualizations that were initially determined from the literature. The
comments and quotes were thus aggregated based on meaning and nuance. The content analysis
was then developed from the keywords and phrases from the stakeholder comments and the
initial categories were affirmed based on the analysis results.
a)

The Content Analysis Process

The selected words and phrases of these stakeholder comments were analyzed to assess
characteristics. The content analysis showed a connection between the stakeholders’ comments
and the categories derived. A further validity explanation of content analysis can be found in
Table A.28.
3.

Content to be Examined

The content for inclusion in this analysis is derived from the stakeholder comments
regarding the criminal and political punishment of the four selected MOCs. The content analysis
examines comments made by the stakeholders described in this chapter. Table A.34 lists the
sources for the comments made and a connection to the punishments of the MOCs (see Tables
A.29, Explanation of Final Coding Analysis Columns, and the TA.30, Final Coding Analysis
with the data for each comment).
INSERT TABLE A.29 - EXPLANATION OF FINAL CODING ANALYSIS COLUMNS
INSERT TABLE A.34 - DATABASES RESEARCHED FOR COMMENTS
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a)

Major Political Scandals

Certain major political scandals provided comments for the convenience sample, which
in turn supported the six initial conceptual categories. Some of these comments were also used in
the content analysis. Table TA.45 provides a synopsis of those scandals, the MOCs accused, and
comments that inferred categories are shown in bold after each comment. See Table A.26 for
details on the accused members’ punishments in the relevant political scandals.
INSERT TABLE A. 26 - LITERATURE, SCANDALS AND CASES USED FOR THE
INITIAL CONCEPT CATEGORIES
4.

Case Selection Process

The four cases selected for the content analysis were the most punished of the 136
members in the dataset. The goal was to choose fewer cases but the most punished members as
these would likely have the most numerous, and the richest, comments.
The comments in this analysis are drawn from the sources listed in Table A.34 in the
appendix. The four Members of Congress chosen for this analysis, based on the tests explained
below, are: Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-CA), Rep. James Traficant (D-OH), Rep. William
Jefferson (D-LA) and Sen. Harrison Williams (D-NJ).
a)

Factor Analysis

A factor analysis provided one basis for determination of the most punished MOCs. The
details of this analysis can be found in the Table A.31, Factor Analysis and Explanation, and
there were 21 MOCs that qualified as the most severely punished by these metrics (listed in
Table A.32). From this group of MOCs the final selections for the content analysis were drawn.
INSERT TABLE A.31 - FACTOR ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
INSERT TABLE A.32 – MOST SEVERELY PUNISHED MOCS
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b)

Selected Cases for the Content Analysis

The four MOCS chosen (see Table A.33 for the data) all lost power: Williams and
Cunningham resigned, Jefferson lost his next election and Traficant was expelled by the House.
All were found guilty of crimes and their corrupt acts were mediated by the Congressional
political environment. None apparently were deterred by the potential for punishment. They
were the most punished (based on the political and criminal justice sanction metrics), their cases
were heavily publicized, and are sufficiently representative of the initial categories to qualify as
the cases to be used in this content analysis. Below is a synopsis of each case.
INSERT TABLE A.33 - CONTENT ANALYSIS - MOC AND STAKEHOLDER COUNTS
(1)

The Case of Representative Randy “Duke” Cunningham

He was involved in one of the largest bribery schemes in the history of Congress. Also
charged with tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and more, he was convicted and sentenced to
100 months in prison and fined $1,956,780 (adjusted for inflation, one of the largest fines in the
research). He was investigated by the House Ethics Committee and resigned before he could be
expelled. Cunningham was a Republican and in the majority at the time of his accusation in
2005, was elected to Congress in 1991 and pled guilty to the charges in 2005 (Perry, 2005; CNN,
2006; CBS News, 2006).
(2)

The Case of Representative William Jefferson (D-LA)

Jefferson was punished by the criminal justice system more than any other MOC in
history, receiving a prison term of 156 months, having been found guilty of 11 of 16 criminal
counts. He lost an election because of the criminal prosecution. He was accused of bribery and
corruption and earned the nickname “Dollar Bill” as the FBI found $90,000 in cash in his freezer
(Morris, 2009). Jefferson was a Democrat and in the minority at the time of his accusation in
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2006. He was elected in 1990 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013) and convicted in 2009
(US Department of Justice, 2009).
(3)

The Case of Representative James Traficant (D-OH)

James Traficant, one of the Democrats in the analysis, was not always a loyal party
member as he often voted with Republicans (CNN, 2002). He was charged with bribery,
racketeering, falsifying tax returns, conspiracy and wire fraud, and was sentenced to 84 months
in prison in addition to 36 months of probation. He refused to resign and was expelled by the
House, one of only 5 members ever to suffer this punishment65 (Congressional Research Service,
n.d.). Traficant was a Democrat in the minority at the time of his accusation in 2002. He was
elected in 1990, indicted and convicted in a court of law, and was expelled from the House of
Representatives in 2002 (Murray & Lengel, 2005; US Department of Justice, 2009).
(4)

The Case of Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ)

The senator was one of seven members tried and convicted as the result of ABSCAM, an
FBI sting operation explained in Chapter I. He was charged with bribery, conspiracy, receiving
an unlawful gratuity, conflict of interest, and more, and was investigated by the Senate Ethics
Committee. He resigned on the Senate floor the day before the vote for his expulsion. He served
21 months in Allenwood Federal Penitentiary and was fined $112,670 (adjusted for inflation).
He was a Democrat in the minority when accused in 1980, he was convicted in 1981 and he also
resigned in 1981 (US Senate Historical Office, n.d.; Fried, 1981).
5.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is a comment made by a stakeholder regarding the punishment of one
of the four selected MOCS.

65

Rep. Ozzie Meyers (D-PA), prosecuted in ABSCAM, was also expelled from Congress.
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6.

Data Collection - Researching the Comments

The comments on the four selected MOC cases were found in the databases listed in
Table A.34. The six categories from the initial sample were used to guide the text collection for
the content analysis. As comments were found they were put in a spreadsheet arranged in the
columns found in Table TA.36. The search terms were the names of the four MOCs chosen for
this analysis. All comments were given equal weight irrespective of source. Some sources
generated more than one comment.66
a)

Comments

“Comment” is the term found in the content analysis literature, so this term is used. The
comments in this analysis implied or inferred stakeholder judgment and were not just descriptive
(e.g., about the details of the case) nor transactional (e.g., stating what the punishment was). A
comment could be a phrase, a sentence or a paragraph.
b)

Sources of the Comments

The data was collected from a variety of sources including scholarly articles, books and
media sources. The sources were edited to prevent duplications of comments and are found in
Tables A.34 and TA.35. There were 30 different sources found in 87 citations from the sources
in the text (see Table TA.35 for the full list of sources, and Table A.37 for the summary of the
data on the sources).
c)

Stakeholders

There were 75 stakeholders in the analysis, such as congressional leaders, MOCs,
journalists, politicians, congressional committees, political constituents, judges, courts,
prosecutors and others. They were individuals and entities that had a stake in, interest in, or

66

For example, the Katzmann text generated a number of comments about the Williams case, and the Copley News
Service provided several comments in the case of Rep. Jefferson.
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some connection to the issues involving the crimes committed by these MOCS and provided
comments relevant to the punishment of these members. The stakeholder roles are found in
Table A.33. There were 11 different types of stakeholders, and these were combined into 3
classifications: politicians, citizen stakeholders and legal stakeholders. The demographics of the
stakeholders (factors such as age, gender and education) were not researched.
d)

Sample and Sample Frame

The sample is 253 stakeholder comments. The sample frame is 253 comments made by
stakeholders about the most punished MOCS in the study and the relationships of those
comments to the initial categories in the convenience sample. The stakeholders made a variety of
comments, in some instances only one comment from a stakeholder was used, in others many
comments from the same stakeholder were included.67 In those cases the comments were usually
distributed across the categories.
7.

Operationalization of the Post-Conviction Categories

Operationalization is defined as the “process of developing measures” (Babbie, 1995,
p.5). Neuendorf (2002, p. 118) states that content analysis operationalization is defined as
“constructing a coding scheme” by means of dictionaries “for text analysis.” The comments
made by stakeholders were coded for key words and phrases that provided their observations of
MOC punishment. These words and phrases were organized into categories that were exhaustive
and mutually exclusive (Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 316; Neuendorf, 2002, p. 118-119).
8.

Variables and Testing of the Content Analysis

A cross tabulation analysis and chi square test was used to determine the correlations
among two selected independent variables and the three conceptual categories. SPSS produced a

67

For example, the 15 comments from US Attorney Carol Lam regarding Rep. Randy Cunningham were used, the
most of any stakeholder.

98

chi square test of independence which yielded Pearson values that determined if there were any
statistically significant relationships. The three combined categories acted as the dependent
variables in the analysis. The four MOCs described above were used in the test.
a)

Variables
(1)

Dependent Variables

The three categories were used as dependent variables as they were outcomes. The
associated hypothetical relationships to the categories were based on the literature and the
political scandals reviewed in table TA.45.
(2)

Independent Variables

The first of the two independent variables used in the cross-tabulation analysis in SPSS
was party (categorical, based on party membership at the time first accused). The four MOCS in
the analysis were either Democrat or Republican, so this variable is dichotomized. A political
party has more to do with electability than ideology (Fenno, 1997, p. 12, 13, 14, 15, 34, 35).
Political parties want to protect their members and win elections and may run afoul of the
electorate in the process. The second variable is majority/minority membership, also categorical,
operationalized as majority or minority status in Congress at the time of accusation.
Majority/minority status has more to do with power and the ability to enact legislation, and thus
provides the potential for confrontation (Fenno, 1997, p. 12, 13, 14, 15, 34, 35).
b)

Cross Tabulation Analysis
(1)

Explanation and Method

A table in SPSS was set up using the two independent variables entered as rows and the
three categories as dependent variables and entered as columns. The resulting chi square values
showed whether the expected cell values differed from the actual cell values. The
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operationalization of the variable was based on party, dichotomized as Republican
(Cunningham) and Democrat (Traficant, Jefferson and Williams) and majority/minority status
(Cunningham was in the majority, and Traficant, Jefferson and Williams were in the minority).
(2)

Coding

Although there was a pre-defined set of categories prior to code the text, this analysis
allowed for the flexibility of adding or combining concepts as the coding progressed. Various
kinds of comments were used including words, phrases, sentences and paragraphs. The coding
was based on the frequency of a category in the research, for example, there were more
references to institutional integrity than any other category (85 comments or 33.6% of the total in
the analysis, see Table A.37).68 The final coding was completed based on the three categories,
and the nuances of words, phrases and sentences were analyzed so that the categories were
determined in a consistent manner. The text was manually coded, which allowed for better
determination of implicit text (Columbia University, n.d.).69 The object was to link the concepts
to the categories, using the words and definitions related to those concepts. The basis for this
method is that “coding here is understood as representing the operations by which data are
broken down, conceptualized, and put back together in new ways” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990,
p.3). The ultimate coding produced the three final categories, which were editted to remove
duplications, and the coding ended when there were no further changes.

68

The first reference to institutional integrity in this research was found in a speech by Sen. Bradley regarding the
Senate vote on the expulsion of Harrison Williams (see Katzmann, 2009, p. 387).
69
The alternative was to use a content analysis coding program, such as Atlas.ti.
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(3)

Results

The cross-tabulation results were based on the chi square values using a significance
level of p=.05. None of the relationships were statistically significant, and thus the variables
were independent of each other (see Table A.44).
INSERT TABLE A.44 - CROSS TABULATION CHI SQUARE RESULTS
(4)

Analysis

The variables party and majority/minority were not significantly related to any category
but were hypothesized to be predictive of institutional integrity (i.e. the more ideological party
members were the greater the negative effect of institutional integrity, and the more
confrontation between the majority and minority the less institutional integrity there would be).
The results did not reveal direct relationships among party and minority/minority status and the
categories, but the stakeholder comments generally indicated concern for the public trust,
retribution and institutional integrity effects.
D.

Validity and Reliability

There are three primary considerations for ensuring validity and reliability (Columbia
University, n.d.): stability (data coding consistency), reproducibility (category membership
consistency), and accuracy (text classification to concept consistency).
1.

Validity

The Columbia University (n.d.) content analysis article states validity is achieved in
content analysis when the “closeness of categories” (reached by using multiple coders) is
observed, and the conclusions are correlated to the data. The coding and categorization is
completed and content validity is achieved, such that a category “covers the full range of the
concept’s meaning” (Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p.95).
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a)

Internal Validity

The content was assessed for internal validity by demonstrating that the categories
determined by the analysis actually showed the stakeholders’ reasons for punishment (Columbia
University, n.d.). For example, the analysis demonstrated that if a MOC was punished because of
a need for retribution or institutional integrity protection, then a relationship was inferred
between those justifications and the punishment (Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 45). In content
analysis internal validity is reached when measures match conceptualizations. For the three final
categories, this was achieved.
2.

Reliability

The Columbia University (n.d.) article states that, in terms of agreement among coders,
“generally, 80% is an acceptable margin for reliability.” The literature does not provide a
consensus on a reliability statistic but Neuendorf (2002, p. 144) suggests that a figure must be
considered and can be measured by percent agreement between each of the coders and the final
coding.
However, there may be some inherent problems in assessing comments made by
congressional leaders and MOCs as they may have been influenced by political factors.70 This
necessitates the coders’ clear understanding of the ideas and nuances in the concepts of the
categories. Their category agreement was essential to reaching an acceptable level of reliability.
This standard is supported by several authors: external validity is increased by probability
sampling and replication (Singleton, Straits and Straits, 2010, p. 202); the key concepts with
respect to “reliability are transparency and replication” (Gibbert, et al. 2008); according to

Singleton and Straits (2010 p. 145) suggest that there is “a difficulty of operationalizing some concepts, such as
attitudes, that are relatively unstable and pose reactivity and other problematic measures.” For example, this may
have been a problem with emotional or politically motivated comments made by stakeholders, especially MOCs.
70
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Krippendorff (Mouter & Noordegraaf, 2012) “analysts can check the reliability by duplicating
their research efforts, and reliability can be defined as the extent to which a measuring procedure
yields the same results on repeated trials” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 112).
a)

Intercoder Reliability

This study uses an 80% agreement threshold for intercoder reliability, in other words, the
coding of the coders must agree with the original coding at least 80% of the time. The intercoder
reliability process consisted of:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Defining the categories to be checked.
Formulating instructions for the coders.
Defining the test sample.
Having the coders complete the test.
Determining the reliability coefficient (percent agreement, in this case).
Reviewing the test results and comparing them to the original coding.
Debriefing a coder if the reliability coefficient was not reached. (The coder would then
complete a re-test in order to reach the threshold percent agreement).
(Mouter and Noordegraaf, 2012)

Mouter & Noordegraaf (2012) state that “the main reliability concern in content analysis
research is intercoder reliability, the amount of agreement or correspondence among two or
more coders” and that the data in this kind of content analysis “can be tested through an
intercoder reliability check.” It is critical that using this procedure “makes it possible for other
researchers to interpret the results and replicate the study” and that “in order to assess the
reliability of the coding at least two different researchers must code the same body of content”
(Mouter & Noordegraaf, 2012). The test itself “consists of coding and comparing the findings of
the coders,” and further that “the coders are properly trained in using the coding and categorizing
protocol” (Mouter & Noordegraaf, 2012).
Determining the assessment coefficient is essential but that “consensus in literature
regarding reliability standards is lacking” (Mouter & Noordegraaf, 2012). This also has to do
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with the percent agreement. In order to achieve an acceptable level of reliability the
consideration of the results of this test “consists of determining whether the score test is above or
below accepted reliability standards for the selected coefficient” (Mouter & Noordegraaf, 2012,
p. 2). Neuendorf (2002, p. 143) concludes that “coefficients of .90 or greater would be
acceptable to all, .80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations and below that, there
exists great disagreement.” Nonetheless, reliability is a primary consideration for content
analysis “in order to establish the objectivity of the codebook and allow the confident
interpretation of results” (Neuendorf, n.d.).
(1)

Coder Training

Two coders were provided with written instructions and were briefed verbally (see
Table A.38, Instructions for Coders). The comments spreadsheet was explained in detail,
and the information for this process is listed in the table. The coders were provided with written
instructions (coders were to code all comments), a dictionary of category concepts and a verbal
debriefing if coding results were less than 80% agreement.
The Primary Coding Analysis spreadsheet (see Table TA.36) was copied to a new
spreadsheet for the coders and columns were deleted and leaving visible only columns for the
comments, primary code, secondary code and remarks. The columns for the original comment
number and the random comment number were hidden. Comments were randomized and
anonymized to reduce bias for the coders. These techniques provided the coders the ability to
concentrate on their reactions to the words themselves, and not be affected by the details of the
data. The coders were advised to base their considerations on their impressions of the meaning of
the text, and not be overly concerned with the case facts. This was done to get a better sense of
the text as it related to the categories without the undue influence of other factors.
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(2)

Randomization

The comments in the coders’ sheets were randomized to reduce the possibility of bias.
Had the comments been left in the original order a coder might have been able to guess the
identity of the MOCs and this might have prejudiced the coding.71 The coder might also have
been able to detect a pattern or recognize a grouping of comments referring to a specific MOC.
The technique used was that only the columns mentioned above were included in the sheet, and
then the comments were randomized by first sorting the comments column alphabetically and
then adding a column with numbers that were arbitrarily entered. Then the spreadsheet was
sorted by those random numbers. The result was that the comments were in a random order.
(3)

Anonymization

The anonymization of key data and identifiers was also necessary to remove any source
of prejudice for the coders. This was explained to them and the coders’ sheets were anonymized
as shown in Table A.38a. This anonymization process masked identifiable data and reduced the
ability of the coders to be prejudiced by the details.
(4)

Reliability Results

Two coders were used for this analysis, both received written and verbal instructions and
coded all 253 comments (the entire sample). However, only the post-conviction comments (217
total) were used to determine reliability. This was done to provide greater comparability of the
comments as the stakeholders making pre-conviction comments could not know the full extent of
the ramifications of the ultimate punishments and also that they were not aware if the MOCs in
question were actually punished. The coders were given all comments at once to save time, thus
a progressive method (coding one small set of comments at a time) was not used.

71

The comments coding sheet had been arranged by MOC.
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Coder #1 initially achieved the threshold with 84.3% agreement (see table TA.39) with
the researcher’s post-conviction coding (see Table A.37 in the appendix). Coder #2 only
achieved a 34.6% agreement in the first attempt. His category agreement was 59.8% with the
original coding for category 1 (public trust), 63.0% for category 2 (retribution) and 70.9% for
category 3 (institutional integrity). The coder was verbally debriefed on the errors, and while
these were across all categories he concentrated on institutional integrity. His issues were with
his understanding of the categories, not with the coding instrument. On the second attempt
Coder #2 improved but did not achieve the 80% threshold. His results were better, but he still
had issues with institutional integrity and again, his issues were with the category definitions. He
was debriefed on the coding in an attempt to help him understand the differences among the
categories.72 On his third attempt he achieved 94.8% agreement with the original postconviction comments (see Table TA.40).
Thus, both coders reached the 80% agreement percentage threshold therefore intercoder
reliability was achieved. The final results are in Table A.37.
E.

Content Analysis Results

There were many comments that referred directly or indirectly to corruption. The Final
Attributes Analysis results (in Table A.37) showed that about 40% of the post-conviction
comments referred to corruption and public trust and suggested merging these into a single
category. The convenience sample literature and comments, along with the content analysis

72

Coder #2 had some difficulty with synonyms for concepts and less with key words, which led to his low reliability
scores on the first 2 rounds of coding. He eventually focused on the category concepts and not just the implicit
comments. We overcame his issues by reviewing the concepts that he incorrectly identified and clarifying the
differences among the categories.
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results, showed that the political stakeholders considered corruption a key consideration73, thus
the logic for combining the two categories from the initial convenience sample.
Retribution was important for many stakeholders. The Final Attributes Analysis (in table
A.37) showed that about 12% of the post-conviction comments indicated that retribution (along
with loss of power) was a key construct in the thinking of stakeholders. The institutional integrity
category in the Final Attributes Analysis totaled 47% of the total post-conviction comments
referring to this concept, combined with the socioeconomic status of the MOC.
The results for the MOCs analysis basically showed that Traficant and Cunningham
received severe criticisms (as shown in Table TA.30), for example: “a Member of Congress who
breaks the law and commits bribery ‘strikes at the heart of representative government’" and “I
had hoped that Representative Traficant would have….resign(ed) his office rather than force the
House to remove him….however, the current situation is before us, and we must act”;
“Cunningham's crimes against the people of the United States are unprecedented for a sitting
Member of Congress” and it was “naked avarice that animated Cunningham's corruption.”
Retribution was not inferred as much, as indicated by the data. Institutional integrity was a
concern for stakeholders as shown by the results. The comments about Jefferson and
Cunningham were more about public trust than the other categories (Table TA.36). The
comments about Traficant were abundant, especially since he would not resign, and House
members had to endure an expulsion process. Williams’ refusal to resign caused his Senate
support to melt away. It was ironic that Sen. Bradley, his mentee and friend, delivered the final
rhetorical blow, stating he would vote to expel the Senator, after which Williams resigned.

73

Corruption comments were 29.2% of the total, see Table A.37.
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Retribution/loss of power was assumed to be more of an issue, but institutional integrity
was the second strongest issue for stakeholders (47% of the post- conviction comments),
especially for MOCs and congressional leaders. There were many comments on corruption in the
context of the effect on Congress, which ultimately inferred a concern for punishment.
1.

Data Results

The primary purposes of this type of analysis were to compare the results “to draw
conclusions and generalizations where possible” and also to “interpret results carefully as
conceptual content analysis can only quantify the information” (Columbia University, n.d.). The
main concern is that “general trends and patterns can be identified” (Columbia University, n.d.).
One of the limitations of this analysis was that the words and comments were presumed to be of
equal value thus the count of the data was not weighted by factors of presumptive importance.74
This data was evaluated to assess their characteristics in order to relate them to the operational
definitions of the categories.
This content analysis examined 253 comments from 75 stakeholders for the 4 selected
MOCs. There were 11 different stakeholder roles, and these were combined into 3 major groups:
politicians, citizen stakeholders and legal stakeholders (see Table A.33). The three final
conceptual categories were supported by the comments based on the statistical output. The table
of comments by stakeholder (A.33) shows the total of comments made by role and the associated
percentage.
The content analysis provided the post-conviction comments (see Table A.37) which
showed that the political stakeholders commented more about institutional integrity than the

74

Such as stakeholder status, i.e. a comment by a congressional leader had equal importance to a media reporter.
There was no method used to rank the stakeholders by type, thus each stakeholder, and accordingly each stakeholder
comment, was given equal weight.
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legal stakeholders did (62% to 20%), yet the chi square analysis showed that the interaction
between political stakeholders and institutional integrity was not statically significant but the
interaction between legal stakeholders and institutional integrity was. This suggests that the
legal stakeholders made more powerful comments and expressing deeper feelings about the
offending members’ effects on the institutional integrity of Congress. The political stakeholders
may have made more transactional comments. However, the legal stakeholders commented
more about public trust than did the political stakeholders (71% to 27%). This result aligns with
the chi square results concerning the hypotheses. None of the stakeholder groups commented
about retribution very much, and therefore this category was not used in the hypotheses. Also,
the citizen stakeholders did not comment the most for any category and therefore this group was
not used. 61.6% of the political stakeholder comments were about institutional integrity and
71.4% of the legal stakeholder comments were about public trust.
a. Stakeholder Results by Comment Category
Table A.37 shows the empirical results for the stakeholder comments. The majority of
the comments on institutional integrity were made by the political stakeholders, and those
stakeholders provided about 64% of the total post-conviction comments.
The legal stakeholders made almost as many comments on the issue of public trust as the
political stakeholders. The legal community had few comments on retribution, but they had more
to say about public trust, and fewer comments on institutional integrity. The citizen stakeholders
made more comments on the issue of public trust, and less so on the other categories. The
stakeholders were highly critical of the MOCs as evidenced by the strong comments in the three
final categories (e.g., “stunning betrayal of public trust,” “our Government in Washington is
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broken” and “he was for sale”) and the extreme nature of some of the comments was evident (see
tables A.41a, A.41b, A.41c).
The 253 collected comments were broken down by the Comments Count by MOC
showing the comments counts and the 87 sources (see Table A.37). These comments came from
27 separate databases (see Table A.34) and were compiled from 75 total stakeholders (see Table
A.33). Of the 253 comments there were 36 made by the stakeholders pre-conviction which left
217 post-conviction comments on which to base the final analysis. The analysis relied on the
count of the comments, and not the number of stakeholders. The three final categories are shown
in the data in Table A.37 shows this (Preliminary Attributes Analysis and Final Attributes
Analysis). The combinations of the categories provided a more efficient basis for the analysis.
Table TA.36, Primary Coding Analysis, provides all comments divided into the 3
categories. The “manifest and latent analysis” (Bengtsson, 2016) of the results were considered
for interpretation of the stakeholder comments, supporting the use of the three combined
categories. The validity assumptions were met as the comments yielded the conceptual
definitions of the three final categories, discussed below.
The results of the category public trust included the category corruption, a broad-based
term but a key concept for the public and stakeholders. The low political recidivism rate in the
data confirms that public trust is difficult to regain once lost.75 The corruption comments were
considered a violation of public trust for the purpose of this analysis. This category comprised
40.1% of the total post-conviction comments made, the second largest of the concept groups.
The category retribution included loss of power, a form of political punishment. LOP is
described in Chapter IV along with the ways in which MOCs lose power. The mandate to punish

75

Of the 136 cases in the study only Rep. Adam Clayton Powell of New York was reelected after being accused.

110

is inherent in the criminal justice system and the wrongdoing of the MOCS deserved retribution
in the eyes of many of the stakeholders. The comments in this category were 12% of the total of
the post-conviction data, enough to warrant a separate category. Retribution took two forms,
criminal justice and political. The category institutional integrity as mentioned above included
the concept of status and 47.5% of the post-conviction comments (the largest of the three
categories) were about the institutional integrity of the Congress and the status of the MOCS.
F.

Discussion

The central purpose of the content analysis was to deduce the stakeholders’ reasons for
the punishment of Members of Congress. The analysis produced 3 final categories that provided
the concepts confirmed by these judgments. The categories provided a politics-centric rationale
for punishing the corruption of the four MOCS. The stakeholder comments substantiated the
categories and allowed for inferences regarding the concepts.
The disdain for the corruption of the four MOCs was apparent, as so many of the
stakeholder comments showed. The institutional integrity of Congress was a primary concern as
Congress was mediator of the corruption and provided the environment in which these MOCS
committed their crimes. These effects can be inferred from the comments. The stakeholders had
much to say about the need to protect the institutional integrity and the status of the MOCs, and
indeed was a reason to indicate that punishment was a message that people in power should not
consider their positions in government a barrier to sanctions.
The four cases used are based on corruption. The categories of institutional integrity and
public trust netted the overwhelming majority of the comments, clearly indicating that the
stakeholders were most concerned with these issues. To a lesser extent the comments expressed
apprehension about the need for retribution, but this may have been due to more of a political
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desire, especially for MOCs and leaders, to avoid the public spectacle of putting their members
in prison as such negative consequences reflected on all members in the eyes of their
constituents. This was as much a political perception issue as a procedurally retributive concern
(guilt by association). The case of Harrison Williams may have been more idiosyncratic in this
regard, as the reasons for forcing a vote on expulsion may have had less to do punishing him
than the need to show the public that the Senate was willing to reprove one of its own, an
exception to the typical reluctance of Congress to take such action. Certainly, the comments
suggested the importance of public trust and the integrity of the institutional integrity of
Congress, inferred the moral obligation to effectively punish reprobate behavior and provided the
perception that people in high status positions were subject to the same rules as everyone else. It
was ironic that the chi square tests of the hypotheses found that the relationship between political
stakeholders and institutional integrity was not significant but the correlation between legal
stakeholders and institutional integrity was.
The Theory of Mediated Corruption supports the connections between the stakeholders
and loss of power. If the congressional environment was a mediator of corruption then the
stakeholders would react to the punishment of offending members as a recognition that
proximity to the locus of power needs to be recognized for its risks and must be properly dealt
with in order to “sustain the institution conditions in the legislature that (support the) integrity of
the democratic process” (Thompson, 1995, p.19). When members disregard the institutional
rules and traditions to engage in acts counter to the legislative process they fall prey to the
inherent corruption of the political environment and ironically violate the laws they were elected
to enact and uphold. If ideological partisans wish to further their agendas, then they also need to
protect the institution in order to preserve its integrity. As Thompson (1993) stated in observing
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the nature of the exchange wherein a public official receives a benefit, “the gain contributes to
mediated corruption insofar as it damages the democratic process--for example, by influencing a
representative to serve private purposes without regard to their substantive merits.”
What this means for the larger inquiry of this dissertation is that mediated corruption
theory was supported by the content analysis in that the stakeholders’ comments inferred the
damage to public trust and institutional integrity caused by the crimes of the four members.
Therefore, the MOCs deserved retribution and to lose power in that their actions negatively
affected Congress. The institution was the mediator of the criminal acts of these four legislators
in that the congressional power structure provided the opportunity for the illicit transactions in
which these members sought to enrich themselves at the public’s expense.
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VI.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A.

Introduction

This study examined the criminal and political punishment of U.S. federal legislators
using a multiple methods approach. The aim of this research was to determine the significant
factors correlated with the effects of the punishment of members of Congress for crimes
committed. The effects of the severity of punishment and the loss of power suffered by the
members of Congress in this research were explained by the categories that were determined by
the content analysis: the reduction in public trust, the denigration of institutional integrity and
the retribution suffered by offending members of Congress.
I hypothesized, based on deterrence theory and the theory of mediated corruption, that a
combination of factors related to the nature of the crime and the politics faced by the members of
Congress explain punishment. Specifically, these two theories suggested that some of the
variables would be significant in determining the correlations of the predictors and the dependent
variables.
Nine independent variables were hypothesized to be related to those punishments: party
(defined as non-Democrat/Democrat), majority/minority status, year punished, tenure of the
accused, punished before/after 1974, polarization of Congress, member party unity score, crime
type, and seriousness of crime. What I found was that only some of those variables were related
to the two dependent variables that capture punishment. Severity of punishment was not
significantly related to majority/minority, tenure, 1974, member party unity score, crime and
seriousness of crime, but was significant with party (non-Dem/Dem), year punished and
polarization. Loss of power was not significantly related to majority/minority, tenure, 1974,
polarization, member party unity score and seriousness of crime, but was significantly related to
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party (non-Dem/Dem) and crime. What this reveals is that deterrence theory should be updated
to include the factors of party (i.e. Democrats are more likely to lose power), majority/minority
status and polarization of Congress, and the theory of mediated corruption should be updated to
include the factors of party (non-Dem/Dem)and crime type. Currently, these theories are
explained by the corruption in the institution of Congress and in the political process of
engagement among political actors (Thompson, 1993).
One goal of this work was to develop outcome categories in the content analysis, which
resulted in: public trust, retribution, and intuitional integrity. The study considered Deterrence
Theory and the theory of Mediated Corruption as the bases for testing these outcomes. I
expected that stakeholder comments would produce categories that would explain their
judgments on MOC crime, and this turned out to be correct. The content analysis measured
stakeholder statements regarding the two punishment types, criminal and political, in terms of
the accused members’ attributes (party - non-Dem/Dem and majority/minority status). The
analysis confirmed the findings in Deterrence Theory and suggested that the Theory of Mediated
Corruption explained how Congress facilitated corruption leading to both forms of punishment.
Several of the quotes in the literature support the concern about institutional corruption.76
The accusation-indictment-conviction-punishment (AICP) continuum provides a basis for
studying the criminal justice process from transgression to punishment. Thompson (1993) writes
about “institutional misconduct” (p.27) and in his explanation suggests the institution was the
mediator of corruption (i.e. mediating the behavior and the crime). Thompson states that his
theory “may be called mediated corruption because the corrupt acts are mediated by the political

Congress dealt with either ideological differences or non-ideological “appeals accusing the other party of
corruption, failure and incompetence” (Lee, 1, 2016, p.2).
76
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process” (p. 369) and the opportunity for corruption are provided by the institution so that
members leverage their positions to engage in corrupt behavior (p. 45-47).
B.

Quantitative Analysis and Content Analysis

The statistically significant variables in the quantitative analysis (see Tables A.16 and
A.17) were party (non-Dem/Dem), year punished and polarization of the institution in the
severity of punishment model, and party (non-Dem/Dem) and crime type in the loss of power
model.
For the severity of punishment analysis, the relationship with the party (non-Dem/Dem)
independent variable was significant in a positive direction and with odds ratio at 4.694, meaning
that Democrats are over 4 time more likely than non-Democrats to suffer severe punishment.
The variable year punished showed a positive correlation to SOP with an odds ratio of 1.041, so
that or each year that passed MOCs were 4% more likely to suffer severe punishment. The
polarization of the institution was a positive predictor of SOP indicating that the more
congressional voting patterns were polarized the more likely criminal punishment of MOCs
would occur by a more than 74 times.
The loss of power model showed that the variable party (non-Dem/Dem) was negatively
correlated, that is Democratic Party members were about 81% more likely to lose office than
non-Democrats. The crime type variable indicated that instrumental crime was positive correlated
to loss of power and more than 17 times more likely to cause a member to lose his office than
instrumental crimes.
The party (non-Dem/Dem) variable was significant and positive for both dependent
variables indicating that a Democrat had more of chance of suffering both punishments, but more
likely criminal retribution and less so of political consequences. The statistical significance of the
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year punished variable predicted a punitive outcome for the MOCS, inferring a greater
probability that a MOC would be accused of an offense77 later in time. Polarization of the
institution of Congress was significant for SOP, and the odds were positive, but was not
significant for LOP. This indicated that the more polarized Congress was the greater the
probability of the severity of punishment. The variable crime type was significant and predictive
the loss of power for instrumental crime. LOP was a significant outcome, and such a great
concern in some cases that accused members would risk prison rather than yield their seats in
Congress.78
A review of the SOP non-significant results (see Table A.16) showed that the
majority/minority correlation was negatively correlated, tenure of the accused was positive,
accused before/after 1974 was negative, member party unity score was positive, crime type was
positive with very high odds and seriousness of crime had a positive correlation. The LOP nonsignificant results (see Table A.17) indicated that majority/minority was positive, tenure of the
accused was negative, accused before/after 1974 was negative, polarization of the institution
was negative, member party unity score was positive and seriousness of crime was positive.
These results did not add any explanatory power to the analysis of the punishment outcomes.
These non-significant findings were disappointing in some respects. For example, I
hypothesized that the tenure of a member would be indicative of corruption (thinking that the
longer an MOC was in office the greater the chance for being leveraged or corrupted) but this did
not prove out.79 I also thought that the majority/minority variable would yield an effective
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As stated in Chapter III the largest aggregate of MOC criminal cases was between Watergate (1974) and
ABSCAM (1980) of any similar period, providing some indication of a lack of deterrent value for new legislation.
78
Rep. Traficant refused to resign and was expelled. Sen. Williams found himself on the floor of the Senate fighting
expulsion after he was convicted (he finally resigned). Other members who were sentenced to prison and resigned
under pressure were Reps. Biaggi, Delay, Jackson and Wright.
79
Tenure was not statistically significant in either punishment model.
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outcome as the natural competitiveness between those in power and those wanting power would
provide a basis for more accusations and indictments, but this variable was not statistically
significant. The accused before/after 1974 variable provided a political era perspective but also
turned out to be non-significant, even though the majority of cases were after 1974. Crime type
indicates a natural dichotomy for rational and emotional offenses, most crime data in the study
being instrumental, but the findings for this variable were also not significant in the SOP model.
I was left with fewer significant variables, but this did not weaken the judgment that
deterrence theory literature was basically confirmed and that the Theory of Mediated Corruption,
although not previously tested, was useful in explaining congressional corruption. The
accusation-indictment-conviction-punishment (AICP) process shows how an MOC transitions
from offending to punishment with the resulting criminal justice and political consequences. The
outcomes were damaging for such MOCs as very few escaped the loss of power.
The MOC punishment did not escape the notice of interested stakeholders, whose
comments on the MOCs’ crimes were analyzed in the content analysis which yielded three
categories that explained the rationale of the stakeholders’ comments: institutional integrity
(including status), retribution (including loss of power), and public trust (including corruption).
The stakeholders were divided into three groups: political, citizen and legal. The categories of
institutional integrity and public trust were most important to the stakeholders, and their
comments provided indications as to their observations of the members’ punishment.
The analysis of the comments showed that the political stakeholders were most concerned
with the category of institutional integrity as expected (80.5% of the category), and less so with
public trust (42.5% of the category), and retribution (59.3%) as anticipated. The legal
stakeholders commented less about retribution (14.8% of the category) which was counter to the
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hypothesis but commented more about public trust (40.2% of the category) which was not. They
were less concerned with institutional integrity (9.7% of the category). Citizen stakeholders
made fewer comments about public trust (17.2% of the category), which was not as expected,
and less so about the other categories (9.2% of institutional integrity and 25.9% of retribution) as
was hypothesized.
The stakeholders were not bashful in their judgments of the four MOCs in the content
analysis. From judges and prosecutors to congressional leaders and journalists, the moralistic
tones of their condemnations were specific and severe, for example “the sentence was the
harshest ever handed out to a former lawmaker, but Justice Department officials said Jefferson
warranted such a severe sanction because of his ‘unprecedented scale of his corruption’”
(Bresnahan, 2009). While the hypotheses may not have been sustained in each instance the
negative comments largely fell into patterns of public distrust, institutional corruption and
justification of punishment. The comments reveal that the illicit actions of the MOCs warranted
retribution out of concern for the public’s trust of the members and the need to protect Congress.
A major concern was that the public might perceive the institution as a breeding ground for
corruption, which needed to be addressed by showing that members would be held to account for
misdeeds. It is apparent from the comments that the stakeholders were concerned that Congress
was seen as a mediator of corruption and that the public must be assuaged, not just rhetorically,
but by the reality of consequential retribution.
C.

Strengths of the Study

There are several strengths of the dissertation. First, it provides a complete data set of
federal legislators accused of crimes and an original set of observations to analyze (the
researcher has not found any other studies of the punishment of federal legislators). The study
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uses the entire history of these observations, and not just certain eras, which provides a more
complete basis for analysis.80 Second, the longer history yields more accused members for the
variable year punished. Also, the study of punishment using a combination of criminal justice
and political variables provides a multi-disciplinary perspective discerning a relationship
between politics and criminal retribution, as well as the distinct criminal justice and political
consequences.
D.

Limitations of the Study

Both the SOP and LOP analyses were affected by the sample size (as a smaller sample
has less explanatory power and may amplify variability), especially since there were fewer cases
at each successive stage of the accusation-indictment-conviction-punishment (AICP) process.81
The research in the content analysis case selection process did not reveal any substantive new
evidence of general deterrence, a finding in line with the deterrence literature. Given the weaker
support for deterrence theory, mediated corruption may provide more effective policy
considerations that explain ways to discourage MOC crime.
The test results of the quantitative analysis did confirm the findings of the deterrence
literature, which basically was that DT lacks support.82 One considerable limitation in this
research was that the theories of justice used either tested weakly (deterrence) or were not tested
(mediated corruption). However, the criminal justice system continues to use deterrence as a
rationale for punishment.

80

Despite the differences in eras, parties, crimes, majority status, and convicted or not, the MOCs in this study
seemed to be concerned with power, whether they risked prison to hold it, or gave it up to avoid increased
punishment. This sheds light on the mediation of the corruption concept as the need to hold power affected the
decisions the members made in the post-accusation stages of the AICP process.
81
For example, there were only 90 MOCS suffering criminal justice punishment, about 67% of the n.
82
For deterrence theory to work there needs to be a correlation between punishment and a reduction in crime. This
finding was absent in this study.
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E.

Concepts at the Intersection of Criminal Justice and Political Science
1.

The Concept of Time

Time is a key element in this study. Three independent variables are based on temporal
considerations. The eras in which either MOC accusation or punishment occurred proved to be
important considerations for both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. The tenure of the
accused variable was hypothesized to be a relevant driver of punishment (the longer an MOC
was in office, the more probable the accusation, and thus the punishment), but it was not
statistically significant. The variable punished before/after 1974 was not significant in either
analysis but most of the cases in the study occurred after 1974. But the variable year punished
was statistically significant for the severity of punishment variable, indicating the greater
possibility of punishment as the years progressed.
While the findings for only one of these three time-oriented variables was significant
together they provided a temporal frame for the consideration of MOC punishment.83 When
retribution is examined over time we may observe the “contours” of these criminal acts84 in the
period post-Watergate and less so during other periods. The same may be said for the tenure of
accused members who served in Congress for longer periods of time prior to criminal accusation.
While the four MOC’s chosen for the content analysis had relatively recent cases, these MOCS
all received severe punishments in high profile cases involving significant felonies and drew
substantial commentary from elected officials, criminal justice representatives and other
interested stakeholders.

83
84

The second proposition for this dissertation is punishment is treated the same across time.
The space in which criminals decide to offend, as inferred by Katz (1988).
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2.

The Significance of the Forced Resignation

The forced resignation of an MOC was a significant observation in this study.
Resignation is defined as voluntary, but for the indicted MOC negotiating with a prosecutor, a
plea bargain that leveraged his resignation was a form of constructive compulsion.85 For
example, a member could risk a trial and thus a longer prison sentence or could choose a lesser
sentence provided he resigned, leaving little other practical choice for the offending MOC.
Those convicted who did not resign typically lost power anyway.86 Paschall (2019) in his article
“Do Members of Congress Suffer the Consequences of Scandal?” states that accusations force
Members of Congress into resigning, choosing not to run or losing their next election. The
impetus for these actions is that such accusations “undermine members’ standing with the public
and make it less likely that implicated members will return in the next Congress,” adding to the
inference that allegations “have electoral consequences” (Paschal, 2019). Given the nature of the
political environment in Congress these recriminations may “contribute to the trends towards
declining trust in government and congressional incapacity” and the resulting pressures
contribute to forcing such resignations (Paschal, 2019).
3.

Loss of Power

The loss of power was a critical element in this study. While the significance of the
forced resignation was an element in the loss of power variable, LOP in any form was a
punishment of great concern to the FEDEGs. This was the ultimate fear for MOCs in many

85

MOCs often found themselves with no choice but to resign due to legal and political pressures, as in the cases of
Jefferson, Biaggi, Delay, Williams and Jackson.
86
Some did not. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., (D) was reelected after losing is seat and several MOCs were accused
but remained in power, including Sen. Theodore Bilbo (D), Rep. Frank Horton (R), Rep. Bob Filner (D), Rep.
Daniel Sickles (D), Rep. Bobbi Fiedler (R) and Rep. Martin McKneally (R).
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cases.87 The LOP punishment, and its examination in this study, compliment the analysis of the
accusation-indictment-conviction-punishment process.
4.

Political Considerations

Politics provides part of the context of the analysis of the crimes by the MOCs. Politics
is power, holding office, getting reelected and affecting legislation. The four MOCs in the
content analysis were driven by these political considerations. The explicitly political variables
in this study, party (non-Dem/Dem), majority/minority, polarization of Congress, and member
party unity score, suggested bases for analysis, even if some did not prove to be significant.
The main point is that elected Members of Congress generally fear the loss of power
more than criminal justice punishment as evidenced by the criminal justice sanctions risked by
this group in hopes of holding onto their political power.
F.

Contributions to the Literature

This study provided some answers to the larger questions posed for this research.
1.

What are the types of crimes Members of Congress have been accused of?

The types of crimes are instrumental and expressive. Instrumental crimes are generally
offenses for profit and (therefore subject to the rational actor theory), but expressive crime is
more emotionally based.
2.
What factors are related to the punishment of MOCs by the criminal
justice system and the institution of Congress?
The statistically significant variables were party, year punished and polarization in the
SOP (criminal) model and party and crime type in the LOP (political) model.
3.
What are the theories of justice used by the criminal justice system and
Congress?

87

For example Williams, Jefferson and Traficant risked increased criminal justice punishment in order to stay in
power. These risks did not pay off as all suffered serious criminal punishment and lost power anyway.
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Deterrence Theory was used in the criminal justice model and the Theory of Mediated
Corruption helped explain the loss of power. Deterrence Theory suggests that punishment
dissuades would-be offenders from criminal acts and the Theory of Mediated Corruption
rationalizes that the political process in the congressional environment facilitates transgressions.
More members were accused of instrumental crimes than expressive crimes. We know
now that the severity of criminal punishment for a Member of Congress is related to the political
effects of being a Democrat or not, the year in which he was punished and polarization of the
institution of Congress at the time of the member’s accusation. We also know that a member’s
loss of political power is related to the political party he belonged to and the type of crime he
committed. Further, we know that relevant stakeholders were concerned with integrity of the
institution of Congress, the need to exact retribution in both criminal and political forms, and the
need to consider the public trust when considering the punishment of members. Deterrence
Theory is still used by the criminal justice system (by Congress), and the Theory of Mediated
Corruption helps explain the environmental conditions in the institution that affect the criminal
behavior of members.
This work also contributes to the literature in that it offers additional perspectives on
concepts that relate to both criminal justice and political science. The additions to the literature
include testing the interplay between criminal justice and political variables, thus incorporating
political outcomes to better understand criminal justice theories of deterrence. This research also
produced a comprehensive and expanded data set of offending legislators, confirmed deterrence
theory and demonstrated the importance of loss of power (LOP) to legislators in weighing their
response to criminal accusations, the formulation of the accusation-indictment-conviction-
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punishment continuum, the discussion of the significance of the forced resignation and applying
a political theory to criminal justice variables and outcomes.
The differential treatment of white-collar criminals in general is evidenced by this study
as prosecutors often leveraged political outcomes, such as forced resignations and withdrawn
candidacies, in moderating plea deals and requested sentences for accused legislators. Thus,
crime type, in this case instrumental, interacts with a political variable, loss of power (LOP) to
determine sentencing outcomes. In turn, the political variables party and polarization affect the
severity of punishment of convicted members.
In term of political science, we know that punishment comes in two forms, prosecutors
leverage resignations as part of deals with accused politicians, and the significant criminal justice
variable crime type affects the political outcome of loss of power. For criminal justice, the
effects of the political variables party and polarization affect criminal punishment of the MOCs.
Another outcome of this research are that the Deterrence Theory is only weakly
supported, in terms of general deterrence. The efficacy of specific deterrence is supported by the
loss of power analysis which shows that 82.1% of the accused MOCS suffered this consequence
(see Table A.13a). But general deterrence is not supported as the time variables showed that
criminal accusations continued to occur over time, given the data for the year punished and
punished before/after 1974 variables. These results show that a criminal justice theory can be
analyzed (and supported or not supported) by the use of political variables, thus indicating the
crossover effects of politics and criminal justice.
INSERT TABLE A13.b – CONVICTIONS BY % PARTY WITH LOP
However, the criminal justice literature shows that punishment only moderately or weakly
provides any deterrence for would be offenders (Pratt, et al., 2009, p. 368; Pratt, et al., 2009, p.
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370, Von Hirsch et al, 1999, p. 26, Paternoster, 2010, p. 766). As mentioned previously
Paternoster (2010, p. 766), in his meta-analysis of deterrence stated that “we do not have very
solid and credible empirical evidence that deterrence through the imposition of criminal
sanctions works very well.” The efficacy of specific deterrence is indicated by the fact that
rarely does an office holder come back from the political graveyard subsequent to the
disapprobation of the electorate. Thus specific deterrence is effective, as the time variables infer
(Andenaes, 1968).
4.

Hypothetical Propositions

The hypothetical propositions in this study were drawn from both criminal justice and
political science. The four propositions addressed, and the results, are:
1. Punishment is treated differently based on the seriousness of crime
Criminal justice is treated differently as the more serious crimes received greater criminal
punishment. But political punishment, in terms of the loss of power, tended to be treated the
same as members who were accused of a crime usually did not stay in Congress (112 out of 136
MOCs, or over 82%, lost power).
2. Punishment is treated the same across time
Punishment increased as time progressed as there were additional laws passed. The 1962
enactment of a federal criminal statute specifically addressing bribery, along with other new
laws, have been a factor in the enhanced punishment of MOCS in this study.
3. Punishment is mediated through politics
The Theory of Mediated Corruption and the chi square results for the content analysis
show that the political process and the congressional environment do affect corruption, and
ultimately transgressions that lead to punishment.
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4. Punishment is contingent on the perception of crime
The public trust category in the content analysis reveals numerous comments by the
stakeholders that the crimes committed by the MOCs are serious and deserve retribution.
G.

Future Research
1.

The AICP Continuum

Why then, did Members of Congress, the highest elected legislators in the country, break
the laws they were elected to make and defend. Did the constant need of MOCs to raise
campaign funds, entertain lobbyists financial pleas and make huge taxing and spending decisions
anesthetize some to the perils of illegal enrichment? The congressional environment may have
induced otherwise law abiding, ethical individuals to transgress where they may not have in
other situations, as the intersection of power and money pulled these members into criminal acts
(Katz, 1988, p. 317).
There have been a number of criminal cases involving MOCs since this research ended
(GovTrack., no date). Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) was under investigation for bribery, having sex
with an underaged girl, and using illicit drugs. Rep. Andy Harris (R-MD) was under
investigation for carrying a concealed gun on to the House floor. Rep. Steve Watkins (R-KS)
was charged with voter fraud and lost the next primary88. Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC) was
indicted on charges of bribery and conspiracy. Rep. Greg Gianforte (R-CO) was charged with
assault. There are numerous other cases, and this points to the need to continue this research to
the consider the illicit behavior of politicians. Some of these cases are in line with this study’s
findings, others deviate. President Trump pardoned of former representatives Duncan Hunter

88

Rep. Watkins entered into a diversion agreement to avoid a possible prison sentence (Associated Press, 2021).
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and Chris Collins, and commuted the sentence of Steve Stockman, which skews the
consideration of loss of power (Kranish 2020).
2.

Research Options

Future field surveys using interviews with congressional leaders, prosecutors and
punished MOCS might assist in determining the attitudes of these groups in connection with
deterrence. Additional research based on the data in this study may involve interviews with
other stakeholders (such as MOCs and prosecutors) to see if this method confirms that criminal
justice punishments (such as prison) are warranted for these white-collar criminals, or whether
economic or other sanctions might be more appropriate for such non-violent offenders.89 In
addition, research might yield observations that could produce additional insights into the
influences of the Congressional environment on members who commit crimes. Interviews with
MOCs could be conducted to provide analyses of their statements to deduce contrition or
defiance, as a test of fear and specific deterrence. Historic research on diaries and other sources
might provide further evidence for those analyses. Future research also might include studies of
key MOC cases typical of the crimes committed (e.g. bribery) in order to assess the motivations
for such crimes and to relate such assessments to other criminological theories. Such research
may deduce patterns of accusation, as the moral basis of the accusation-indictment-convictionpunishment process leads to a consideration of the need to punish the criminal acts of politicians.

89

This may satisfy the notion of proportionality and reduce the costs of traditional punishment.
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APPENDIX – TABLES AND FIGURES
(Please note there is also a Technical Appendix (TA) with long tables that may be found in the
website kgrossberger@academia.edu ).
FIGURE A.1: CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION TREE
No
indictment
No
Conviction
Accusation
No
Punishment

Indictment

Conviction

Punishment

FIGURE A.2: PARTY MEANS

(Poole and Rosenthal, 2015)
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FIGURE A.3: HOUSE POLARIZATION 2009-2011

(Poole and Rosenthal, 2015)
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FIGURE A.4 - PEW RESEARCH GRAPH – PUBLIC TRUST

Pew Research Center (2015)

TABLE A.1: CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAGE DEFINITIONS
Accusation: by a legal prosecuting authority, including Congress
Indictment: by a legal authority
Conviction: by a court of law
Punishment: criminal justice - severity of punishment by a legal authority
political – loss of power by the means listed in Table 6 below
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TABLE A.3a: AICP STAGE ANALYSIS
STAGE
Accused
Indicted
Convicted
Punished

No. of
MOCs
136
122
95
91

% of
accused

SUBCATEGORY

No. of
cases

% of
accused

% of previous
stage

89.7%
69.1%
66.9%

Not indicted*
Not convicted**
Not punished***

14
41
45

10.3%
30.1%
33.1%

10.3%
33.6%
47.9%

* accused but not indicted
** accused but not convicted (by a court nor Congress)
*** accused but not punished

TABLE A.3b - NOT-CONVICTED MOCS BY CRIME TYPE AND LOP

NOT CONVICTED
Ames
Oakes
Bilbo
Theodore
Clark
William A.
Dietrich
Charles H.
Dorsey
Stephen
Edwards
Francis S.
Fiedler
Bobbi
Flake
Floyd
Foley
Mark
Garmartz
Edward A.
Gilbert
William A.
Golladay
Jacob S.
Gonzalez
Henry B.
Gurney
Edward
Hays
Wayne
Helstoski
Henry
Herbert
Philemon
King
William S.
Leach, Jr.
Anthony C.
Lorimer
William
Matteson
Orsamus B.
McDade
Joseph
Passman
Otto
Patterson
James W.
Pomeroy
Samuel C.
Powell, Jr.
Adam Clayton
Schumaker
John G.
Sherwood
Don
Sickles
Daniel E.
Simmons
James F.
Smith
John D.
Smith
Frank Leslie
Thompson
Philip B.
Waggoner
Joseph D.
Wheeler
Burton K.
Whelchel
Benjamin F.

CRIME
TYPE
0=expressive,
1=instrumental
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1

RESIGN

DID NOT
RUN
1

LOST ELEC

EXPEL/EXLUDE/REMOVE

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
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Whittemore
Wilson
Wilson
Wright
Zihlman

Benjamin F.
Charles H.
Charles N.
James
Nicholas

1
1
0
1
1
0=8; 1=33
Crime Type: 0=Expressive, 1=Instrumental

1
1
1
12

9

1
7

1

TABLE A.3c – MOCS CONVICTED/NOT CONVICTED BY PUNISHMENT TYPE

Convicted
Not-Convicted
Totals

CRJ-PUN
yes
82
0
82

CRJ-PUN
no
13
41
54

Totals

LOPyes
81
31
112

95
41
136

LOPno
14
10
24

Totals
95
41
136

TABLE A.3d – CONVICTED – NO CRJ PUNISHMENT, NO LOP PUNISHMENT
No CRJ Punishment
Chamber
House
House
House
House
House
House
House
Senate
House
Senate
House
Total of 11

Member
Frank Boykin
James Brooks
Roderick R. Butler
Alexander Cauldwell
Tom Delay
Robert Garcia
Austin Murphy
Truman Newbury
Mary Rose Oakar
Ted Stevens
John N. Williamson

State
AL
NY
TN
KS
TX
NY
PA
MI
OH
AK
OR

Party
D
D
R
R
R
D
D
R
D
R
R

No LOP Punishment
Chamber
House
House
Senate
House
House
House
House
House
House
House

Member
Kevin Brady
Roderick R. Butler
Mike Crapo
Edmund H. Driggs
Walter Fauntroy
Bob Filner
Frank Horton
James R. Jones
Patrick J. Kennedy
Gerald Kleczka

State
TX
TN
ID
NY
DC
CA
NY
OK
RI
WI

Party
R
R
R
D
D
D
R
D
D
D
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House
House
House
House
Total of 14

Joseph Kolter
Matthew Lyon
Louis Stokes
J. Irving Whalley

PA
VT
OH
PA

D
DR
D
D

TABLE A.4: CRIME TYPOLOGIES
TYPE

EXAMPLES

NUMBER OF
ACCUSATIONS*

Instrumental

Bribery, illegal campaign contributions,
embezzlement, election fraud, false statements,
influence peddling
Homicide, assault, child pornography, sexual
assault, solicitation, DUI, resisting arrest,
illegal drug use

243 (88.4%)

Expressive

NUMBER OF
LEGISLATORS
ACCUSED**
111

32 (11.6%)

25

*total number of criminal accusations against all 136 MOCS
** There were 5 legislators accused of both types

TABLE A.5: MOC CRIME TYPOLOGY FREQUENCY
CRIME TYPOLOGY AND FREQUENCIES
ASSAULT
BANK FRAUD
BRIBERY
CHILD PORN
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION VIOLATIONS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSPIRACY
CONTEMPT
CORRUPT
DISORDERLY/INTOXICATION
DRUGS
ELECTION FRAUD
EMBEZZLEMENT
EXTORTION
FALSIFY RECORDS
FORGERY
GHOST EMPLOYEES
HOMICIDE
INFLUENCE PEDDLING
INSURANCE FRAUD

TOTAL
ACCUSATIONS
4
3
63
1
10
5
28
1
6
1
3
4
3
6
4
2
1
4
4
1
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INSTRUMENTAL

EXPRESSIVE
4

3
63
1
10
5
28
1
6
1
3
4
3
6
4
2
1
4
4
1

LAND FRAUD
MAIL FRAUD
MISDEMEANOR DUI
MISUSE OF FUNDS
MONEY LAUNDRY
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
OFFICIAL MISDONDUCT
PAYROLL FRAUD
PERJURY
RACKETEERING
RESISTING ARREST
SCHEME TO DEFRAUD
SEXUAL ASSAULT/ABUSE/SOLICITATION
SPEEDING
THEFT OF GOVT PROPERTY
TREASON
TAX FRAUD/EVASION
UNLAWFUL GRATUITY/GIFTS
WIRE FRAUD
WITNESS TAMPERING
TOTALS
PERCENTAGES

2
12
8
7
5
6
1
5
18
6
1
1
8
2
1
4
17
10
5
2
275

2
12
8
7
5
6
1
5
18
6
1
1
8
2
1
4
17
10
5
2
243
88.4%

32
11.6%

TABLE A.6: PUNISHMENT CATEGORIES
The punishments analyzed in this study are in two major areas: criminal justice (CRJ) and
political.
The CRJ punishments are:
• prison/jail (in months served)
• fines/restitution (in dollars)
• probation/community service (in months)
The political punishment is the loss of power, meaning the loss of congressional elected office,
caused by:
• resignation from Congress
• exclusion from Congress
• expulsion from Congress
• removal from Congress
• deportation from the United States (one case)
• loss of election
• reelection abnegation
TABLE TA.7 – GDP INFLATOR INDEX AND VALUES
TABLE A.8: CRIMINAL JUSTICE PUNISHMENTS – CONSOLIDATED
CATEGORIES
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Category
Prison/jail*
Fines/restitution**
Probation/community service***

Observations
60
48
22

Code
PRISON
FINESADJ
ATI

Operationalization
Months
Dollars
Months

*Prison is defined as a sentence of more than more than 12 months, and jail as a sentence of less than 12 months
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d.)
**There are 2 restitution cases in this study: Rep. Wes Cooley $4.5 million (adjusted), Rep. Randy Cunningham
$1.9 million (adjusted)
***defined here as Alternatives to Incarceration (ATI)

TABLE A.9: Measurement Scales – Severity of Punishment, Loss of Power
BINARY SCALE - CRJ PUNISHMENT
Severity of Punishment*
Severely punished = 15.4% of the dataset
BINARY SCALE - POLITICAL PUNISHMENT
Loss of Power**

Non-severe
115

Severe
21

No LOP
24

LOP
112

Lost power = 82.4% of dataset
* Financial penalties have been adjusted using a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator, see Table TA.7
** includes:
Resigned
Presumed to be involuntary
Excluded
Congress prevents a MOC from taking his or her seat
Removed
A MOC is removed from office pending appeal
Expelled
A MOC is permanently removed from office by Congress
Deported
Ohio Rep. Clarence Vallandigham was deported by President Lincoln
Lost next election/primary
MOC lost an election due to an indictment or conviction
Did not run in next election
MOC reelection abnegation in the next primary or election due to an indictment or conviction
The lesser punishments have been removed from the analysis: loss of Institutional Integrity position (Speaker, leader, etc.) loss of
committee position (chair, vice chair), loss of seniority, loss of party position (Conference chair, etc.) censure and reprimand, as
insufficiently consequential.

TABLE A.10: PUNISHMENT GROUP FREQUENCIES WITH CUT POINTS
Statistics
PRISON
N

Valid

ATI

136

136

136

0

0

0

10

.00

$0.00

.00

20

.00

$0.00

.00

30

.00

$0.00

.00

40

.00

$0.00

.00

50

.00

$0.00

.00

60

1.00

$0.00

.00

70

6.90

$468.98

.00

80

14.60

$20,834.94

.00

90

24.00

$48,674.10

12.00

Missing
Percentiles

FINESADJ

136

TABLE A.11: PARTY AT TIME OF ACCUSATION
PARTY
Democrats
Republicans
Other

# MOCS
76
55
5

%
55.9
40.4
3.7
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TABLE A.12: CRIME TYPES
CRIME
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

EXPRESSIVE

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

25

18.4

18.4

18.4

INSTRUMENTAL

111

81.6

81.6

100.0

Total

136

100.0

100.0

TABLE A.13a: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Statistics
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Std. Deviation

PARTY

YEARPUN

MAJMIN

TENACCUS

ACCUS1974

POLAR2

MPUS

CRIME

SOC

136

133

136

136

136

111

130

136

135

0

3

0

0

0

25

6

0

1

.57

1955.34

.71

10.24

.57

.64838

83.04253

.82

2.44

.497

52.088

.454

8.552

.496

.185790

16.168556

.389

.779

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

TABLE A.13b: CONVICTION BY % PARTY WITH LOP
CONVICTION BY % PARTY WITH LOP
TOTAL
CONVICTED
LOP
% LOP within PARTY

DEM
77
55
60
77.9%

% total
56.6%
57.3%
53.6%

OTHER
59
41
52
88.1%

% total
43.4%
42.7%
46.4%

TOTALS
136
96
112

TABLE A.14 – CHI SQUARE TEST STATISTICS OF THE QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS IVs
Test Statistics
ACCUS
PARTY MAJMIN YEARPUN TENACCUS
1974
POLAR2 MPUS CRIME
SOC
Chi-Square
2.382a
24.735a
81.286b
126.059c
2.941a
87.486d 2.862e 54.382a 50.800f
df
1
1
75
32
1
47
126
1
2
Asymp. Sig.
.123*
.000*
.290*
.000*
.086*
.000* 1.000*
.000*
.000*
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 68.0.
b. 76 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 1.8.
c. 33 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 4.1.
d. 48 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 2.3.
e. 127 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 1.0.
f. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 45.0.
*p<.05
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% of TOTAL
70.6%
82.4%

TABLE A.15a: COLLINEARITY STATISTICS FOR SOP DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Collinearity Statistics
Model
1

Tolerance >.10

VIF < 10

Party (Dem/non-Dem)

.812

1.231

Majority/Minority Status

.911

1.097

Year Punished

.313

3.199

Tenure of the Accused

.868

1.152

Accused Before/After 1974

.325

3.076

Polarization of Congress

.663

1.509

Member Party Unity Score

.866

1.154

Crime Type

.454

2.201

Seriousness of Crime

.487

2.052

(Constant)

a. Dependent Variable: SOP

TABLE A.15b: COLLINEARITY STATISTICS FOR LOP DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Collinearity Statistics
Model
1

Tolerance >.10

VIF < 10

Party (Dem/non-Dem)

.812

1.231

Majority/Minority Status

.911

1.097

Year Punished

.313

3.199

Tenure of the Accused

.868

1.152

Accused Before/After 1974

.325

3.076

Polarization of Congress

.663

1.509

Member Party Unity Score

.866

1.154

Crime Type

.454

2.201

Seriousness of Crime

.487

2.052

(Constant)

a. Dependent Variable: LOP
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TABLE A.16: BINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS – SOP MODEL
Variables in the Equation

p ≤ .10
Party
(0=non-Dem, 1=Dem)
Majority Minority Status
(0=minority, 1=majority)
Year Punished
(discrete)
Tenure of the Accused
(discrete)
Accused Before/After 1974
(0=before 1974, 1=including and after 1974)
Polarization of Congress
(continuous)
Member Party Unity Score
(continuous)
Crime Type
(0=expressive, 1=instrumental)
Seriousness of Crime
(0 = misdemeanor, 1 = low felony, 2 = high
felony)
Constant

Odds Ratio
4.692

S.E.
.832

Sig.
.063

.660

.805

.606

1.041

.023

.074

1.031

.667

.963

.461

1.134

.494

74.733

2.351

.066

1.011

.021

.601

829902207.394

8010.867

.998

1.789

.638

.362

.000

8010.989

.989

TABLE A.17: BINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS – LOP MODEL
Variables in the Equation
p ≤ .10
Odds Ratio
Party
(0=non-Dem, 1=Dem)
Majority Minority Status
(0=minority, 1=majority)
Year Punished
(discrete)
Tenure of the Accused
(discrete)
Accused Before/After 1974
(0=before 1974, 1=including and after 1974)
Polarization of Congress
(continuous)
Member Party Unity Score
(continuous)
Crime Type
(0=expressive, 1=instrumental)
Seriousness of Crime
(0 = misdemeanor, 1 = low felony, 2 = high felony)
Constant
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.190

S.E.
.754

Sig.
.028

1.163

.690

.826

1.029

.018

.117

1.111

.665

.874

.599

1.240

.679

.254

1.945

.481

1.003

.019

.878

17.922

1.038

.005

1.231

.534

.697

34.805

.112

.000

TABLE A.19: RELIABILITY TEST – CRONBACH’S ALPHA
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Cronbach's

Standardized

Alpha

Items
.151

N of Items
.281

9

TABLE A.20 – YEAR ACCUSED 1958-2015
LASTNAME
Grimm
Crapo
Filner
Radel
Jackson, Jr.
Fosella
Craig
Renzi
Stevens
Foley
Jefferson
Kennedy
Ney
Brady
Cunningham
Delay
Ballance
Janklow
Sherwood
Traficant
Cooley
Fauntroy
Tucker III
Perkins
Reynolds
Rostenkowski
Murphy
Bustamante
Hubbard
Kim
Kolter
Mavroules
McDade
Smith
Oakar

FIRSTNAME
Michael
Mike
Bob
Trey
Jesse
Vito
Larry
Rick
Ted
Mark
William J.
Patrick J.
Robert
Kevin
Randy (Duke)
Tom
Frank
William
Don
James
Wes
Walter
Walter
Carl C
Mel
Dan
Austin
Albert
Carroll
Jay
Joseph
Nicholas
Joseph
Larry
Mary Rose

YEARACCUS
2014
2013
2013
2013
2012
2008
2007
2007
2007
2006
2006
2006
2006
2005
2005
2005
2004
2004
2004
2001
1996
1995
1995
1994
1994
1994
1993
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1991
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PARTY
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat

STATE
NY
ID
CA
FL
IL
NY
ID
AZ
AK
FL
LA
RI
OH
TX
CA
TX
NC
SD
PA
OH
OR
DC
CA
KY
IL
IL
PA
TX
KY
CA
PA
MA
PA
FL
OH

Durenburger
Flake
Lukens
Wright
Swindall
Biaggi
Kleczka
Fiedler
Gonzalez
Hansen
Stokes
Andrews
Hinson
Jenrette
Kelly
Murphy
Myers
Thompson
Williams
Wilson
Wilson
Clark
Leach, Jr.
Lederer
Burke
Diggs, Jr.
Eilberg
Flood
Garmartz
Richmond
Tonry
Hastings
Hays
Horton
Howe
Jones
Waggoner
Helstoski
Gurney
Hanna
Passman
Brasco
Podell
Whalley
Gallagher
Dowdy
McKneally
Brewster

David
Floyd
Donald ("Bud")
James
Pat
Mario
Gerald
Bobbi
Henry B.
George V.
Louis
Ike
John
John
Richard
John M.
Michael
Frank
Harrison A.
Charles H.
Charles N.
Frank M.
Anthony C.
Raymond
Herbert
Charles C.
Joshua
Dan
Edward A.
Fred
Richard A.
James F.
Wayne
Frank
Allan
James R.
Joseph D.
Henry
Edward
Richard T.
Otto
Frank
Bertram L.
J. Irving
Cornelius
John V.
Martin B.
Daniel

Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat

1990
1990
1989
1989
1988
1987
1987
1986
1986
1984
1983
1982
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1979
1979
1979
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1977
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1975
1974
1974
1974
1973
1973
1973
1972
1971
1970
1968
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MN
NY
OH
TX
GA
NY
WI
CA
TX
ID
OH
NC
MS
SC
FL
NY
PA
NJ
NJ
CA
TX
PA
LA
PA
FL
MI
PA
PA
MD
NY
LA
NY
OH
NY
UT
OK
LA
NJ
FL
CA
LA
NY
NY
PA
NJ
TX
NY
MD

Boykin
Johnson
Powell, Jr.

Frank W.
Thomas F.
Adam Clayton

Democrat
Democrat
Democrat

1963
1962
1958

AL
MD
NY

TABLE A.21 – LOP AND PUBLIC TRUST2
Variables in the Equation
Sig.
Step

1a

Exp(B)

PUBLIC TRUST2

.999

26056045.852

Constant

.000

62.000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: PUBLIC TRUST2.

TABLE A.22: FREQUENCIES: LOP WITH MAJ/MIN AND POLAR3
Categorical Variables Codings
Parameter coding
Frequency
Majority Minority Status

Polarization of Congress

(1)

Minority

30

1.000

Majority

80

.000

Low Polarization

31

1.000

High Polarization

79

.000

TABLE A.23: BINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION - LOP WITH POLAR3 AND
MAJMIN
Variables in the Equation
df
Step 1a

Sig.

Exp(B)

S.E.

Majority Minority Status

1

.480

1.455

.530

Polarization of Congress

1

.876

1.089

.546

Constant

1

.073

3.061

.625

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MAJMIN, POLAR3.
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TABLE A.24 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS CHART OF MAJ/MIN AND POLAR3
MAJ
High
Polarization
Severe
punishment
Non-severe
punishment
Low
Polarization
Severe
punishment
Non-severe
punishment

54

TOT

80
121 total

MIN
25

54

100.0%

6

17.1%

0

0.0%

29

82.9%

26

5
2

7.7%

0

0.0%

24

92.3%

5

100.0%

66.1%

30

33.9%

TABLE A.25a: SOP CLASSIFICATION TABLE a,b

Step 0

Predicted
SOP
OTHER
SEVERE
114
0
21
0

Observed
SOP
OTHER
SEVERE
Overall Percentage

Percentage
Correct
100.0
.0
84.4

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

TABLE A.25b: SOC CATEGORICAL VARIABLES
CODINGS
SOC

M
F-LO
F-HI

Frequency
24
27
85

(1)
1.000
.000
.000

Parameter coding
(2)
.000
1.000
.000

TABLE A.26 – LITERATURE, SCANDALS AND CASES USED FOR THE INITIAL
CONCEPT CATEGORIES
Scandal/Case

ABSCAM

Case of Sen. David
Durenberger

Scandal/Case Initial
Conceptual
Category*
Public Trust
Corruption
Institutional Integrity

Public Trust
Corruption

Accused Members

Member CRJ
Punishment

Member Political
Punishment

Rep. Richard Kelly
Rep. Michael Myers
Rep. Frank Thompson
Rep. John Jenrette
Rep. Raymond Lederer
Rep. John M. Murphy
Sen. Harrison Williams
Sem. David
Durenberger

Prison
Prison, fines
Prison
Prison
Prison, fines
Prison, fines
Prison, fines
Fines

Lost election
Expelled
Resigned
Resigned
Resigned
Lost election
Resigned
Did not run
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Case of Rep.
George Hanson
Case of Rep.
William Janklow
Credit Mobilier

Status

Rep. George Hanson

Prison

Lost election

Status

Rep. William Janklow

Jail, Fines

Resigned

House Post Office

Corruption
Public Trust
Status
Corruption
Retribution
Loss of Power
Institutional Integrity

Keating 5

Corruption

Rep. Oakes Ames
Rep. James Brooks
Rep. Bud Lukens
Rep. Carl C. Perkins
Rep. Carroll Hubbard
Rep. Mary Rose Oakar
Rep. Dan Rostenkowski
Rep. Joseph Kolter
Sen. Donald Riegle
Sen. John McCain
Sen. John Glenn
Sen. Alan Cranston
Sen. Dennis DeConcini
Rep. Otto Passman
Rep. Richard T. Hanna
Sen. John Mitchell
Rep. John N. Williamson

House Banking

Koreagate

Corruption
Institutional Integrity
Oregon Land Fraud Corruption
Loss of Power
Paschall comments Corruption
Public Trust
Retribution
Pew Research
Public Trust
Institutional Integrity
Watergate
Public Trust
Wedtech
Corruption
Rep. Mario Biaggi
Status
Rep. Robert Garcia
*per scandal not for the listed member accused

Prison, fines
Prison, fines,
ATI
Fines, ATI
Prison, fines
Prison, fines

Prison, fines
Fines

Censured
Censured
Resigned
Did not run
Lost election
Lost election
Lost election
Lost election
Criticized by the Senate
Criticized by the Senate
Criticized by the Senate
Reprimanded, did not run
Criticized by the Senate
Lost election
Resigned
Did not run

Prison, fines
None (appeal)

Resigned
Resigned

TABLE A.27: CONTENT ANALYSIS - INITIAL NON-PROBABILITY CATEGORIES
CATEGORY
Violation of Public Trust
Retribution
Institutional Integrity
Loss of Power
Status
Corruption

DEFINITION
Offending the electorate
Offenders’ punishment
Protection of the institutional integrity of Congress
Political incapacitation, removal from Congress
The socio-economic status of those in high positions
Acts and behavior that violate legal norms

TABLE A.28: FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CONTENT ANALYSIS
The purpose of this process is to “identify the intentions, focus or communication trends of an
individual, group or Institutional Integrity.” The content analysis used in this study is more of a
conceptual analysis, which suggests that “a concept is chosen for examination and the analysis
involves quantifying and counting its presence.” The purpose is “to examine the occurrence of
selected terms in the data” and to explain explicit and implicit terms. A conceptual analysis
processes a volume of text into “manageable content categories” a process called “selective
reduction” (Columba University, n.d.). The idea is to take text, develop a concept, then convert
it to a category (Corbin and Strauss, 2003). Stakeholder judgments may be stated or inferred.
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One of the limitations of this analysis is that some of the text seems to imply more than one
category, but one was chosen based on the researcher’s perception of the intent of the comment.
The researcher had a better understanding and more knowledge of the background of the cases,
and the coders did not, thus they were more sometimes challenged in trying to choose the most
appropriate categories for the sample of text.
TABLE A.29 – EXPLANATION OF FINAL CODING ANALYSIS COLUMNS
Column Label
A
#
B

#

C
D
E
F

MOC
Stakeholder
MOC Party
MOC MAJ/MIN

G
H

Comments Pre/PostConviction
Stakeholders Roles

I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R

Comment Date
Attribute
Key
Comment
Coder 1 Primary
Coder 1 Secondary
Coder 1 Comments
Coder 2 Primary
Coder 2 Secondary
Coder 2 Comments

Explanation
The identification number for that comment in the full
list
The identification number for that comment for that
MOC
The name of the MOC that is this content analysis
The name of the stakeholder who made the comment
Political party of the MOC – Democrat or Republican
Whether the MOC was in the majority or minority in
Congress at the time of accusation
Whether or not the stakeholder comment was made
before or after the date of the MOC’s conviction
The role of the stakeholder such as judge, prosecutor,
Member of Congress
Date comment was recorded in the source
The category attributed to the comment – the coding
The numeric coding of the category (1, 2 or 3)
The comment made
Coder 1’s primary coding choice
Coder 1’s secondary coding choice
A place for Coder 1’s comments, if any
Coder 2’s primary coding choice
Coder 2’s secondary coding choice
A place for Coder s’s comments, if any

TABLE TA.30 – FINAL CODING ANALYSIS
(see the Technical Appendix)
TABLE A.31 - FACTOR ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component

Total

% of Variance

Cumulative %

1

1.218

40.586

40.586

2

1.024

34.138

74.724

3

.758

25.276

100.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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A factor analysis was used to deduce the most punished MOCS to help determine which member
cases should be used for the content analysis. Factor analysis is a “statistical technique applied
to a single set of variables when the researcher is interested in discovering which variables in the
set form coherent subsets that are relatively independent of one another” (Tabachnik & Fidel,
2001, p.582). Factor analysis is typically used to combine sub-measures into a single score, in
this case to determine the sub-measures of criminal justice punishment. The analysis produced
three combined categories: PRISON (prison and jail), FINESADJ (fines adjusted for time, see
Table TA.7a) and ATI (alternatives to incarceration such as probation and community service).
The factor analysis produced new SOP continuous variables (labeled SOPFAC1-2, SOPFAC22). New columns were added in SPSS for these combined values as shown in Table TA.7.
The factor analysis suggests that the three combined punishment types organize well into the
three categories shown. The first two eigenvalues suggest that these categories load strongly on
a new factor and account for most of the variance. The low alpha (see Table 19) seems to suggest
that the 3 punishment categories should be maintained and that they are not measuring the same
thing. The analysis shows that the eigenvalues for the first dimension, prison, and the second
dimension, fines, are high and account for most of the variance. The third factor, ATI, is lower
and does not load on the other factors. Given the variables, and the operative criminal justice
theory used, this could mean that prisons and fines are more of a deterrent factor than ATI and
produce more severe punishments. Certainly, the small sample size affects the factor analysis.
Given the small sample sizes it made more empirical sense to aggregate the data into fewer
punishment categories, from the original five to three. The data for the new SOP variables are
not used in this content analysis but are here for information purposes.
Based on the eigenvalues the punishments load heavily on the first two components (PRISON,
FINES) and, using those values, a frequency analysis (see Table A.10) shows the cut points
based on 10 percentiles. The frequencies of the three combined categories were analyzed to
determine the most severely punished MOCS. Based on the results shown in the table below
using the 10 percentile cut points the results for most severe punishments are:
Punishment
Prison
Fines
ATI

90th percentile thresholds
24.00 months
$48,739.80
(but not used as ATI is not considered a “severe”
punishment)
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TABLE A.32 – MOST SEVERELY PUNISHED MOCS

LAST NAME
Balance
Biaggi
Brasco
Bustamante
Clark
Cooley
Cunningham
Gallagher
Hubbard
Jackson, Jr.
Jefferson
Langley
Lukens
Mitchell
Renzi
Reynolds
Rostenkowski
Thompson
Traficant
Tucker III
Williams

FIRST NAME
Frank
Mario
Frank
Albert
Frank M.
Wes
Randy (Duke)
Cornelius Edward
Carroll
Jesse
William J.
John W.
Donald ("Bud")
Charles Franklin
Rick
Mel
Dan
Frank
James
Walter
Harrison A.

POSITION
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Sen.

CONGRESS
ACCUSED
108
99
92
102
93
104
108
92
102
112
109
68
100
26
109
103
103
96
106
103
96

STATE
NC
NY
NY
TX
PA
OR
CA
NJ
KY
IL
LA
KY
OH
NY
AZ
IL
IL
NJ
OH
CA
NJ

PRIME CRIME
Money laundry
Bribery
Bribery
Bribery
Tax evasion
Money laundry
Bribery
Tax evasion
Campaign funds
Wire fraud
Bribery
Bribery
Bribery
Forgery
Money laundry
Bank fraud
Mail fraud
Bribery
Bribery
Bribery
Bribery

MONTHS
PRISON
48
26
57
42
24
13
100
24
24
31
156
24
31
24
24
78
17
24
84
27
21

TABLE A.33 - CONTENT ANALYSIS - MOC AND STAKEHOLDER COUNTS
MOC CASES
Total
STAKEHOLDERS
Citizen
Legal
Political
Total
STAKEHOLDER ROLES ANALYSIS
Congressional Committees
Congressional leaders
Members of Congress
Politicians
Journalists/Academics/Authors
Lobbyists
Media
Courts
Judges
Prosecutors
Law enforcement
Combined
Politicians
Citizen stakeholders
Legal

MOC MAJORITY - MINORITY
Majority
Minority

4

18
25
32
75

Comments
9
42
74
4
19
1
12
8
7
59
18
253

Group
Politicians
Politicians
Politicians
Politicians
Citizens
Citizens
Citizens
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal

129
20
104
253

51.0%
7.9%
41.1%

1
3
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Cunningham
Traficant, Williams, Jefferson

ADJUSTED
FINES
$11,221
$834,950
$37,971
$78,082
$38,324
$4,563,300
$1,956,780
$40,037
$217,630
$0
$0
$0
$776
$0
$102,740
$0
$135,530
$0
$0
$0
$112,670

MOC PARTY
Republican
Democrat

1
3

Cunningham
Traficant, Williams, Jefferson

MOC CHAMBER
House
Senate

3
1

Cunningham, Traficant, Jefferson
Williams

CONVICTION DATES
Cunningham
Traficant
Williams
Jefferson

11/28/05
04/12/02
05/01/81
08/05/09

TABLE A.34 – DATABASES RESEARCHED FOR COMMENTS
The following 27 sources were researched for the comments:
Congressional Record
The Federal Register
Congressional ethics committee hearing records
Press releases from members of Congress
Court documents, such as sentencing memoranda
Prosecutors’ statements
New York Times database
Washington Post database
CNN
C-SPAN
PBS
Reuters
Politico
Fox News
Local media in the MOCS’ districts and states
Books, such as Katzmann (1991) and Noonan (1984)
LexisNexis
LexisNexis Academic
Congressional Misconduct Database
Index to Legal Periodicals
Congressional Misconduct Database
John Jay library databases
CUNY library databases
govtrack.us
Justia
Oyez
Court Listener
TABLE TA.35 – COMMENTS - CITATIONS REFERENCE TABLE
(see the Technical Appendix)
TABLE TA.36 - PRIMARY CODING ANALYSIS
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(see the Technical Appendix)
TABLE A.37 – CONTENT ANALYSIS - COMMENTS BY DATA RESULTS
TABLE A.37 - CONTENT ANALYSIS - COMMENTS DATA RESULTS
STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
Total

253

SOURCES COUNT
Sources
Citations

30
87

COMMENTS COUNT BY MOC
Cunningham
Traficant
Williams
Jefferson
TOTAL
PRELIMINARY ATTRIBUTES ANALYSIS
Attribute
PUBLIC TRUST
RETRIB
INSTINT
LOP
STATUS
CORRUPTION

Comments
67
89
46
51
253

Citations
24
20
16
27
87

Code
1
2
3
4
5
6

# Total
comments
36
38
85
8
12
74
253

% of total
14.2%
15.0%
33.6%
3.2%
4.7%
29.2%
100.0%

FINAL ATTRIBUTES ANALYSIS

# PostConvict

# Total
Attribute
PUBLIC TRUST (combined with Corruption)
RETRIB (combined with LOP)
INSTINT (combined with Status)

Code
comments
117
31
105
253

1
2
3

% of total
46.2%
12.3%
41.5%
100.0%

Comments
87
27
103
217

% of
total
40.1%
12.4%
47.5%
100.0%

COMMENTS PRE/POST CONVICTION
Pre-conviction
Post conviction

36
217
253

14%
86%

INTERCODER RELIABILITY RESULTS

Total Comments
Raw Score
Percentage

Coder #1
Coder #2

216
85.4%
243
96.0%
(out of 253 total comments)

MOC RESULTS BY CATEGORY
PUBLIC TRUST
RETRIB
INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY

Cunningham
33
11
10
54
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Traficant
22
1
65
88

Post Conviction Comments
Raw
Percentage
Score
183
84.3%
206
94.8%
(out of 217 total postconviction comments)
Williams
12
3
24
39

Jefferson
20
12
4
36

87
27
103
217

STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS BY
CATEGORY
Political stakeholders
Citizen stakeholders
Legal stakeholders
post-conviction results

INSTINT

PUBLIC
TRUST
37
15
35
87

RETRIB

Totals

16
7
4
27

138
30
49
217

STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS BY
CATEGORY %
Political stakeholders
Citizen stakeholders

INSTINT

RETRIB

82.5%
7.8%

PUBLIC
TRUST
42.5%
17.2%

59.3%
25.9%

Totals
63.6%
13.8%

9.7%

40.2%

14.8%

22.6%

INSTINT

PUBLIC
TRUST

RETRIB

Totals

Political stakeholders

61.6%

26.8%

11.6%

100.0%

Citizen stakeholders

26.7%

50.0%

23.3%

100.0%

Legal stakeholders

20.4%

71.4%

8.2%

100.0%

INSTINT

RETRIB

Totals

61.6%

PUBLIC
TRUST
26.8%

11.6%

100.0%

38.4%

73.2%

89.4%

100.0%

INSTINT

RETRIB

TOT

Legal stakeholders

STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS BY
STAKEHOLDER CATEGORY

STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS BY
STAKEHOLDER CATEGORY COMBINED
Political stakeholders
Non-Political stakeholders
COMMENTS COUNT TOTAL

85
8
10
103

Pol - Cong Ldr

25

PUBLIC
TRUST
15

2

42

Pol - Non Ldr

61

23

3

87

Citizen

9

16

7

32

Legal

10

63

19

63.6%
13.8%
22.6%

92
253

COMMENTS COUNT TOTAL %
Cong Ldr

60%

PUBLIC
TRUST
36%

5%

% of
STKHLDR
100%

Pol Non Ldr

70%

26%

3%

100%

Legal

28%

50%

22%

100%

Citizen

11%

68%

21%

100%

RETRIB
1

39

3

87
30

COMMENTS COUNT POST-CONVICTION

INSTINT

INSTINT

RETRIB

Pol - Cong Ldr

24

PUBLIC
TRUST
14

Pol - Non Ldr

61

23

8

15

7

10

34

17

Citizen
Legal

TOT of
STKHLDR

61
217

COMMENTS COUNT POST-CONVICTION %

INSTINT

Cong Ldr

62%

PUBLIC
TRUST
36%

Pol Non Ldr

70%

26%
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RETRIB
3%

% of
STKHLDR
100%

3%

100%

Legal

27%

50%

23%

100%

Citizen

16%

56%

28%

100%

TABLE A.38: INSTRUCTIONS TO CODERS
Briefing on the dissertation - its purpose
This study examines the punishment of U.S. federal legislators (Senators and Representatives in
Congress) for criminal acts. The legislators in this study are few in proportion to the number of
those who have served in the U.S. Congress, but their criminal acts are meaningful to the popular
perception of Congress, and those accused of crimes come from a wide array of demographics
and backgrounds.
Briefing on the qualitative chapter
This dissertation uses a qualitative research technique known as content analysis.
How a content analysis works:
Content analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words, themes, or
concepts within some given qualitative data (i.e. text). Using content analysis, researchers can
quantify and analyze the presence, meanings and relationships of such certain words, themes, or
concepts. Researchers can then make inferences about the messages within the text (Columbia
University, n.d.).
To analyze the text using content analysis, the text must be coded, or broken down, into
manageable code categories for analysis (i.e. “codes”). The categories are used to summarize the
data (the text) (Columbia University, n.d.).
How the comments were researched, collected and coded:
The comments were mainly found in sources such as court records, prosecutor statements, the
New York Times, the Washington Post and media local to the convicted Member of Congress
(MOC), as well as the Congressional Record, reports from congressional ethics committee
hearings, and other published reports. These comments were made by various stakeholders in
these cases such as congressional leaders, MOCs, journalists, politicians, constituents, judges,
prosecutors and others. The comments were collected in a spreadsheet, and identified by the
stakeholder who made the comment, the date, the source, the party of the accused MOC, and
whether or not the MOC was in the majority or minority on Congress at the time of accusation. I
then I assigned my coding.
The sample and the purpose of the categories:
The collected comments represent the sample to be studied. You will be coding all of the
comments. The categories that result from this analysis will help explain the reasons why the
stakeholders believe the MOCs in question needed to be punished. All of the MOCs about
whom comments were made were convicted and punished, all were men, and all lost their seats
in Congress by various means.
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Coding instructions:
Please use the dictionary of key words and phrases in the comments that are organized by the
three categories listed below.
In the coding spreadsheet read the comments listed in column C. For a given comment examine
the attributes (categories) listed below. Use these categories to guide your observations and enter
number 1, 2 or 3 for your choice for a particular comment for one the listed categories in column
D for coder 1 or column G for coder 2. Your first impression is probably the best. If none of the
categories seem to fit, write in a category you think is appropriate or write "no code" in your
COMMENTS column. This should take no more than 1 minute or so per comment. You may
change a code you have entered at any point before you share the final coding with me for
review. While you will not see my codes, your job is to confirm that my initial coding was
correct. This is the basis for inter-coder reliability, a key concept in content analysis.
At your option, please provide any notes and questions, if any, in the COMMENTS column,
which we will discuss. I will review your coding and will debrief you on your judgments. If your
coding is in at least 80% agreement with my coding, then we are done. If less than 80% then
coding sheet will be updated and we will conduct a second round of coding. We will again
debrief and review for at least 80% agreement.
Dictionary and definitions used in the coder spreadsheet
I coded the comments which placed them in one of the following categories based on the
definitions below:
Code #1
Public Trust (PUBLIC TRUST)
You will find words and phrases that refer to the violation of the public trust, offending voters,
angering or upsetting the public, insulting the public, and destroying or damaging the bond
between the MOC and the public.
This concept also includes all references to corruption and corrupt acts, political corruption,
misdeeds, selling the official office, bribery and other crimes.
Code #2
Retribution (RETRIB)
The category refers to words that indicate an MOC is deserving of punishment, penalties,
sentencing, must pay the price for his crimes, deserves expulsion or removal from Congress or
deserves censure by Congress.
This category also involves the MOC’s loss of power (LOP) defined as the loss of congressional
office. LOP occurs by expulsion from Congress, resignation from Congress, exclusion from
Congress, removal from Congress, loss of election or choosing not to run for reelection.
Code #3

Institutional Integrity(INSTINT)
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The phrases in this category refer to the concept of the protection of the Institutional Integrity of
Congress, offenses against Congress, the government is broken, official misconduct, an MOC
used his position for personal gain, the standards of Congress, the rules of the CONGRESS have
been violated, the code of the CONGRESS was violated, or the honor of CONGRESS was
violated.
This category also includes the concept of the status of an MOC, the highest elected legislator in
the US. The issue is that those in positions of high status deserve to be punishment as much
those in lower societal status, the fact that high position or office does not insulate someone from
punishment, that nobody is above the law, and that being in a powerful position does not exempt
someone from punishment.
Please see the coding key at the bottom of the spreadsheet.
Below are key terms for data that was replaced for the purposes of anonymization:
0000 = used for any year
CONGRESS = either the Senate or the House of Representatives
COUNTRY = for any foreign country
JUDGE = for any judge
LEADER = a leader in Congress or the Senate
MEDIA = for any media outlet or service
MOC = Member of Congress, either a Senator of Representative
PARTY = either Democrat or Republican
PERSON = someone who is not an MOC, judge, prosecutor or stakeholder
PROSECUTOR = for any persecutor
SCANDAL = for any scandal
STATE = the code used to anonymize the state mentioned
The data is in a spreadsheet with the following columns showing:
-a column with the comments
-these are in random order from the original spreadsheet which was organized by
MOC certain names, dates and data have been anonymized to remove the influence
of that information on your coding
-a column for a primary code – this is where you will enter your code number
-a column for a secondary code – in case you think there is another code that may apply
-a column for any comments – for any feedback you might think is appropriate
Take the time you need to make a considered observation but do not linger as again your first
impression is generally your best. I suggest you do the coding in one sitting.
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TABLE A.38a - CODER SHEET ANONYMIZATION OF TERMS
Replaced names of Cunningham, Traficant, Williams and Jefferson with MOC
Replaced all names of states with STATE
Names of MOCs, leaders, prosecutors, judges were replaced with descriptive terms, for example
a prosecutor’s name was replaced by PROSECUTOR
Any member of the House or Senate was replaced by the term MOC to prevent the coder from
knowing in which house of Congress the MOC served at the time of accusation
References to the House of Representatives or the House, or the Senate, were re-labeled
CONGRESS
References to Democrat and Republican were replaced with the term PARTY
Any name of a city, county or locality was replaced with CITY.
Any year was replaced by 0000
The names of any other people replaced with the term NAME.
Names of companies were replaced with COMPANY
TABLE TA.39 - CATEGORY ANALYSIS – CODER #1
(see the Technical Appendix)
TABLE TA.40 - CATEGORY ANALYSIS – CODER #2
(see the Technical Appendix)
TABLE A.41a. – SAMPLE OF COMMENTS REFERRING TO PUBLIC TRUST
COMMENT
Public trust
Fell below the standard the public demands of its elected representatives
A sad day for the people
Our government in Washington is broken
If we cannot remove a Member of Congress who has been convicted of 10
felonies, including using his office for personal gain, we risk losing the faith
and trust of the American people that we have.
The public is watching us
Unparalleled corruption
Public corruption is a cancer on this country, and it needs to be revealed,
prosecuted and punished….
Stunning betrayal of the public trust
Erected a "for sale" sign upon our nation's capital.
Naked avarice that animated MOC’s corruption
He broke "the public trust he has built through his military and congressional
career."

155

MOC
Cunningham
Cunningham
Cunningham
Cunningham
Traficant

Traficant
Cunningham
Jefferson
Jefferson
Cunningham
Cunningham
Cunningham

TABLE A.41b. – SAMPLE OF COMMENTS REFERRING TO RETRIBUTION
COMMENT
Punishment
Should pay a serious price for his crimes
…to prevent lawmakers who have been convicted of official misconduct
from collecting taxpayer funded pensions
….appropriate sentence, which is helpful to deter others who might wish to
engage in similar conduct
Removal
Expulsion
Expel
…conduct was ethically repugnant to the point of warranting his expulsion
“….The lengthy prison sentence imposed on MOC today is a stark reminder
to all public officials that the consequences of accepting bribes can and will
be severe."
"This sentence should be a clear signal that our society will not tolerate
bribery; it’s not just another cost of doing business in government"
“There must be some kind of greed virus that attacks those in power,”
JUDGE said when he was sentencing MOC. Back then JUDGE believed
such greed warranted great punishment.
MOC’s sentence was the harshest ever handed out to a former lawmaker, but
Justice Department officials said MOC warranted such a severe sanction
because of the unprecedented scale of his corruption.
As chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, it is my
duty to ask the CHAMBER to expel the gentleman from STATE.

MOC
Jefferson
Cunningham
Cunningham
Williams
Traficant
Williams
Traficant
Williams
Jefferson

Jefferson
Jefferson

Jefferson

Traficant

TABLE A.41c. – SAMPLE OF COMMENTS REFERRING TO INSTITUTIONAL
INTEGRITY
COMMENT
Institutional Integrity
Integrity of the CHAMBER
Obligation as elected Members…..
Violated the CHAMBER rules of conduct
We are keeping our CHAMBER in order
No legislator, no matter how high his status, was exempt
What is the point at which embarrassing behavior becomes unacceptable
behavior with regard to the CHAMBER’s Institutional Integrity?
Can any other MOC imagine doing in a similar situation just what this MOC
has done?
MOC then noted that, just because MOC had not had the grace to withdraw
from the CHAMBER, "we should not perpetrate our own disgrace by asking
him to stay."
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MOC
Williams
Jefferson
Traficant
Traficant
Traficant
Williams
Williams
Williams
Williams

Our colleague has brought disrespect on his CHAMBER by his violations of
law and for that reason, he must be expelled.
And it is not easy today, my colleagues, but it is our job. It is our duty.
Uphold the integrity of this CHAMBER and vote to expel the gentleman from
STATE.
I do not think it is right, and I do not think it does this CHAMBER honor.
What my concern is what this looks like for our CHAMBER for the future
This CHAMBER is more important than any of us individually.

Traficant
Traficant

Traficant
Traficant
Traficant

TABLE A.42 - STAKEHOLDERS ROLES ANALYSIS
STAKEHOLDERS
Citizen
Legal
Political
Total

18
25
32
75

STAKEHOLDER ROLES ANALYSIS
Congressional Committees
Congressional leaders
Members of Congress
Politicians
Journalists/Academics/Authors
Lobbyists
Media
Courts
Judges
Prosecutors
Law enforcement

Comments
9
42
74
4
19
1
12
8
7
59
18
253

Combined
Politicians
Citizen stakeholders
Legal

129
20
104
253

TABLE A.43 - OPERATIONALIZED CROSS TABULATION DATA
MOC
Cunningham, Randy
Jefferson, William
Traficant, James
Williams, Harrison

PARTY
0=R, 1=D
0
1
1
1

MAJ/MIN
O=MIN, 1=MAJ
1
0
0
0
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51.0%
7.9%
41.1%

TABLE A.44 – PARTY (Dem/non-Dem) AND MAJORITY-MINORITY STATUS
CROSS TABULATION CHI SQUARE RESULTS
Cross Tabulation
Party (Dem/non-Dem) * Public Trust
Party (Dem/non-Dem) * Retribution
Party (Dem/non-Dem) * Institutional Integrity
Majority Minority Status * Public Trust
Majority Minority Status * Retribution
Majority Minority Status * Institutional Integrity

Chi-Square (p=.05)
.248
.248
.505
.248
.248
.505

TABLE TA.45 – MAJOR POLITICAL SCANDALS
(see the Technical Appendix)
TABLE TA.46 – POLITICAL STAKEHOLDERS COMMENTS COUNTS
(see Technical Appendix)
TABLE TA.47 – LEGAL STAKEHOLDERS COMMENTS COUNTS
(see Technical Appendix)
TABLE A.48 - CHI SQUARE RESULTS
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
H1a: Stakeholder Politician Majority * Institutional Integrity
H1b: Stakeholder Politician Majority * Public Trust
H2a: Stakeholder Politician Minority * Institutional Integrity
H2b: Stakeholder Politician Minority * Public Trust

Missing

Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

129

58.4%

92

41.6%

221

100.0%

129

58.4%

92

41.6%

221

100.0%

129

58.4%

92

41.6%

221

100.0%

129

58.4%

92

41.6%

221

100.0%

Stakeholder Politician Majority * Institutional Integrity

Crosstab
INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
Non Institutional Institutional
Integrity
Stakeholder Politician Non

Count

Majority

Expected Count

Majority

Integrity

Total

16

41

57

19.0

38.0

57.0

28.1%

71.9%

100.0%

% within Institutional Integrity

37.2%

47.7%

44.2%

% of Total

12.4%

31.8%

44.2%

% within Stakeholder Politician
Majority
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Majority

Count

27

45

72

24.0

48.0

72.0

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

% within Institutional Integrity

62.8%

52.3%

55.8%

% of Total

20.9%

34.9%

55.8%

43

86

129

43.0

86.0

129.0

33.3%

66.7%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

33.3%

66.7%

100.0%

Expected Count
% within Stakeholder Politician
Majority

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Stakeholder Politician
Majority
% within Institutional Integrity
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests

Value
Pearson Chi-Square

df

1.273a

1

.259

.884

1

.347

1.283

1

.257

1.263

1

.261

Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

Asymptotic
Significance (2sided)

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

129

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Stakeholder Politician Majority * Public Trust

Crosstab
PUBLIC TRUST
NON-PUBLIC
PUBLIC
TRUST
TRUST
Stakeholder

Non-Majority

Count

Total

44

13

57

40.2

16.8

57.0

77.2%

22.8%

100.0%

% within Public Trust

48.4%

34.2%

44.2%

% of Total

34.1%

10.1%

44.2%

47

25

72

50.8

21.2

72.0

Politician

Expected Count

Majority

% within Stakeholder
Politician Majority

Majority

Count
Expected Count
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% within Stakeholder

65.3%

34.7%

100.0%

% within Public Trust

51.6%

65.8%

55.8%

% of Total

36.4%

19.4%

55.8%

91

38

129

91.0

38.0

129.0

70.5%

29.5%

100.0%

100.0%
70.5%

100.0%
29.5%

100.0%
100.0%

Politician Majority

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Stakeholder
Politician Majority
% within PUBLIC TRUST
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests

Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity

Correctionb

Likelihood Ratio

Asymptotic
Significance (2sided)

df

2.174a

1

.140

1.638

1

.201

2.206

1

.137

2.157

1

.142

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

129

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.79.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Stakeholder Politician Minority* Institutional Integrity

Crosstab
Institutional Integrity
Non-Institutional
Institutional
Integrity
Integrity
Stakeholder

Non-Minority Count

Politician Minority

Expected Count
% within Stakeholder

Total

27

45

72

24.0

48.0

72.0

37.5%

62.5%

100.0%

62.8%

52.3%

55.8%

20.9%

34.9%

55.8%

16

41

57

19.0

38.0

57.0

28.1%

71.9%

100.0%

Politician Minority
% within Institutional
Integrity
% of Total
Minority

Count
Expected Count
% within Stakeholder
Politician Minority

160

% within Institutional

37.2%

47.7%

44.2%

12.4%

31.8%

44.2%

43

86

129

43.0

86.0

129.0

33.3%

66.7%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

33.3%

66.7%

100.0%

Integrity
% of Total
Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Stakeholder
Politician Minority
% within Institutional
Integrity
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests

Value
Pearson Chi-Square

df

1.273a

1

.259

.884

1

.347

1.283

1

.257

Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

Asymptotic
Significance
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Fisher's Exact Test

Exact Sig. (1-sided)

.347

Linear-by-Linear Association

1.263

N of Valid Cases

1

.174

.261

129

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Stakeholder Politician Minority* Public Trust

Crosstab
Public Trust
Non-Public Trust
Public Trust
Stakeholder

Non-Minority

Count

Total

47

25

72

50.8

21.2

72.0

65.3%

34.7%

100.0%

% within Public Trust

51.6%

65.8%

55.8%

% of Total

36.4%

19.4%

55.8%

44

13

57

40.2

16.8

57.0

77.2%

22.8%

100.0%

% within Public Trust

48.4%

34.2%

44.2%

% of Total

34.1%

10.1%

44.2%

Politician

Expected Count

Minority

% within Stakeholder
Politician Minority

Minority

Count
Expected Count
% within Stakeholder
Politician Minority

161

Total

Count

91

38

129

91.0

38.0

129.0

70.5%

29.5%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

70.5%

29.5%

100.0%

Expected Count
% within Stakeholder
Politician Minority
% within Public Trust
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance (2sided)

df

2.174a

1

.140

Continuity Correctionb

1.638

1

.201

Likelihood Ratio

2.206

1

.137

2.157

1

.142

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association

N of Valid Cases
129
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.79.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

H3: Stakeholder Politician * Institutional Integrity
H4: Stakeholder Politician * Public Trust
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Missing
N
Percent

Valid
N
Stakeholder Legal *

Percent

Total
Percent

N

220

99.5%

1

0.5%

221

100.0%

220

99.5%

1

0.5%

221

100.0%

Institutional Integrity
Stakeholder Legal * Public
Trust

Stakeholder Legal * Institutional Integrity

Crosstab
INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
NONINSTITUTIO
INSTITUTIONAL
NAL
INTEGRITY
INTEGRITY
Stakeholder

Non-Stakeholder Count

Legal

Legal
Expected Count

162

Total

42

86

128

72.1

55.9

128.0

% within Stakeholder

32.8%

67.2%

100.0%

33.9%

89.6%

58.2%

19.1%

39.1%

58.2%

82

10

92

51.9

40.1

92.0

89.1%

10.9%

100.0%

66.1%

10.4%

41.8%

37.3%

4.5%

41.8%

124

96

220

124.0

96.0

220.0

56.4%

43.6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

56.4%

43.6%

100.0%

Legal
% within Institutional
Integrity
% of Total
Stakeholder

Count

Legal

Expected Count
% within Stakeholder
Legal
% within Institutional
Integrity
% of Total

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Stakeholder
Legal
% within Institutional
Integrity
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance (2sided)

df

69.027a

1

.000

Continuity Correctionb

66.756

1

.000

Likelihood Ratio

76.148

1

.000

68.714

1

.000

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association

N of Valid Cases
220
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40.15.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Stakeholder Legal * Public Trust

Crosstab
PUBLIC TRUST
NON-PUBLIC
PUBLIC
TRUST
TRUST
Stakeholder

Non-Stakeholder Count

Legal

Legal

Expected Count
% within Stakeholder Legal

163

Total

91

37

128

69.8

58.2

128.0

71.1%

28.9%

100.0%

% within Public Trust

75.8%

37.0%

58.2%

% of Total

41.4%

16.8%

58.2%

29

63

92

50.2

41.8

92.0

% within Stakeholder Legal

31.5%

68.5%

100.0%

% within Public Trust

24.2%

63.0%

41.8%

% of Total

13.2%

28.6%

41.8%

120

100

220

120.0

100.0

220.0

54.5%

45.5%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

54.5%

45.5%

100.0%

Stakeholder

Count

Legal

Expected Count

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Stakeholder Legal
% within Public Trust
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests

Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity

Correctionb

Likelihood Ratio

Asymptotic
Significance (2sided)

df

33.808a

1

.000

32.230

1

.000

34.558

1

.000

33.654

1

.000

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association

N of Valid Cases
220
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.82.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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